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THE OPEN COVID PLEDGE:
DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION AND PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT
OF AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMMONS
Jorge L. Contreras*
Abstract
Early during the COVID-19 pandemic, a number of widely publicized
incidents gave rise to concerns that holders of patents and other
intellectual property (IP) rights could hinder the development,
manufacture, and distribution of essential medical devices, protective
equipment, and biomedical products. The global response to these
concerns was swift and included the issuance of compulsory licensing
orders by several national governments, as well as the proposal of a
technology pool by the World Health Organization (WHO). Alongside
these efforts, a group of scientific, engineering, and legal experts created
a lightweight, open framework under which IP holders could voluntarily
pledge not to assert their rights against those responding to the COVID19 pandemic. This effort—known as the Open COVID Pledge (OCP)—
attracted significant participation from some of the world’s largest IP
holders, with nearly 500,000 patents and patent applications, as well as
significant copyrighted material, pledged to date. The OCP has also been
adopted as part of the framework of the WHO’s COVID Technology
Access Pool (C-TAP), a multinational initiative to make particular
biomedical innovations more accessible around the world. This Article
describes the development of the OCP, including the design choices that
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shaped its legal structure and implementation. It also assesses the
adoption of the OCP across market sectors including biopharmaceuticals,
diagnostics, medical devices, protective equipment, and digital
innovations. It finds that while pledges in the biopharmaceutical sector
have been infrequent, many other critical technologies in the fight against
COVID-19 have been made broadly available to users through this and
related pledging mechanisms, creating a favorable environment for open
innovation, new market entry, and equitable access to technology. As such,
the OCP may both help to address the current pandemic and serve as a
useful model for IP sharing platforms to address future public health
emergencies.
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INTRODUCTION
On December 31, 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) office in
Beijing was notified that a cluster of idiopathic pneumonia cases had been diagnosed
in Wuhan, a medium-sized city located in the central Chinese province of Hubei.1
On January 9, 2020, the WHO announced that the source of the infection was a novel
coronavirus,2 subsequently designated SARS-CoV-2. On January 30, with nearly
8,000 confirmed cases in China and 100 elsewhere, the WHO characterized the
outbreak as a public health emergency of international concern.3 And on March 11,
with more than 118,000 reported cases in 114 countries and 4,200 deaths worldwide,
the Director-General of the WHO declared that “COVID-19 can be characterized as
a pandemic.”4
The international biomedical research community mobilized rapidly in
response to the escalating crisis. Concerns about patents arose just as quickly. Many
potential vaccines, diagnostics, and treatments for COVID-19 were originally
targeted at related diseases including malaria, hepatitis C, influenza, Marburg virus,
Ebola, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS), and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).5 Many of these
1

Pneumonia of Unknown Cause–China, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 5, 2020),
https://www.who.int/csr/don/05-january-2020-pneumonia-of-unkown-cause-china/en/
[https://perma.cc/C733-3UNA].
2
World Health Org., WHO Statement Regarding Cluster of Pneumonia Cases in
Wuhan, China (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.who.int/china/news/detail/09-01-2020-whostatement-regarding-cluster-of-pneumonia-cases-in-wuhan-china [https://perma.cc/UXA2QNKF].
3
Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO Dir.-Gen., Statement on IHR Emergency
Committee on Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.who.int/direct
or-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-statement-on-ihr-emergency-committeeon-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov) [https://perma.cc/B9QQ-6Q7C].
4
Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO Director-General, Opening Remarks at the
Media Briefing on COVID-19 (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/directorgeneral/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-oncovid-19---11-march-2020 [https://perma.cc/DT4G-J5YH].
5
Cynthia Liu, Qiongqiong Zhou, Yingzhu Li, Linda V. Garner, Steve P. Watkins,
Linda J. Carter, Jeffrey Smoot, Anne C. Gregg, Angela D. Daniels, Susan Jervey & Dana
Albaiu, Research and Development on Therapeutic Agents and Vaccines for COVID-19 and

2021]

THE OPEN COVID PLEDGE

837

compounds were covered by existing patents and patent applications. One March
2020 study by the American Chemical Society identified over 2,000 patents relating
to SARS and MERS treatments alone.6 These patents were held by a range of
companies and institutions across North America, Asia, and Europe. Another study
identified over 120 different entities holding patents covering diagnostic tests
relevant to COVID-19.7 In addition to these biochemical patents, researchers
identified a large number of patents covering the manufacture, operation, and
components of devices and equipment used to treat the symptoms of COVID-19 and
to monitor and contain its spread, including respirators, ventilators, diagnostic kits,
facial masks, algorithms, mobile apps, and the like.8 Some began to view this
sizeable body of patents as a potential impediment to research, development,
manufacture, and distribution of critical supplies, products, and equipment.9
Then, early in the pandemic, a number of high-profile incidents involving
patents galvanized concern over these issues. For example:
•

In February 2020, the Wuhan Institute of Virology announced that it had
filed a patent application claiming the use of Gilead Sciences’ experimental
antiviral drug remdesivir to treat COVID-19.10 The announcement caused
significant controversy, given that the Wuhan Institute did not develop the
drug and its effectiveness against COVID-19 was still unproven.11 Gilead’s
own patents on the drug also caused controversy, prompting thirty state
attorneys general to request that the NIH exercise its march-in rights under

Related Human Coronavirus Diseases, 6 ACS CENT. SCI. 315, 318–21 (2020),
https://dx.doi.org/10.1021/acscentsci.0c00272 [https://perma.cc/3D4E-9PF7].
6
Id.; see also Patents–Coronaviruses, 38 NATURE BIOTECH. 695, 695 (2020)
(identifying patents related to vaccines and methods of treatment of coronaviruses).
7
SAGACIOUS IP, LIST OF COMPANIES: DIAGNOSTICS/TESTING KITS FOR CORONAVIRUS
(2020) (on file with author).
8
Frank Tietze, Pratheeba Vimalnath, Leonidas Aristodemou & Jenny Molloy, CrisisCritical Intellectual Property: Findings from the COVID-19 Pandemic, IEEE
TRANSACTIONS ENG’G MGMT. 6–9 (2020), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9120047
[https://perma.cc/YT6Y-39T8].
9
See generally id.; Frederick M. Abbot & Jerome H. Reichman, Facilitating Access to
Cross-Border Supplies of Patented Pharmaceuticals: The Case of the COVID-19 Pandemic,
23 J. INT’L ECON. L. 535 (2020).
10
Jacob Schindler, Wuhan Lab Says It Will Seek Patent Protection of Gilead Antiviral,
INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.iam-media.com/coronavirus/wuhan-labsays-it-will-seek-patent-protection-of-gilead-antiviral [https://perma.cc/KGZ6-XCW3].
11
See id.; Enrico Bonadio & Andrea Baldini, COVID-19, Patents and the NeverEnding Tension Between Proprietary Rights and the Protection of Public Health, 11 EUR. J.
RISK REGL. 390, 390 (2020).
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the Bayh-Dole Act12 to authorize additional manufacturers to meet
predicted demand for the drug.13
•

In March 2020, two engineers in Brescia, Italy, a region that was
particularly hard-hit by the pandemic, used a desktop 3D printer to
fabricate replacement valves for more than a hundred ventilator machines
used at a local hospital.14 Early news reports claimed that a ventilator
manufacturer threatened to sue the engineers for infringing patents
covering the valves.15 While the existence of the threat and the patents
themselves remains murky, the incident sparked a flurry of commentary
regarding the risks that volunteers and hospitals could face from patents.16

•

Later in March, patent assertion entity (PAE) Labrador Diagnostics sued
French firm bioMérieux and its Utah-based subsidiary BioFire Diagnostics
for patent infringement. Labrador alleged that diagnostic kits being
developed for COVID-19 infringed patents it had acquired from defunct
blood testing company Theranos.17 News of the lawsuit sparked a wave of
negative publicity that quickly persuaded Labrador’s parent company,

12

See Section I.B.2 (discussing march-in rights under the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980).
Letter from California Attorney General Xavier Becerra et al., to Alex M. Azar,
Sec’y, HHS, Dr. Francis S. Collins, Dir., NIH, & Stephen Hahn, Comm’r, FDA (Aug. 4,
2020) (on file with author) (“Gilead is unable to assure a supply of remdesivir sufficient to
alleviate the health and safety needs of the country amid this pandemic. Its supply is
dangerously limited and its recent announcement of high prices for all patients, governments,
and insurers will impede access to treatment in the U.S. and further strain state budgets.”).
14
Cristian Fracassi & Alessandro Romaioli, Opinion, We Made Copies of Ventilator
Parts to Help Hospitals Fight Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2020), https://www.ny
times.com/2020/03/22/opinion/ventilators-coronavirus-italy.html [https://perma.cc/G6LUXEKN].
15
Jay Peters, Volunteers Produce 3D-Printed Valves for Life-Saving Coronavirus
Treatments, VERGE (Mar. 18, 2020, 5:30 PM ET), https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/17/21
184308/coronavirus-italy-medical-3d-print-valves-treatments
[https://perma.cc/ZVD8DYGN] (reporting that one person involved recounted, “Let’s say the risk to be sued exists
since they bypassed a patent”).
16
See Lucas Osborn, 3D Printing, Patent Infringement, and the Coronavirus,
PATENTLY-O BLOG (Mar. 19, 2020), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2020/03/printinginfringement-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/4RXJ-YY3Y]. There are numerous other
issues arising from unauthorized attempts to repair medical equipment, including ventilators.
These include tight manufacturer controls on copyrighted service manuals and locked control
software. See Jason Koebler, Hospitals Need to Repair Ventilators. Manufacturers Are
Making That Impossible, VICE (Mar. 18, 2020, 8:15 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/art
icle/wxekgx/hospitals-need-to-repair-ventilators-manufacturers-are-making-that-impossible
[https://perma.cc/LJP4-AVZZ].
17
Labrador Diagnostics LLC v. BioFire Diagnostics, LLC, & bioMérieux S.A., No.
1:20-cv-00348, at *6–61 (D. Del. filed Mar. 9, 2020).
13
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Fortress Investments, to end the lawsuit and offer royalty-free licenses to
anyone conducting COVID-19 testing.18
•

On April 1, Kentucky governor Andy Beshear publicly called on 3M
Corporation to grant broad access to more than 400 patents covering “N95”
respirators used by healthcare workers and other individuals at high risk of
infection.19 Beshear was responding to severe shortages of such protective
equipment in his state, which he and others attributed to patents that
prevented firms other than 3M from manufacturing them.20 He is reported
to have urged 3M to license its patents to “the nation” as its “patriotic duty”
in a time of national crisis.21

•

Beginning in April, another PAE, Swirlate IP, brought patent infringement
suits against more than a dozen manufacturers of products including
ventilators and blood glucose monitors.22 The asserted patent covered
wireless communications technology and was originally owned by
Panasonic.23

•

In July, Vancouver-based AbCellera Biologics sued rival Berkeley Lights
for the infringement of eight patents originally issued to the University of
British Columbia.24 In the suit, AbCellera sought an injunction to prevent

18

Craig Clough, Fortress Offers IP Rights to Fight COVID-19 After Backlash, LAW360
(Mar. 17, 2020, 5:14 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com/articles/1254102/fortress-offersip-rights-to-fight-covid-19-after-backlash [https://perma.cc/LA5A-2QQ5].
19
See Health Systems Editorial Team, The Netherlands Joins COVID-19 IP Pool
Initiative; Kentucky Governor Requests 3M Release N95 Patent, HEALTH POL’Y WATCH
(Apr. 8, 2020), https://healthpolicy-watch.news/the-netherlands-joins-covid-19-ip-poolinitiative-kentucky-governor-requests-3m-release-n95-patent/
[https://perma.cc/QAL58EVJ].
20
Clough, supra note 18.
21
Id.
22
See Patroll/Contests/Contest Swirlate IP LLC—US 7,567,622 (Wireless
Communication Systems), UNIFIED PATENTS, https://patroll.unifiedpatents.com/contests/cK
FKWRAAwqyiM2y5o [https://perma.cc/PE5V-K2KR] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021)
[hereinafter Contest Swirlate IP LLC]; Joe Mullin, New Low for a Bad Patent: Patent Troll
Sues Ventilator Company, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (May 20, 2020), https://www.eff.org/dee
plinks/2020/05/new-low-bad-patent-patent-troll-sues-ventilator-company [https://perma.cc/
64ZD-F3FJ].
23
See Contest Swirlate IP LLC, supra note 22.
24
See generally AbCellera Biologics Inc. v. Berkeley Lights, Inc., No. 1:99MC09999,
2020 WL 3956700 (D. Del. filed July 9, 2020). Four additional patents were added to the
suit in August. Christopher Yasiejko, After Stock Surges, Covid Antibody Seeker Faces
Patent Threat, BLOOMBERG LAW (Aug. 26, 2020, 1:15 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com
/ip-law/high-flying-covid-antibody-seeker-faces-growing-patent-threat [https://perma.cc/A
Z6B-TUPF].
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Berkeley from selling its Beacon Optofluidic System, which is being used
for the discovery and development of antibodies against COVID-19.
•

From the earliest weeks of the pandemic, patents were also perceived as
hindering research efforts relating to COVID-19. As one senior molecular
biology researcher recalls:
[F]rom the first moment we started having these [COVID-19]
meetings there were discussions of patents. There were
discussions of things that we couldn’t do because they were
patented; there were discussions of things where we didn’t know
if we could do them, if they were valid things that we could use to
pursue strategies to deal with the pandemic because of patents.
And even more astonishingly to me, there were already
discussions about patenting the things that were going to happen
in these COVID labs.25

•

Finally, in the crucial area of vaccine research, it soon became apparent
that a patent “gold rush” was on. One news report in May 2020 announced,
“Virus Researchers Race to File Patents . . .”,26 long before any vaccine
candidate was close to approval. Echoing concerns over the inaccessibility
of patented vaccine technologies during the SARS and Ebola outbreaks,
the WHO urged governments and the private sector to make patents
broadly available in the fight against COVID-19.27

These examples demonstrate that the specter of patent liability and litigation
manifested itself from the early days of the pandemic in areas ranging from basic
research28 and vaccine development to the manufacture, supply, and distribution of
medical supplies and equipment.
25

Michael B. Eisen, Howard Hughes Medical Institute and University of California
Berkeley, Oral Comments at the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law Lee E.
Teitelbaum Utah Law Review Symposium: The Law & Ethics of Medical Research (Nov.
20, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zncLue0xvBg&list=PLrfMz_WZNoCYWlA
spMuf1epDV3FliajTc&index=3 [https://perma.cc/B2QP-GZCN].
26
Matthew Bultman, Virus Researchers Race to File Patents Ahead of Research
Reveal, BLOOMBERG LAW (May 15, 2020, 4:30 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/iplaw/virus-researchers-race-to-file-patents-ahead-of-research-reveal [https://perma.cc/D5CS
-Z9WP].
27
World Health Org., Solidarity Call to Action: Making the Response to COVID-19 a
Public Common Good, https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus2019/global-research-on-novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov/covid-19-technology-access-pool/
solidarity-call-to-action [https://perma.cc/MA69-KMMM] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021)
[hereinafter WHO, Solidarity Call to Action].
28
One notable area in which patents have not played a role in the COVID-19 pandemic
is genomic sequencing. The researchers that first elucidated the genomic sequence of the
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The public sector reaction to these concerns was swift and included the issuance
by a half dozen countries of compulsory licensing orders for COVID-related
biomedical technologies29 and the formation by the WHO of a COVID-19
Technology Access Pool (C-TAP).30 Voluntary efforts also emerged to address
perceived areas in which patents and other intellectual property could hinder the
response to COVID-19. Ventilator manufacturers such as Medtronic and Smiths
Group made product designs available for free over the web,31 and several large
universities and national laboratories offered to license pandemic-relevant
technologies on a royalty-free basis.32

SARS-CoV-2 virus did not seek to patent it, but instead released it in the publicly accessible
GenBank data repository. Their release of this critical data enabled the scientific community
to mobilize rapidly and conduct research on a range of diagnostic, vaccine, and therapeutic
applications based on the viral RNA sequence. See Michael A. Martin, David VanInsberghe
& Katia Koelle, Insights from SARS-CoV-2 Sequences, 371 SCIENCE 466, 466 (2021) (“More
than 260,000 [SARS-CoV-2] sequences are now available in public databases, about a year
after the viral genome was first sequenced. These sequences and their associated metadata
have allowed researchers to estimate the timing of SARS-CoV-2 spillover into humans,
characterize the spread of the virus, and gauge virus adaptation to its new host.” (footnote
omitted)); Michael J. Mina & Kristian G. Andersen, COVID-19 Testing: One Size Does Not
Fit All, 371 SCIENCE 126, 126 (2021) (“Tests for detecting [SARS-CoV-2] were developed
within days of the release of the virus genome.” (footnote omitted)). Had the researchers who
first sequenced SARS-CoV-2 sought patent protection for their discovery, as earlier research
teams did during the SARS, H1N1, and H5N1 outbreaks, global research relating to COVID19 could have been less efficient and more costly. See generally Matthew Rimmer, The Race
to Patent the SARS Virus: The TRIPS Agreement and Access to Essential Medicines, 5
MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 335 (2004) (discussing the impact of patent law on the race to
sequence the SARS virus). One of the reasons that patents are no longer sought on genomic
sequences is the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Association for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., which established that a sequence of naturally occurring nucleotides
is an unpatentable “product of nature.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 577 (2013); see also Jorge L. Contreras, COVID-19 as an Example of
Why Genomic Sequence Data Should Remain Patent Ineligible, in 2 COVID-19 POLICY
PLAYBOOK: LEGAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A SAFER, MORE EQUITABLE FUTURE 137, 137
(Scott Burris, Sarah de Guia, Lance Gable, Donna E. Levin, Wendy E. Parmet & Nicolas P.
Terry eds., 2021), https://www.publichealthlawwatch.org/covid19-policy-playbook
[https://perma.cc/UMT8-B9DX].
29
See discussion infra Section I.B.1.
30
See discussion infra Section I.C.3.
31
Jorge L. Contreras, Michael Eisen, Ariel Ganz, Mark Lemley, Jenny Molloy, Diane
M. Peters & Frank Tietze, Pledging Intellectual Property for COVID-19, 38 NATURE
BIOTECH. 1146, 1146–1447 (Oct. 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-020-06821.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CZM-P8EQ] [hereinafter Contreras et al., Pledging].
32
Id. at 1447.
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Alongside these efforts, an independent group of legal experts, scientists and
engineers33 coalesced to develop a common framework that would enable
intellectual property holders to commit their rights to the COVID-19 response on a
compensation-free basis without the need for governmental intervention or the
administrative complexities of IP pooling arrangements. This work resulted in the
Open COVID Pledge (OCP), a standardized licensing platform for patents and
copyrights that was launched on April 7, 2020.34 At its launch, the OCP included
over 70,000 patents licensed by Intel, and within a few weeks, Microsoft, Facebook,
IBM, Uber, Amazon, Hewlett-Packard Enterprise, Sandia National Laboratory and
other large patent holders had joined the effort.35 To date, it is estimated that close
to 500,000 patents have been pledged under the OCP framework,36 and the OCP has
been included as an integral “operational part” of the WHO’s C-TAP program.37 As
such, the OCP has helped to promote an open innovation landscape in key areas of
COVID-19 research and production.38
This Article discusses the genesis and formation of the OCP, including the
goals and design choices that shaped its development. The remainder of this Article
proceeds as follows: Part I provides a brief summary of patent law and the economic
incentives that patents provide for innovation and product development, then
explores how patents may serve to limit access to necessary products and services
during times of crisis. Part I also discusses conventional mechanisms used to expand
33

The group, which referred to itself as the “Open COVID Coalition” and the “OCP
Steering Committee,” consisted of ten individuals: Jorge Contreras, Michael Eisen, Ariel
Ganz, Mark Lemley, Jenny Molloy, Diane Peters, Alexander James Phillips, Mark Radcliffe,
Eric Steuer, and Frank Tietze.
34
See Eric Steuer, Patent Holders Urged to Take “Open COVID Pledge” for Quicker
End to Pandemic, OPEN COVID PLEDGE (Apr. 7, 2020, 5:00 PM EDT),
https://opencovidpledge.org/2020/04/07/patent-holders-urged-to-take-open-covid-pledgefor-quicker-end-to-pandemic-2/ [https://perma.cc/S2HJ-M7ZV] [hereinafter Steuer, Patent
Holders].
35
See Eric Steuer, Amazon, Facebook, Hewlett Packard Enterprise, IBM, Microsoft,
and Sandia National Laboratories Join “Open COVID Pledge” to Make Patents Freely
Available in the Fight Against COVID-19, OPEN COVID PLEDGE (Apr. 20, 2020, 4:00 PM
EDT), https://opencovidpledge.org/2020/04/20/amazon-facebook-hewlett-packard-enterpri
se-ibm-microsoft-and-sandia-national-laboratories-join-open-covid-pledge-to-make-patents
-freely-available-in-the-fight-against-covid-19-2/
[https://perma.cc/E3HM-AG8M]
[hereinafter Steuer, Amazon].
36
Estimating the number of patents held by different entities is an inexact art and is
confounded by reporting (both by patent holders and third parties) that is inaccurate,
outdated, and inconsistent. Compounding these problems are differing standards for how
patents, patent applications, patent families, and international filings are treated. Based on
available public records and reports, OCP estimates that between 417,000 and 500,000
worldwide patents have been pledged to date.
37
See discussion infra Section I.C.3.
38
See Anita M. McGahan, Marcel L.A.M. Bogers, Henry Chesbrough & Marcus
Holgersson, Tackling Societal Challenges with Open Innovation, 63 CALIF. MGMT. REV. 49,
55 (2021); see also discussion infra Section IV.D.
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access to biomedical technologies, including public sector approaches such as
compulsory licensing, march-in rights, and government use, as well as private
approaches such as patent pools and clearinghouses. Part II shifts to the open
licensing models that informed the development of the OCP, including open-source
software and Creative Commons licensing, and concludes with a discussion of other
pledges that have been made in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Part III
discusses the design and organization of the OCP, which combines features of open
source and Creative Commons licensing with IP pledges. Part IV describes the
implementation and adoption of the OCP, including an assessment of its impact in
different industry sectors. Part V analyzes the OCP in the broader context of patent
pledges, describes its future prospects, and considers other contexts in which IPsharing platforms such the OCP may be useful.
I. PATENTS, ACCESS, AND BIOMEDICAL INNOVATION
A. The Access Versus Innovation Debate
A patent confers a twenty-year period during which its owner has the exclusive
right to make, use, sell, and import the patented invention.39 This grant of exclusivity
gives the patent owner the ability to exploit the market for the patented invention to
the exclusion of others during the patent term, and thus to charge prices for that
invention that are not constrained by market competition. At a basic level, patents
thus afford two principal and related benefits to their owners: the ability to operate
within a particular market without competition, and the ability to charge supracompetitive prices.40
Given these factors, two competing sets of goals influence policy discussions
relating to the patent system: allocation and innovation. Allocative considerations
relate to the distribution of existing resources among potential users. In terms of
many patented technologies—e.g., smart phones, aircraft engines, food additives—
market forces act efficiently to allocate products to those who value them most
highly.41 However, in some cases, simple market forces may not work to achieve
maximum social benefit. Thus, in the case of patented drugs and healthcare

39

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271 (2018). The focus of this Article is on U.S. law. However,
the basic protections of patent law are common to most countries.
40
See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294–333 (2003) (surveying the economics of patent law). Of
course, many patents cover only minor technical improvements to existing technologies or
small components of large, complex products that may be covered by thousands of separate
patents. In these cases, the patent holder is not likely to enjoy a monopoly, or even market
power, in any given product market. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S.
28, 36–37 (2006). Nevertheless, this simplified economic model best illustrates the
competing concerns raised by patents.
41
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 40.
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equipment, a manufacturer’s optimal price may be unaffordable to segments of the
population.42
Moreover, even if the holder of a patent is willing to price a healthcare product
at a level that will ensure broad access, the holder may lack the production capacity
to meet the demand for that product. It may thus be necessary to allow others to
operate under that patent in order to supply sufficient quantities of the product in
question. In the event that a patent holder is unwilling to grant its existing and
potential competitors adequate rights to operate under its patents, a research or
supply “bottleneck” may arise.43 Because these allocative issues concern the supply
of patented technologies at a particular time (e.g., when the need for them arises),
they are sometimes referred to as “static” considerations. Static allocative issues
have been at the forefront of the debate over COVID-19 and innovation policy.44
In contrast, “dynamic” considerations concern the market conditions that are
needed to create an optimal quantity of new technologies over time. Patents give
their owners exclusive rights to exploit their inventions commercially, and thus
provide financial incentives to those who make commercially valuable discoveries
and inventions.45
Thus, some argue that increasing the availability and enforceability of patents
is likely to increase overall innovation and the quantity of socially beneficial
technologies that are available, particularly in response to a public emergency.46
Such arguments have been made in varying forms in the context of the COVID-19
pandemic. For example, the Director General of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) has argued that instead of lowering IP barriers to access to

42

Will Zerhouni, Gary J. Nabel & Elias Zerhouni, Editorial, Patents, Economics, and
Pandemics, 368 SCIENCE 1035, 1035 (2020) (“Patents give a time-limited exclusivity to the
innovator who can then set premium pricing that maximizes the return on R&D investment.
Such pricing can hinder wide dissemination once vaccines or therapies are developed, often
leaving many patients unable to afford these products.”).
43
See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras & Jacob S. Sherkow, CRISPR, Surrogate Licensing, and
Scientific Discovery, 355 SCIENCE 698, 698, 700 (2017) (discussing the risk of research
bottlenecks when broad patent rights are held by entities that are unable to exploit all of those
rights themselves and do not wish to license others).
44
See Bhaven N. Sampat & Kenneth C. Shadlen, The COVID-19 Innovation System,
40 HEALTH AFFS. 400, 400–07 (2021).
45
Because their payoff is entirely market-driven, patents incentivize innovations that
are likely to be the most lucrative to the patent holder, rather than the most socially beneficial
(hence the tendency of some firms to focus R&D dollars on hair loss treatments and weight
loss pills rather than the eradication of rare diseases). As a result, patents are not always
optimally calibrated to address social needs.
46
See Andrew W. Torrance, Patents to the Rescue—Disasters and Patent Law, 10
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 309, 311 (2007) (arguing that patents are well-situated to
incentivize the creation of lifesaving technologies).
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biomedical technologies, “governments should instead be pursuing policies to
incentivize scientific innovation through strong IP rights.”47
In the U.S., commentators have used the pandemic as a vehicle for airing
longstanding grievances about the Supreme Court’s patent jurisprudence, blaming
its 2012 decision in Mayo v. Prometheus,48 which held that diagnostic tests based on
the observation of naturally-occurring physiological reactions are not eligible for
patent protection, for the shortage of reliable COVID-19 diagnostic tests.49 And in
an effort to accelerate the issuance of patents relating to COVID-19, the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) introduced a prioritized examination program.50 The
PTO also created the Patents 4 Partnerships IP Marketplace Platform—an online
resource showcasing COVID-19 related patents available for commercial
licensing.51
Yet a broad range of economic incentive structures other than patents exists to
incentivize socially beneficial innovation. These include government grants,
subsidies, prizes, and tax incentives.52 In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic,
perhaps the most significant financial incentive of all may be governmental
47

Steve Brachmann, WHO’s C-TAP Initiative Pushes for Non-Exclusive Global
Licensing Amid Pharma Industry Concerns, IPWATCHDOG (May 31, 2020),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/05/31/whos-c-tap-initiative-pushes-non-exclusiveglobal-licensing-amid-pharmaceutical-industry-concerns/id=122041/ [https://perma.cc/D7
FW-CTUB] (quoting Francis Gurry, Director-General of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO)).
48
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
49
See Valerie Bauman, Covid-19 Spotlights Ruling’s Chilling Effect on Diagnostic
Tests, BLOOMBERG LAW (Mar. 23, 2020, 4:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/healthlaw-and-business/covid-19-spotlights-rulings-chilling-effect-on-diagnostic-tests [https://per
ma.cc/QQ7K-UVXW] (quoting several attorneys in private practice); see also In the Fight
Against the Coronavirus Outbreak, Life Sciences Companies Need Certainty in 101, INTELL.
ASSET. MGMT. (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.iam-media.com/law-policy/they-focusfighting-the-coronavirus-outbreak-now-more-ever-life-sciences-companies [https://perma.
cc/8HR2-DL2X] (“The COVID-19 R&D surge seeking the rapid discovery and
commercialisation of diagnostics, therapeutics, vaccines and cures for the present threat will
lay the groundwork for a remarkable range of scientific knowledge and potential commercial
and clinical applications. The extent to which these promising prospects turn into new
products, new businesses and new jobs depends in significant part on restored certainty and
breadth of the patentable subject matter . . . .”).
50
COVID-19 Prioritized Examination Pilot Program, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/initiatives/covid-19-prioritized-examination-pilot [https://per
ma.cc/A8CW-N9FM] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
51
Patents 4 Partnerships IP Marketplace Platform, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://developer.uspto.gov/ipmarketplace/search/patents [https://perma.cc/H3GG-WFTG]
(last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
52
See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism, 128
YALE L.J. 544, 547–49 (2019); Doug Lichtman, The Central Assumptions of Patent Law: A
Response to Ana Santos Rutschman’s IP Preparedness for Outbreak Diseases, 65 UCLA L.
REV. 1268, 1268–1275 (2018); Qiwei Claire Xue & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation
Policy and the Market for Vaccines, 7 J.L. BIOSCIENCES 1, 3–7 (2020).
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procurement,53 under which the U.S. government alone has allocated tens of billions
of dollars to purchase vaccines, protective equipment, and other technologies.54
While incentives like these reward desired innovation, they do not achieve it through
grants of market exclusivity.
However, it is worth remembering that removing patent barriers to the
production of a pharmaceutical product or device will not ensure that it is supplied
in significant quantity or at an acceptable level of quality. Many vaccines,
diagnostics, drugs, and medical devices are regulated by governmental agencies
such as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Thus, notwithstanding
patent authorizations, a secondary supplier of a regulated drug or device will often
be required to obtain regulatory approval of the product that it wishes to produce, as
well as its own manufacturing facilities and processes.55
The “access versus incentives” tradeoff is one of the fundamental tensions in
intellectual property law today.56 It is often unclear whether dynamic or static issues
should take priority in any given situation, and advocates often promote one over
the other depending on their own preferences (e.g., access to technology or obtaining
patents). Policy makers have adopted a range of strategies to strike the right balance
between expanding access to protected technological products while continuing to
incentivize future innovation. In this respect, the COVID-19 pandemic resembles
earlier public crises in which debates over access versus incentives have played
out.57
53

See Sampat & Shadlen, supra note 44, at 404 (describing governmental procurement
funding in the U.S. and elsewhere).
54
See Here’s Everything the Federal Government Has Done to Respond to the
Coronavirus So Far, PETER G. PETERSON FOUND. (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.pgpf.org/
blog/2021/01/heres-everything-congress-has-done-to-respond-to-the-coronavirus-so-far
[https://perma.cc/Z9G9-MHFX] (reporting budget allocations of “$29 billion designated for
the procurement and distribution of coronavirus vaccines and treatments and $22 billion for
testing, tracing, and mitigation of coronavirus”).
55
See Hannah Brennan, Amy Kapczynski, Christine H. Monahan & Zain Rizvi, A
Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government Patent Use for Health, 18
YALE J.L. & TECH. 275, 340–45 (2017) (describing NDA, ANDA, and 505(b)(2) routes for
regulatory approval of generic drugs).
56
Cf. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 40, at 11, 20–22, 213–14; Hemel & Ouellette,
supra note 52, at 559–62 (delineating innovation incentives and allocation mechanisms in IP
policy). See generally Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and
Innovation in International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y & ETHICS
193 (2005) (discussing the access and innovation tension in pharmaceuticals).
57
See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, Bronwyn H. Hall & Christian Helmers, Pledging
Patents for the Public Good: Rise and Fall of the Eco-Patent Commons, 57 HOUS. L. REV.
61, 64 (2019) [hereinafter Contreras et al., Pledging Patents for the Public Good] (“In the
area of climate change mitigation . . . a variety of proposals to increase innovation and
diffusion of technology have been made, many of them involving adjustments to the patent
system. Such proposals have encompassed strategies to increase the number of green/clean
tech patents to encourage private sector investment in innovation and to decrease either the
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The next two Sections review public and private interventions that have been
proposed to increase access to patents covering critical technologies in connection
with the COVID-19 pandemic.
B. Expanding Access to Patents: Governmental Interventions
This Section reviews public mechanisms that have been proposed within the
U.S. and internationally to expand access to patented technologies in the context of
the COVID-19 pandemic. These mechanisms are then compared with patent
pledges, and the Open COVID Pledge specifically, in Parts II and III.
1. Compulsory Licensing
In an effort to ensure that diagnostics, vaccines, therapeutics, and medical
equipment necessary to respond to COVID-19 are developed, manufactured, and
made available rapidly and in large quantities, governments around the world have
explored and enacted compulsory licensing measures for privately held patents.
Generally speaking, when a government orders compulsory licensing, the holder of
a patent is required to license it (usually at a reasonable rate) to other manufacturers
in order to ensure the continuity of, or an increase in, production and supply of the
patented article.58
Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the global dialogue around compulsory patent
licensing had focused largely on making essential medicines available in the
developing world, and most cases in which compulsory licenses were ordered in
countries such as Brazil, India, and Thailand involved drugs targeting HIV/AIDS
and cancer.59 But the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic reignited the debate
number or potency of such patents in an effort to reduce the costs of innovation globally.”
(footnote omitted)); Jesse Reynolds, Jorge L. Contreras & Joshua D. Sarnoff, Solar Climate
Engineering and Intellectual Property: Toward a Research Commons, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 1, 71–72 (2017) (describing PTO initiatives both to limit and accelerate patent grants,
particularly in the area of green technology).
58
Compulsory licensing of patents is permitted under the World Trade Organization’s
(WTO’s) Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, and
compulsory licensing for exports of essential medicines was expressly addressed by the
WTO’s Doha Declaration and subsequent amendments to the TRIPS Agreement. See
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, annex 1C, art. 31; World Trade
Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 ILM 746 (2001); World Trade Organization, General Council
Decision: Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health, WTO Doc. WT/L/540 and Corr. 1 (Sept. 1, 2003).
59
See JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43266, COMPULSORY LICENSING OF
PATENTED INVENTIONS 9–13 (2013) (cataloging and summarizing non-U.S. compulsory
licenses); Jerome H. Reichman, Comment, Compulsory Licensing of Patented
Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating the Options, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 247, 247–48
(2009).
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over compulsory licensing around the world. Early in the pandemic, compulsory
licensing measures relating to patented technologies relevant to COVID-19 were
authorized in countries including Chile, Ecuador, Israel, Germany, and Canada.60
Unlike many countries, the U.S. lacks a general statutory framework for
compulsory patent licensing. Thus, in the U.S., the discussion around compulsory
licensing has centered on two statutory mechanisms: federal march-in rights under
the Bayh-Dole Act, and governmental use under 28 U.S.C. § 1498.
2. March-In Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 was intended to rationalize the previously chaotic
rules governing the ownership of federally-funded inventions.61 Most importantly,
it allowed research institutions to patent inventions arising from government-funded
research and penalized institutions that failed to pursue patent protection for such
inventions.62 In return, the Act gives the federal government a non-exclusive, paidup license under each patent covering a federally-funded invention,63 and authorizes
the government to exercise so-called ‘march-in’ rights to compel the owner to
license it to one or more third parties to the extent necessary, among other reasons,
to address health or safety needs.64
Over the years, numerous petitions have been filed requesting that federal
agencies exercise their march-in rights under the Bayh-Dole Act, primarily in cases
involving under-supplied or costly pharmaceutical products.65 To date, however,
neither NIH nor any other federal agency has exercised its march-in rights during
the 40+ years that the Bayh-Dole Act has been in effect.66 Moreover, march-in rights
apply only to inventions that were made using federal funding.67 While the
foundational discoveries underlying many new drug candidates were made by
federally-funded university laboratories, a significant amount of biomedical
research is conducted by pharmaceutical and medical device companies without
federal support. As a result, march-in rights under the Bayh-Dole Act have been of
little practical relevance during the COVID-19 pandemic.

60
See Ellen ‘t Hoen, Covid-19 and the Comeback of Compulsory Licensing, MEDS. L.
& POL’Y (Mar. 23, 2020), https://medicineslawandpolicy.org/2020/03/covid-19-and-thecome-back-of-compulsory-licensing/ [https://perma.cc/W9PU-ENJS]; Adam Houldsworth,
The Key Covid-19 Compulsory Licensing Developments So Far, INTELL. ASSET. MGMT.
(Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.iam-media.com/coronavirus/the-key-covid-19-compulsorylicensing-developments-so-far [https://perma.cc/M678-M29N].
61
35 U.S.C. § 200 (2018).
62
Id. § 202(c)(3).
63
Id. § 202(c)(4); 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(c)(3) (2020).
64
35 U.S.C. § 203(a); 37 C.F.R. §§ 401.6, 401.14(j).
65
See generally JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44597, MARCH-IN RIGHTS
UNDER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT (2016) (cataloging and summarizing march-in petitions).
66
Id.
67
35 U.S.C. § 203(a).
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3. Governmental Use and § 1498
The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1498, which traces its origins to the 1910
Government Use Statute,68 is not a compulsory licensing law, but a limited waiver
by the U.S. government of its immunity to suit in the federal courts.69 Under this
statute, if the federal government (itself or through its contractors) uses or
manufactures an invention patented in the U.S. without permission of the owner, the
owner is granted a remedy—the pursuit of a claim for “reasonable and entire
compensation” in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.70 No other remedy is permitted,
and the patent owner cannot seek to enjoin the government’s use of the invention.
Since its enactment, § 1498 has been invoked periodically in cases relating to
the procurement of military technology and other equipment.71 Though less
frequently, § 1498 has also been used to bolster the U.S. supply of drugs and
biomedical technologies at prices lower than those charged by patent holders. Milton
Silverman and Philip R. Lee report that during the 1960s, the Department of
Defense’s Military Medical Supply Agency (MMSA) utilized § 1498 to obtain
supplies of approximately fifty drugs, including the antibiotic tetracycline, from
producers in countries where the drugs were not patented.72 Though the federal
government’s use of § 1498 in the pharmaceutical sector declined by the 1970s,73
the Department of Health and Human Services threatened to invoke the statute again
in 2001 during the post-9/11 anthrax scare.74 Since then, commentators have
proposed using the government’s powers under § 1498 to drive down drug prices,75
but no meaningful utilization of this power has occurred for pharmaceutical products
in nearly two decades.
With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, and highly publicized shortages of
testing kits, respirators, ventilators, and other critical supplies,76 the prospect of U.S.
68

Act of June 15, 1910, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851 (providing additional protection for
owners of U.S. patents). For a historical overview, see Sean M. O’Connor, Taking, Tort, or
Crown Right?: The Confused Early History of Government Patent Policy, 12 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 145, 183–84 (2012); Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Robert F. Allnutt,
Patent Infringement in Government Procurement: A Remedy Without a Right, 42 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 5, 6–9 (1966).
69
28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).
70
Id.
71
See, e.g., Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(patents on night vision goggles).
72
MILTON SILVERMAN & PHILIP R. LEE, PILLS, PROFITS & POLITICS 187 (1974).
73
Brennan et al., supra note 55, at 306.
74
See id. at 303 (the government’s proposal to import doses of low-cost generic
ciprofloxacin caused the domestic manufacturer Bayer to reduce its price by half).
75
See id. at 279–80; see also Amy Kapczynski & Aaron S. Kesselheim, “Government
Patent Use”: A Legal Approach to Reducing Drug Spending, 35 HEALTH AFFS. 791, 791–
93 (2016).
76
See Peter Baker & Eileen Sullivan, U.S. Virus Plan Anticipates 18-Month Pandemic
and Widespread Shortages, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03
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government intervention through § 1498 again gained traction.77 Nevertheless, for
what appears to be a range of political and practical reasons, there has been little
meaningful movement in the U.S. toward the exercise of government use rights. It
is possible that opposition from the private sector is partially responsible. Moreover,
any such intervention might contradict the stance that the U.S. has taken in the
international arena, in which it routinely condemns the issuance of compulsory
patent licenses by developing countries.78 Interestingly, the most significant result
of possible government intervention in this area may have been the voluntary
pledges made by IP holders seeking to forestall more drastic governmental action.79
C. Private Ordering: Patent Pools
In addition to government-driven mechanisms for making patented
technologies broadly available, private ordering and market forces sometimes work
to achieve the same ends. One of the principal private means for clearing blocking
patent positions and enabling industry cooperation is the patent pool.
1. Patent Pools in the Life Sciences
Patent pools are private arrangements among patent holders that enable the
participants to operate under one another’s patents, to manage and administer the
pooled patents through a centralized mechanism, and often to grant licenses of the
pooled patents to third parties, with the proceeds allocated among the participants
according to an agreed formula. Patent pools have been around for more than a
century in industries ranging from oil refinement to aircraft to semiconductors to
/17/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-plan.html [https://perma.cc/6RDM-GZJL] (reporting that
the White House plan predicts “potentially critical shortages of diagnostics, medical supplies
(including [personal protective equipment] and pharmaceuticals), and staffing in some
locations” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
77
See, e.g., Adam Houldsworth, Covid-19 Emergency May Expose Compulsory
Licensing Limits, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.iam-media.com/lawpolicy/covid-19-emergency-may-expose-compulsory-licensing-limits [https://perma.cc/PL
29-7YL3]; Valerie Bauman, Government May Have Ownership or Rights to Coronavirus
Vaccines, BLOOMBERG LAW (Mar. 20, 2020, 10:15 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
pharma-and-life-sciences/government-may-have-ownership-or-rights-to-coronavirusvaccines [https://perma.cc/T4CP-XV2Y].
78
See generally Sapna Kumar, Compulsory Licensing of Patents During Pandemics
(Mar. 5, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3636456 [https://perm
a.cc/DKW4-KPLR] (examining proposals for compulsory license schemes during pandemic
circumstances).
79
See discussion infra Section II.C.3; see also Thomas Prock, Peter Roberts, Daniel
Sizer & Matthew Jefferies, 3D Printing and IP in a Pandemic, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (Apr.
3,
2020),
https://www.iam-media.com/coronavirus/3d-printing-and-ip-in-pandemic
[https://perma.cc/4F4W-7VFN] (“[I]t would be advantageous for IP rights holders to be
proactive by licensing IP on their own terms before the decision is made for them by the
government.”).
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digital media. In all of these cases, pools have enabled the efficient consolidation of
patents in a manner that has facilitated licensing and commercialization.
Historically, however, patent pools have not enjoyed much commercial success
in the biomedical sector. As I have previously explained:
Several factors could explain the absence of pooling in this arena: the need
for at least some market exclusivity in an environment with extremely high
costs of product development, clinical trials and regulatory approval;
patent holders’ desire to retain control over their assets; and concern over
compromising commercial secrecy by collaborating with others.80
Patent pools have also been suggested as mechanisms to address more acute
public health crises such as disease outbreaks. Patent pooling structures were
actively discussed and considered in response to the SARS outbreak of 2002–03,81
the H5N1 influenza outbreak of 2006,82 and the H1N1 influenza pandemic of 2009.83
Yet despite the perceived need for aggregation of distributed patent rights in order
to combat these diseases, patent pools were never formed for a range of practical,
administrative, and competitive reasons.84
In the wake of these outbreaks, the WHO initiated a series of activities to
explore the viability of pooling patents relating to public health technologies.85
Specifically, the WHO’s 2011 Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health,
Innovation and Intellectual Property (GSPOA) called for an examination of the
“feasibility of establishing voluntary patent pools of upstream and downstream
technologies to promote innovation of and access to health products and medical

80
Jorge L. Contreras, The Anticommons at 20: Concerns for Research Continue, 361
SCIENCE 335, 336 (2018).
81
See, e.g., James H.M. Simon, Eric Claassen, Carmen E. Correa & Albert D.M.E.
Osterhaus, Managing Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Intellectual Property
Rights: The Possible Role of Patent Pooling, 83 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 707 (2005);
Carmen E. Correa, Case 2. The SARS Case. IP Fragmentation and Patent Pools, in GENE
PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS: PATENT POOLS, CLEARINGHOUSES,
OPEN SOURCE MODELS AND LIABILITY REGIMES 42 (Geertrui van Overwalle ed., 2009);
Hillary Greene, Patent Pooling Behind the Veil of Uncertainty: Antitrust, Competition
Policy, and the Vaccine Industry, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1397, 1399–1400 (2010).
82
See Dana Beldiman, Patent Choke Points in the Influenza-Related Medicines
Industry: Can Patent Pools Provide Balanced Access?, 15 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
31, 60 (2012).
83
See Greene, supra note 81, at 1400.
84
See, e.g., Beldiman, supra note 82, at 58 (“Because it took an extended period of
time to agree which patents to include, to craft the pool structure agreement and its licensing
terms, and to ensure that antitrust and other regulations were met, the SARS outbreak was
contained before the pool was ever completed.” (footnote omitted)).
85
See World Health Org., Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health,
Innovation and Intellectual Property 13, 16 (2011), https://www.who.int/phi/publications/
Global_Strategy_Plan_Action.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2WF-M2GF].
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devices.”86 Yet despite support within WHO,87 no significant progress toward such
pools occurred.
One reason that patent pools may not have successfully formed in these areas
may relate to antitrust law. A patent pool necessarily includes a variety of patents
held by different owners. But when a pool aggregates rights covering technologies
that may be substitutes for one another, such as patents covering different types of
vaccines, innovation could be reduced (i.e., if patents covering the leading
technology “A” as well as its two closest competitors “B” and “C” are licensed as a
bundle, then the creators of “B” and “C” have little incentive to improve their
technologies to compete with “A,” given that they all benefit when “A” is sold and
achieve no incremental gains through improvements to “B” or “C”). On the other
hand, when pooled patents are complementary (e.g., several patents covering aspects
of the same vaccine), pools are viewed as increasing efficiency and enhancing
innovation. It is for this reason that most antitrust enforcement agencies concur that
the patents included in a pool should generally be complementary and not substitutes
for one another.88
Yet the exercise of determining which patents are complementary and which
patents are substitutes is not a trivial one. Various studies have estimated the cost of
this “essentiality analysis” to be in the range of $10,000 per patent,89 a cost that can
easily reach millions of dollars in heavily patented areas. Patent pools involve other
costs, as well. Professors Robert Merges and Michael Mattioli have estimated the
set-up costs of two major patent pools relating to data compression standards—
MPEG Audio and HEVC—at $7.8 million and $4.8 million, respectively, with
annual operating budgets in the range of $600,000 and $2 million.90
2. IP Clearinghouses and the Medicines Patent Pool
In addition to formal pooling arrangements, some have sought to address public
health needs through more flexible structures. For example, in 2010 the Unitaid arm
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Id. at 13.
See World Health Org., Research and Development to Meet Health Needs in
Developing Countries: Strengthening Global Financing and Coordination 56–57 (2012),
https://www.who.int/phi/CEWG_Report_5_April_2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WHG9FJKJ].
88
See U.S. DEP’T JUST. & U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 62, 66-67
(2007),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/222655.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H3SW-G2F6].
89
See Jorge L. Contreras, Essentiality and Standards-Essential Patents, in CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND
PATENTS 209, 215 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2017).
90
Robert P. Merges & Michael Mattioli, Measuring the Costs and Benefits of Patent
Pools, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 281, 307, 310–12 (2017).
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of the WHO created the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP).91 MPP’s mission is to
aggregate patents, clinical trials data and other IP relating to HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Hepatitis-C medications and make them available at low or no cost
to manufacturers that commit to produce and sell drugs to users in low-income
countries.92
Despite its name, the MPP is not a patent pool, as that term is commonly
understood. Rather, it is a clearinghouse or intermediary that obtains inbound
licenses from willing IP holders and then sublicenses those rights to generic drug
manufacturers operating in developing countries. These licenses, which may be
royalty-bearing or royalty-free, are generally available on an a-la-carte basis, and do
not necessarily aggregate all of the rights licensed to MPP (thus avoiding some of
the antitrust issues and up-front costs described above). To date, several significant
patent holders, including AbbVie, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Gilead Sciences, Pfizer,
ViiV Healthcare, and Johns Hopkins University, have licensed IP to the MPP, which
has in turn granted twenty-two sublicenses to generic drug manufacturers for
distribution of products in the developing world.93 A similar effort that gained
attention around the same time was the Pool for Open Innovation Against Neglected
Tropical Diseases (POINT), which has since been folded into the WIPO Re: Search
initiative.94
3. The WHO COVID-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP)
In the early days of the pandemic, advocates proposed that a patent pool or
MPP-like clearinghouse be formed to aggregate technologies responsive to the
COVID-19 pandemic.95 In March 2020, the President and Health Minister of Costa
Rica requested that the WHO “undertake an effort to pool rights to technologies that

91

See About Us, MEDS. PAT. POOL, https://medicinespatentpool.org/who-weare/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/AZU6-HPGW] (last visited Feb. 27, 2021).
92
See id.; see also Esteban Burrone, Patent Pooling in Public Health, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
GOVERNANCE, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 93, 96–102 (Margaret Chon, Pedro Roffe
& Ahmed Abdel-Latif eds., 2018).
93
MEDS. PAT. POOL, SUPPORTING UNIVERSAL HEALTH COVERAGE THROUGH
AFFORDABLE MEDICINES: ANNUAL REPORT 2019, 15 (2020), https://annual-report2019.medicinespatentpool.org/ [https://perma.cc/H7H6-EB3U].
94
See Jennifer Dent, Katy M. Graef & Paddy Shivanand, Open Innovation to Bolster
Research and Development for Neglected and Emerging Infectious Diseases, 1 J. MEDS.
DEV. SCIS. 46, 47 (2015); Hannah Waters, Patent-Sharing Scheme for Neglected Diseases
May Have Catch, 17 NATURE MED. 1529, 1529 (2011).
95
See, e.g., Brook Baker, Rationale for Supporting Costa Rica’s Proposal for
Emergency COVID-19 Technology IP Pool for All Countries, HEALTH GAP (Mar. 25, 2020),
https://healthgap.org/rationale-for-supporting-costa-ricas-proposal-for-emergency-covid19-technology-ip-pool-for-all-countries/ [https://perma.cc/WZJ9-22CC].
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are useful for the detection, prevention, control and treatment of the COVID-19
pandemic.”96
On May 29, the WHO announced the creation of the COVID-19 Technology
Access Pool (C-TAP),97 a program “intended to provide a means to accelerate the
development of products needed to fight COVID-19 as well as to accelerate the
scale-up of manufacturing and the removal of barriers to access in order to make
products available globally.”98 Supported by thirty countries, C-TAP adopts a fivepronged approach to expanding technology access and dissemination in response to
COVID-19:99
•
•
•
•
•

Public disclosure of gene sequences and data;
Transparency around the publication of all clinical trial results;
Inclusion in research funding agreements of requirements for equitable
distribution, affordability and the publication of trial data;
Licensing any potential treatment, diagnostic, vaccine or other health
technology to the Medicines Patent Pool; and
Promotion of open innovation models and technology transfer that increase
local manufacturing and supply capacity, including through the Open
COVID Pledge and the WHO’s Technology Access Partnership (TAP).

As indicated by the fourth and fifth points above, C-TAP relies on existing IP
aggregation and licensing platforms—the MPP, the OCP and the TAP—rather than
attempting to create a new one. The fact that the OCP was included in this
multinational UN-backed initiative less than two months after its launch is a
testament to its efficient design and broad, rapid adoption in the field.
II. OPEN LICENSING MODELS
The Open COVID Pledge offers a structural alternative to governmental
compulsory licensing mechanisms, on one hand, and administratively complex
96

Letter from Carlos Alvarado Quesada, President, Costa Rica, & Daniel Salas Peraza,
Minister of Health, Costa Rica, to Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Dir.-Gen., World
Health Org. (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.keionline.org/wp-content/uploads/PresidentMoH-Costa-Rica-Dr-Tedros-WHO24March2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/86NP-VMQS]
[hereinafter Costa Rica Letter].
97
WHO, Solidarity Call to Action, supra note 27.
98
WHO Team C-TAP, Medicines Selection, IP and Affordability, C-TAP: A Concept
Paper—Operationalising the COVID-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP) 1 (World Health
Org., Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/c-tap-a-concept-paper
[https://perma.cc/V3E9-YMFK] [hereinafter C-TAP Concept Paper].
99
See Press Release, World Health Org., International Community Rallies to Support
Open Research and Science to Fight COVID-19: WHO and Costa Rica Launch Landmark
COVID-19 Technology Access Pool (May 29, 2020), https://www.who.int/news/item/2905-2020-international-community-rallies-to-support-open-research-and-science-to-fightcovid-19 [https://perma.cc/A6E8-X66E].
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patent pools, on the other hand. Its design borrows from a number of existing
licensing models that are known for their efficiency and broad adoption, including
the public licenses utilized by the open-source software community and the
lightweight licensing framework developed by Creative Commons for online
content. It also adopts the features of prior patent pledges made in a range of
industries and those made early in the COVID-19 pandemic.
A. Open-Source Software
A computer program’s “source” code is a version of the program written in a
human-readable programming language such as C++, PERL, BASIC or Fortran. In
order to execute on a computer, this source code is typically compiled or interpreted
into machine-readable “object” code, which is unintelligible to most people. Most
proprietary software is licensed and distributed in object code form.
Beginning in the 1970s, a group of software developers in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, bristling against the restrictive practices of corporate software firms,
began to make their source code publicly available.100 This trend began the “free
software” or “open-source software” (OSS) movement. Despite its emphasis on
sharing and open development structures, OSS software today has been embraced
by the business community and includes some of the most successful and widely
deployed software in the world, including the Linux and Android operating systems,
the Firefox web browser and the Apache web server.101
1. OSS Licensing
The hallmark of OSS software is that its source code is made available to the
public, usually without charge. While its developers generally retain their copyrights
(and patents) in the software code,102 they indiscriminately grant licenses to anyone
who wishes to use, modify or distribute that code.103 These licenses are typically
granted via self-executing, publicly accessible agreements that become effective as

100

See Richard Stallman, The GNU Operating System and the Free Software
Movement, in OPEN SOURCES: VOICES FROM THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION 53, 57, 60
(Chris DiBona, Sam Ockman & Mark Stone eds., 1999).
101
See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 5, 60, 64, 435 (2006).
102
OSS is not contributed to the “public domain.” See Stallman, supra note 100, at 58–
59.
103
What Is Open Source?, OPENSOURCE.COM, https://opensource.com/resources/whatopen-source [https://perma.cc/R4XG-773A] (last visited Feb. 24, 2021) (authors of open
source software “make its source code available to others who would like to view that code,
copy it, learn from it, alter it, or share it” and that “users must accept the terms of a license
when they use open source software . . . .”).
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soon as the user downloads or uses the software, much like consumer shrinkwrap or
clickwrap agreements.104
The first OSS licenses were created by the GNU Project, a software
development effort led by Richard Stallman, one of the founders of the OSS
movement. One of the best known and most widely deployed OSS licenses is the
GNU General Public License or GPL, which now has numerous variants. But, as
discussed below, the GPL is complex and contains features that are unattractive to
commercial users. As a result, a number of alternative OSS licenses have emerged
over the years. Among the most popular of these are the BSD license developed at
the University of California Berkeley in 1990,105 the MIT License, the Mozilla
Public License and the Apache Public License.106
Given the proliferation of licensing structures purporting to be OSS, in 1998
the non-profit Open Source Initiative (OSI) published a set of criteria defining what
it meant to be an “open source” license.”107 These criteria include:
1. Free redistribution of the software must be permitted;
2. Source code must be made available to users;
3. Users must be permitted to create modifications and derivative works
of the software;
4. The license may not discriminate against persons, groups or fields of
endeavor and cannot be specific to a particular product or technology;
and
5. The license must automatically apply to anyone to whom the software
is redistributed without the need for an additional license.
In addition to publishing and occasionally updating these criteria, OSI certifies
the compliance of particular licensing agreements with its criteria. As of December
2020, it had certified 105 such licenses as meeting its definition of OSS.108

104
See Van Lindberg, Comment, OSS and FRAND: Complementary Models for
Innovation and Development, 20 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 251, 256 (2019) (“Open
source licenses are also self-executing, meaning that each person who receives a copy of the
covered work is automatically granted a new license upon receipt.” (footnote omitted)).
105
See JORGE L. CONTRERAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING AND
TRANSACTIONS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 543–44 (forthcoming 2021) (available at
www.iptransactions.org) [hereinafter CONTRERAS, LICENSING] (discussing BSD licenses).
106
Open Source Licenses by Category, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, https://opensource.
org/licenses/category [https://perma.cc/E2W4-3FMD] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
107
The Open Source Definition (Annotated), OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE (Mar. 22, 2007)
https://opensource.org/osd.html [https://perma.cc/ZW7J-6U6E].
108
Licenses by Name, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, https://opensource.org/licenses/alpha
betical [https://perma.cc/DHQ8-Z4LW] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).

2021]

THE OPEN COVID PLEDGE

857

2. Other Terms of OSS Licenses
While all OSS licenses include the basic provisions identified in the OSI
definition, many include additional terms and conditions, some of which have
become controversial. Among these are the following:
(a) Attribution
Most OSS licenses require that distributors of OSS software reproduce any
copyright notices that are included in the original source code. When a user modifies
a portion of that code, it adds itself to the copyright notice, thereby creating a list of
all contributors to the code like an old fashioned “chain letter.” In this way,
contributors to the copyrighted code receive attribution or recognition for their
original contributions, an important feature of the OSS ethos.109
(b) The Viral Effect of Copyleft
Richard Stallman coined the term “copyleft” (the opposite of copyright) to
describe the licensing strategy of the GPL, which “uses copyright law, but flips it
over to serve the opposite of its usual purpose: instead of a means of privatizing
software, it becomes a means of keeping software free.”110 If a piece of software is
distributed under the GPL, then anyone who redistributes that software, or any
modified version of that software, must also distribute it under the GPL. Thus, like
a biological virus, the GPL propagates itself from user to user, program to program.
Many corporate users perceived the copyleft provisions of the GPL as a threat, not
because GPL’d code can only be relicensed under the GPL, but because the GPL’d
code could infect any proprietary code with which it was combined, making the
entire combined work (i.e., both the GPL’d and proprietary code) subject to the
GPL.111
(c) Patents and OSS
Though most OSS licenses deal primarily with copyrights in computer code,
some address patent issues as well. For example, the GPL and Mozilla licenses
require that a contributor to an OSS program license to users its patents covering
every component of that program, even those contributed by others.112 Other OSS
109

See BENKLER, supra note 101, at 66–67.
Stallman, supra note 100, at 59.
111
See CONTRERAS, LICENSING, supra note 105, at 546–47 (discussing the “viral”
nature of GPL and the perceived threat to commercial software).
112
See Free Software Found., GNU General Public License: Version 3, § 11, para. 3
(June 29, 2007), http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html [https://perma.cc/4PN5-JR4R]
(“Each contributor grants [to each user of the program] a non-exclusive, worldwide, royaltyfree patent license under the contributor’s essential patent claims, to make, use, sell, offer for
110
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licenses, such as the Apache license, require a contributor to grant licenses under its
patents, but only with respect to its own contributions to the OSS program, and not
those of third parties.113
B. Creative Commons Licensing
Creative Commons began in 2004 as an experiment by law professors Larry
Lessig, James Boyle, and others.114 Its goal was to create a legal framework that
would enable individual producers of online content—photographs, videos, poetry,
blog posts—to relinquish some of the exclusive rights granted by copyright law and
allow others to copy, disseminate and modify their work. The system utilized a
simple set of “tags,” each of which specified a particular right being granted to
others.
Thus, if a photographer wishes to post a photo to a social media site and make
it available for anyone else to use so long as they give her credit (attribution), she
can tag the photo with the “CC BY” symbol, and the CC Attribution license will
apply.115 If she also wishes to stipulate that her photo cannot be modified in any way,
then she can tag it with the “CC BY ND” (Attribution, No Derivatives) license. If
she wants to be sure that her photo remains free for all to use, even if someone
incorporates it into a proprietary database or website, then she can add the “SA”
(Share Alike) tag.116 And if she wishes to prohibit commercial uses (e.g., using her
photo in a corporate ad), then she can apply the “NC” (Non-Commercial) tag. As
shown in Figure 1, there are only six permitted combinations of these four licensing
tags (out of 15 possible combinations), reflecting the designers’ views of the most
frequent and logical types of uses that should be permitted.

sale, import and otherwise run, modify and propagate the contents of its contributor
version.”); see also CONTRERAS, LICENSING, supra note 105, at 548 (discussing concerns
over breadth of GPL and Mozilla patent licenses).
113
See Apache Software Found., Apache License, Version 2.0 § 3 (Jan. 2004),
https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 [https://perma.cc/QWB9-4T4V] (“[E]ach
Contributor hereby grants to [each user of the program] a perpetual, worldwide, nonexclusive, no-charge, royalty-free, irrevocable (except as stated in this section) patent license
to make, have made, use, offer to sell, sell, import, and otherwise transfer the Work, where
such license applies only to those patent claims licensable by such Contributor that are
necessarily infringed by their Contribution(s) alone or by combination of their
Contribution(s) with the Work to which such Contribution(s) was submitted.”).
114
See Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons, 65 MONT. L. REV. 1, 11 (2004).
115
The attribution feature of CC licenses bears similarities to the attribution feature of
some OSS licenses. See discussion supra Section II.A.2.a.
116
Share-alike licensing is similar to the “viral” feature of OSS licenses such as the
GPL. See discussion supra Section II.A.2.b.
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Figure 1: The Creative Commons Suite of Licenses
The CC suite of licenses appears simple, but a sophisticated legal structure
underlies its streamlined user-facing tags. Thus, the tag “CC BY ND” does not itself
convey a license to the user. Rather, when a tag is attached to an online image or
other content, it includes a hyperlink to a more comprehensive licensing agreement
that is hosted on CC’s website.117
Importantly, the CC licenses are “public” licenses. That is, they are not
specifically negotiated between copyright owners and users, but are publicly posted
and can be “accepted” by anyone who wishes to use the licensed content. Thus, the
introduction to the CC BY NC ND 4.0 license reads as follows:
By exercising the Licensed Rights (defined below), You accept and agree
to be bound by the terms and conditions of this Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public
License (“Public License”). To the extent this Public License may be
interpreted as a contract, You are granted the Licensed Rights in
consideration of Your acceptance of these terms and conditions, and the
117

See, e.g., Creative Commons, Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercialNoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/bync-nd/4.0/legalcode [https://perma.cc/6ABD-FFPY] (last visited Feb. 25, 2021) (full text of
the CC BY NC ND 4.0 license).
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Licensor grants You such rights in consideration of benefits the Licensor
receives from making the Licensed Material available under these terms
and conditions.
The Creative Commons website today claims that more than 500 million online
images are available under CC licenses. As Lessig and others intended, the appeal
of the CC licensing system is its simplicity and its intuitiveness. A user can choose
to apply one of six different combinations of four different licensing options to their
works. Each option is described in simple, plain language and identified by an
intuitive icon. Professor Jane Ginsburg points to four important design features that
have contributed to the success of the CC model: its overall simplicity, its extension
of credit to authors (included in each of the six permitted licenses), its ability to
authorize use of the licensed content instantly and forever, and its potential to expand
distribution of a work through search engines.118 These features have made CC
licensing a standard feature of online platforms and social media sites today.
C. IP Pledges
As noted in Section I.C.1 above, the formation of a patent pool often requires
significant legal planning, negotiation, agreements concerning revenue sharing (if
any), and an administrative structure. As a result, IP holders have found it
increasingly expedient to make commitments regarding the enforcement and
licensing of IP rights without the legal trappings, infrastructure, and overhead of
formal pools. These commitments—IP pledges—are voluntary, unilateral promises
made by IP holders to limit the enforcement or other exploitation of their IP rights,
and are often coupled with more detailed public licensing agreements or
statements.119
1. Pledges as Clearing Mechanisms
IP pledges enable a broad range of users to operate freely under the pledged IP.
For the most part, such pledges are made without direct compensation or other
consideration to the pledgor.120 This is not to say, however, that IP pledges are
economically irrational; they may be supported by motivations ranging from
promoting market development to forestalling governmental action to improving

118

Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors’ Transfer and License Contracts Under U.S. Copyright
Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING 3, 23 (Jacques de
Werra ed., 2013).
119
See Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 564–72 (2015)
(explaining the structure of patent pledge programs) [hereinafter Contreras, Patent Pledges].
120
The primary exceptions to this rule are the “FRAND” commitments made by
participants in some standards-development organizations to license their patents on
financial terms that are “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory.” See, e.g., id. at 546.
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employee relations.121 A number of pledges have also been made to support IP
holders’ philanthropic, environmental, and corporate social responsibility (CSR)
goals.122
Thus, in most of these cases, pledges (and accompanying public licenses)
enable users to operate under the pledged IP without fear of infringement. Such
freedom to operate can both encourage and enable users to develop, manufacture
and sell products otherwise covered by the pledgor’s IP. For example, when Tesla
Motors CEO Elon Musk famously pledged in 2014 that Tesla would not assert its
patents against others in the electric vehicle market, it was widely believed that the
purpose of this pledge was to encourage the rapid development and deployment of
electric vehicle infrastructure systems and components, thereby benefiting Tesla
over its gasoline-powered competitors.123
Yet few unilateral pledges, and not many collective pledges, can assure a user
of complete freedom from IP (specifically patent) risks when it produces a
commercial product. In the high technology sector, many products are covered by
many thousands of patents held by multiple firms,124 and even biotechnology and
pharmaceutical products, once viewed largely as single-patent products, are covered
by an increasing number of diversely held patents.125 What’s more, it is increasingly
common that, through a combination of expansive claim drafting and shrewd market
121

See id. at 573–92; Jorge L. Contreras, The Evolving Patent Pledge Landscape 7–8
(Ctr. for Int’l Governance Innovation (CIGI), Working Paper No. 166, 2018) [hereinafter
Contreras, Evolving Landscape]; see also Jonas Fabian Ehrnsperger & Frank Tietze, Motives
for Patent Pledges: A Qualitative Study 15–17 (Ctr. for Tech. Mgmt., Working Paper No.
2019/11, 2019), https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/301782 [https://perma.cc/T
VN4-VA4F] (finding, based on interviews, primary motives for patent pledges to be
“[d]riving technology diffusion and ecosystem and infrastructure building,” “[b]uilding
reputation and PR,” and “[d]ecreasing uncertainty and patent threats”); Colleen V. Chien,
Opening the Patent System: Diffusionary Levers in Patent Law, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 793, 839–
40 (2016) (identifying motives for patent “sharing” to include humanitarian reasons,
encouragement of downstream research, broader dissemination of funded research, profit
enhancement, and generating feedback). See generally Jonathan M. Barnett, The Host’s
Dilemma: Strategic Forfeiture in Platform Markets for Informational Goods, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 1861 (2011) (proposing that firms forfeit valuable technology rights in order to
encourage adoption of a platform technology, which can subsequently benefit the forfeiting
firm through the control and exploitation of associated rights or services).
122
Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 119, at 590–92 (identifying philanthropic
pledges); Contreras, Evolving Landscape, supra note 121, at 7 (expanding category to
encompass broader corporate mission such as corporate social responsibility and employee
morale).
123
See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 119, at 544–45.
124
Introduction, in PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS: TOWARD A GLOBAL
CONSENSUS 1, 3 (C. Bradford Biddle, Jorge L. Contreras, Brian J. Love & Norman V.
Siebrasse eds., 2019).
125
See generally Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Note, How Many Patents Does It Take to
Make a Drug: Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299 (2010) (refuting “conventional wisdom” that
biopharmaceutical products are covered by only one or a few patents).
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prediction, a firm’s patents can cover products developed entirely by others and to
which the patent holder made no contribution at all.
As a result, even the most carefully orchestrated patent landscape clearing
mechanisms—whether implemented through patent pools or pledges—cannot
assure complete freedom from patent risk; there may always be “outsiders” who are
not bound by the patent non-assertion commitments of others.126 For example, the
Bluetooth standard for short-range wireless connectivity was developed by a group
of firms that each committed to license its applicable patents to manufacturers of
Bluetooth-enabled products and components without charge. Yet a non-practicing
entity (NPE) that did not participate in the development of the standard held a patent,
originally filed in connection with an unrelated technology, that was found by a
Texas jury to read on Bluetooth and which entitled the NPE to a multi-million-dollar
damages award against a manufacturer of Bluetooth-enabled products.127
This being said, it is not essential that complete clearance exist in order for
product markets to be made more accessible through pledging programs. The
relevant question is how much “freedom to operate” is conferred by a particular
pledge or pledge community. If infringement risk is reduced below a certain
threshold, then a market may be considered open, even if residual risk exists from
outsider patent suits. This point is discussed in greater detail when evaluating the
adoption of the Open COVID Pledge within different market segments in Sections
IV.B. and IV.C, below.
The following sections of this Part discuss IP pledges that have been made in
response to global crises—the EcoPatent Commons, an effort to make green/clean
technologies available in the fight against climate change, and a number of recent
pledges made in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
2. The EcoPatent Commons
In January 2008, IBM, Nokia, Pitney Bowes, and Sony launched an innovative
project known as the EcoPatent Commons (EcoPC). The announced mission of
EcoPC which was “to manage a collection of patents pledged for unencumbered use
by companies and IP rights holders around the world to make it easier and faster to
innovate and implement industrial processes that improve and protect the global

126

See Jorge L. Contreras, When a Stranger Calls: Standards Outsiders and
Unencumbered Patents, 12 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 507, 509–10 (2016) [hereinafter
Contreras, Stranger] (discussing non-participants in standards-related pledges). See
generally Michael Mattioli, Patent Pool Outsiders, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 225 (2018)
(discussing non-participants in patent pools).
127
Rembrandt Wireless Techs., LP v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:13-CV-213-JRG,
2016 WL 633909, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2016). See generally Contreras, Stranger, supra
note 126 (finding that a material number of assertions of standards-essential patents are
brought by outsiders to the standardization process).
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environment.”128 A total of thirteen firms eventually joined the EcoPC and
collectively pledged a total of 248 “green technology” patents between its formation
in 2008 and its discontinuation in 2016.129
But despite significant coverage in the press and academic literature,130 a study
conducted by Contreras, Hall, and Helmers found that the EcoPC failed to achieve
any meaningful diffusion of the pledged technologies.131 Through interviews of
EcoPC participants and organizers, the authors identified several possible
explanations for the EcoPC’s inability to achieve its goals:
[There were] several common critiques of the EcoPC’s structure and
operational processes that help explain our quantitative findings,
particularly EcoPC’s inability to provide information regarding the usage
of contributed technologies. Another major impediment to diffusion was
the lack of information provided by pledging companies beyond the patent
documents that could have helped potential users (especially in developing
countries) see potential applications of the pledged technologies. Finally,
no concerted effort was made to group or link patents in the commons to
any particular technology. This lack of coordination may have limited
synergies that could have been created through a more deliberate approach
to the technologies covered by contributed patents.132
Despite these shortcomings, the EcoPC was an ambitious and innovative effort
directed toward an urgent public need. As such, it offers valuable lessons for the
designers of future industry-driven efforts to open intellectual property for public
use, and in many respects served as a model for the Open COVID Pledge.
3. COVID-19 Pledges
The COVID-19 pandemic gave rise to a number of unilateral and collective IP
pledges in addition to the Open COVID Pledge.133 Several of these are described
below.

128

WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., ECO-PATENT COMMONS: JOINING
OR SUBMITTING ADDITIONAL PATENTS TO THE COMMONS 2 (2012), http://www.otromundoes
posible.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/EcoPatentGroundRules.pdf [https://perma.cc/6247
-7Q8T] (last visited Mar. 1, 2021).
129
See Contreras et al., Pledging Patents for the Public Good, supra note 57, at 74.
130
Id. at 68–69.
131
Id. at 70–71.
132
Id. at 71.
133
See Contreras et al., Pledging, supra note 31, at 1147.
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(a) Wellcome Trust Publishers Pledge
The first pandemic-related IP pledge addressed copyrights. On January 31,
2020, the Wellcome Trust, a large UK-based medical charity, led a group of
approximately thirty scientific and medical publishers in committing to make all
peer-reviewed research publications relating to COVID-19 available without charge
on an open access basis.134 The signatories included Elsevier, Cell Press, Karger, the
JAMA Network, the New England Journal of Medicine, Oxford University Press,
Springer Nature, Taylor & Francis, Wiley, and Wolters Kluwer. The initiative
echoed earlier Wellcome-led pledges of similar scope made with respect to research
concerning the Zika and Ebola outbreaks.135
(b) Fortress/Labrador
As noted above,136 in March, 2020, patent assertion entity (PAE) Labrador
Diagnostics sued French firm bioMérieux and its Utah-based subsidiary BioFire
Diagnostics for the infringement of patents allegedly claiming diagnostic kits being
developed for COVID-19. The patents had been acquired by Labrador’s parent
company, Fortress Investments, from defunct blood testing company Theranos.
News of the lawsuit sparked a wave of negative publicity that soon persuaded
Fortress to end the lawsuit and publicly offer royalty-free licenses to anyone
conducting COVID-19 testing.
(c) Ventilator Manufacturers
Some of the first pandemic-related patent pledges were made by hospital
ventilator manufacturers Smiths Group (March 21, 2020) and Medtronic, Inc.
(March 30, 2020). In connection with its pledge, each of these companies released
the electronic design files associated with a particular ventilator model and
authorized others to use those files and accompanying software to manufacture and
sell ventilator products on a royalty-free basis.137
134

Press Release, Wellcome Tr., Sharing Research Data and Findings Relevant to the
Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) Outbreak (Jan. 31, 2020), https://wellcome.org/corona
virus-covid-19/open-data [https://perma.cc/H4KZ-VMKD].
135
Press Release, Wellcome Tr., Statement on Data Sharing in Public Health
Emergencies (Jan. 31, 2016), https://wellcome.org/press-release/statement-data-sharingpublic-health-emergencies [https://perma.cc/U436-KPME]; Press Release, Wellcome Tr.,
Sharing Research Findings and Data Relevant to the Ebola Outbreak in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (May 21, 2018), https://wellcome.org/press-release/sharing-researchfindings-and-data-relevant-ebola-outbreak-democratic-republic-congo [https://perma.cc/M
WE6-JSP4].
136
See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
137
See UK’s Smiths Makes Ventilator Available to Other Producers, REUTERS (Mar.
21, 2020, 5:27 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-health-coronavirus-britain-
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Medtronic requires any user that wishes to download its design files to register
on its website.138 It then grants users a non-exclusive license that extends until the
later of the end of the WHO-declared Public Health Emergency of International
Concern or October 1, 2024.139 The license requires users that modify the Medtronic
files or software to make those modifications available on terms identical to those
extended under Medtronic’s license (i.e., a share-alike or copyleft-style
requirement).140
The Smiths pledge is not publicly available and appears to be extended only to
other members of the UK government’s Ventilator Challenge Consortium.141
(d) UC Berkeley Innovative Genomics Institute
The Innovative Genomics Institute (IGI) at University of California Berkeley
is a Howard Hughes-funded, semi-autonomous research group that has achieved
global recognition for its groundbreaking work on CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing (an
accomplishment for which its President, Jennifer Doudna, received the Nobel Prize
in Chemistry for 2020). On March 23, IGI released an “Emergency COVID-19
Technology Pledge” in which it committed to make technology that its researchers
developed after March 13, 2020 (the date of a pivotal, multi-party meeting convened
by Doudna), available on a royalty-free basis to any entity conducting research on
the diagnosis or treatment of COVID-19.142 To effectuate these rights, a user is
ventilator-idUKKBN2180IG [https://perma.cc/F4T2-J7EJ]; Press Release, Medtronic,
Medtronic Shares Ventilation Design Specifications to Accelerate Efforts to Increase Global
Ventilator Production (Mar. 30, 2020), https://newsroom.medtronic.com/newsreleases/news-release-details/medtronic-shares-ventilation-design-specifications-accelerate
[https://perma.cc/NWU5-KGKR]. Though neither the Smiths nor the Medtronic pledge
specifically mentions patents, the license grant of the Medtronic pledge speaks in terms of
the statutory rights of a patent holder. Medtronic, Permissive License—Open Ventilator Files
1, https://www.medtronic.com/content/dam/medtronic-com/global/Corporate/covid19/docu
ments/permissive-license-open-ventilator.pdf [https://perma.cc/KY6W-6DNZ] (last visited
Feb. 17, 2021) [hereinafter Medtronic, Permissive License] (“Medtronic hereby provides [to
each user of the program] a non-exclusive, royalty-free, world-wide license to the Design
Materials to use, make, have made, manufacture, have manufactured, sell and have sold a
ventilator . . . in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.”).
138
Register to Download Ventilator Files, MEDTRONIC, https://www.medtronic.com/us
-en/e/open-files.html?cmpid=vanity_url_medtronic_com_openventilator_Corp_US_Covid
19_FY20 [https://perma.cc/MHH6-YG8C] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
139
Medtronic, Permissive License, supra note 137.
140
Id.; see also discussion supra Sections II.A, II.B (discussing share-alike and copyleft
licenses).
141
See Contreras et al., Pledging, supra note 31, at 1147 tbl. 1.
142
Press Release, Innovative Genomics Inst., Our Pledge to Share COVID-19 IP (Mar.
29,
2020),
https://innovativegenomics.org/news/our-pledge-to-share-covid-19-ip/
[https://perma.cc/J6X9-5L33]; see also University of California, Berkeley, Office of
Technology Licensing, Special Non-Exclusive Limited License Between [ ] and the Regents
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required to enter into a license agreement with the University of California
enumerating the specific patents that are licensed.
(e) Harvard-MIT-Stanford (HMS)
On April 7, 2020 (the same day that the OCP was launched), Harvard
University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and Stanford
University (collectively referred to as HMS) announced a “COVID-19 Technology
Access Framework” that it describes as follows:
We are committed to implementing COVID-19 patenting and licensing
strategies that are consistent with our goal of facilitating rapid global
access. For most types of technologies, this includes the use of rapidly
executable non-exclusive royalty-free licenses to intellectual property
rights that we have the right to license, for the purpose of making and
distributing products to prevent, diagnose and treat COVID-19 infection
during the pandemic and for a short period thereafter.143
As of January 2021, twenty additional U.S. research institutions and one nonU.S. university had also “signed” this commitment.144 While the HMS Framework
does not utilize a self-executing “public” licensing agreement, the universities
commit to using a “rapidly executable” agreement. The licenses to be granted are
both non-exclusive and royalty-free, features designed to ensure broad access. The
term of the licenses is the COVID-19 pandemic plus “a short period thereafter,” and
their scope is limited to making and distributing products intended to prevent,
diagnose, and treat COVID-19 infection.
One important feature of the HMS licenses is their express expectation that
users will commit “to distribute the resulting products as widely as possible and at a
low cost that allows broad accessibility during the term of the license.”145 This type
of the University of California for Covid-19 Limited Applications of Intellectual Property
(on file with the author). The meeting and the circumstances leading up to the IGI pledge are
described in WALTER ISAACSON, THE CODE BREAKER: JENNIFER DOUDNA, GENE EDITING,
AND THE FUTURE OF THE HUMAN RACE 405 (2021).
143
COVID-19 Technology Access Framework, STAN. OFF. TECH. LICENSING,
https://otl.stanford.edu/covid-19-technology-access-framework
[https://perma.cc/6RPLT8AK] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021) (emphasis in original removed).
144
The full list includes: The Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard, Cornell University,
Dartmouth College, Drexel University, Georgetown University, King Abdullah University
of Science and Technology, Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center, Mississippi State
University, Northeastern University, Ohio State University, Oregon Health & Science
University, Oregon State University, RTI International, University of Arkansas for Medical
Sciences, University of Louisiana at Lafayette, University of Maryland–College Park,
University of Nevada Reno, University of South Alabama, University of Texas at San
Antonio, Virginia Commonwealth University, and Yale University. Id.
145
Id.
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of “downstream” pricing constraint is intended to ensure that technology licensed
on a royalty-free basis is not priced so high by manufacturers that certain users
cannot afford it.
It is unclear at this time how many, and to whom, licenses have been granted
under the HMS Framework, and with respect to what intellectual property, as this
information does not appear to be publicly available.
(f) Oxford and AstraZeneca
Approximately two weeks after the announcement of the HMS Framework,
Oxford University unveiled a similar program that also included the express
expectation of downstream pricing constraints.146 But in August, Oxford is reported
to have granted pharmaceutical giant AstraZeneca an exclusive license to the
university’s COVID-19 vaccine technology with no pricing constraints.147 Oxford’s
apparent abandonment of its earlier pledge has attracted criticism,148 but has not yet
been challenged on legal grounds.149
Interestingly, AstraZeneca itself pledged to distribute the vaccine “at no profit
for the duration of the pandemic,”150 though some debate has emerged regarding the
company’s apparent discretion to declare an end to the pandemic far earlier than
public health authorities.151
(g) AbbVie-Kaletra
On March 18, 2020, Israel’s Minister of Health issued a permit for the
importation of generic versions of AbbVie’s patented AIDS drug Kaletra for the
146
Expedited Access for COVID-19 Related IP, OXFORD UNIV. INNOVATION,
https://innovation.ox.ac.uk/technologies-available/technology-licensing/expedited-accesscovid-19-related-ip/ [https://perma.cc/NGX3-6UZM] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
147
Jay Hancock, Kaiser Health News, Oxford’s COVID Vaccine Deal with
AstraZeneca Raises Concerns About Access and Pricing, FORTUNE (Aug. 24, 2020, 3:00
AM),
https://fortune.com/2020/08/24/oxford-astrazeneca-covid-vaccine-deal-pricingprofit-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/37Y5-PR8V]. Oxford does not appear to have commented
on these reports. See Donato Paolo Mancini, AstraZeneca Vaccine Document Shows Limit
of No-Profit Pledge, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/c474f9e1-88074e57-9c79-6f4af145b686 [https://perma.cc/X9K5-8LRE].
148
See Luke McDonagh, Could University Patents Stand in the Way of Universal
Global Access to a COVID-19 Vaccine?, LSETHINKS (Sept. 10, 2020),
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/covid19/2020/09/10/could-university-patents-stand-in-the-way-ofuniversal-global-access-to-a-covid-19-vaccine/ [https://perma.cc/3GL7-7UGT].
149
See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 119, at 548 (discussing the legal grounds
for enforcement of patent pledges under U.S. law).
150
Press Release, AstraZeneca, AZD1222 Vaccine Met Primary Efficacy Endpoint in
Preventing COVID-19 (Nov. 23, 2020, 7:00 AM GMT), https://www.astrazeneca.com/cont
ent/dam/az/media-centre-docs/press-releases/2020/AZD1222-HLR-RNS.pdf [https://perma
.cc/P6E9-FLLJ].
151
See Mancini, supra note 147.
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purpose of treating COVID-19.152 Two days later, AbbVie announced that it would
no longer enforce patents relating to Kaletra anywhere in the world.153 AbbVie’s
pledge was widely viewed as a response to Israel’s action, and was possibly an
attempt to avoid compulsory licensing orders by other governments.154
(h) Open COVID-19 Declaration (Japan)
In early May 2020, two Japanese business executives and a professor from
Kyoto University organized a Japan-focused pledge community similar to the
OCP.155 The pledge, administered by a venture-backed biotechnology firm called
GenoConcierge, quickly attracted major Japanese industrial firms from the
automotive, electronics, and healthcare industries.156 Pledgors include LSI Medience
and SRL Inc., which provide COVID-19 diagnostic testing, Mitsubishi Chemical,
which operates in the health care sector, and Teijin, a pharmaceutical
manufacturer.157 To date, the Japanese program claims that over one hundred
organizations have pledged nearly one million patents toward “any activities whose
sole purpose is stopping the spread of COVID-19, including diagnosis, prevention,
containment and treatment.”158 In addition to patents, the pledge covers utility
models, designs, and copyrights.159
Like the OCP, the Japanese pledge permits firms to modify the terms on which
they are willing to make their IP available to users. As reported by one press account,
eighteen pledgors had modified these terms by late May 2020.160 The modifications
152
See Israel Approves Import of Generic of AbbVie’s HIV Drug for Covid-19, PHARM.
TECH. (Mar. 20, 2020, 1:11 PM), https://www.pharmaceutical-technology.com/news/kalet
ra-covid-19-israel/ [https://perma.cc/MN5K-U3ZY] [hereinafter Israel Approves Import of
Generic, PHARM. TECH.].
153
See Donato Paolo Mancini & Hannah Kuchler, AbbVie Drops Patent Rights for
Kaletra Antiviral Treatment, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/5a7a
9658-6d1f-11ea-89df-41bea055720b [https://perma.cc/9F3N-CG9G]; Ed Silverman,
AbbVie Will Allow Generic Copies of Its HIV Pill in Israel After the Government Approved
a License, STAT (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2020/03/23/abbviehiv-kaletra-generics-coronavirus-covid19/ [https://perma.cc/E34Z-6YCD].
154
See Silverman, supra note 153 (noting AbbVie’s historical “aversion to compulsory
licenses” in other contexts) (quoting Professor Brook Baker).
155
See Jacob Schindler & Bing Zhao, Top Japanese Corporates Pledge Patent NonAssertion to Speed Virus Fight, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (May 7, 2020), https://www.iammedia.com/coronavirus/top-japanese-corporates-pledge-patent-non-assertion-speed-virusfight [https://perma.cc/2N63-WVNA].
156
Id.
157
GenoConcierge Kyoto, Open COVID-19 Declaration (Apr. 3, 2020),
https://www.gckyoto.com/covid-2-1 [https://perma.cc/7VBJ-CEBE].
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Jacob Schindler, Japanese Covid-19 Patent Pledge Triples Membership, but Users
Must Read Fine Print, INTELL. ASSET MGT. (May 25, 2020), https://www.iam-
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include requirements that users notify pledgors of their activities and the patents that
they intend to use, and potential limitations to the term of the license extended.161 In
addition, concerns have been raised regarding the language of the pledge, which
extends only to activities whose “sole” purpose relates to COVID-19.162
(i) Gilead-Remdesivir
In May 2020, amidst calls for foreign governments to impose compulsory
licenses on Gilead’s patented drug remdesivir,163 Gilead granted non-exclusive
licenses to, and committed to share manufacturing technology with, five generic
pharmaceutical manufacturers based in Egypt, India, and Pakistan for distribution in
127 low-income countries.164 The licenses will remain royalty-free until the WHO
declares the end of the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency of International
Concern, or until a pharmaceutical product other than remdesivir or a vaccine is
approved to treat or prevent COVID-19.165
(j) Moderna—mRNA Vaccine
On October 8, 2020, mRNA vaccine maker Moderna, Inc. publicly pledged not
to enforce its COVID-19 related patents against “those making vaccines intended to
combat the pandemic.”166 In its pledge, Moderna refers to its “special obligation
under the current circumstances to use our resources to bring this pandemic to an
end as quickly as possible.”167 Yet other benefits may accrue to Moderna from its
commitment not to assert its patents. First, the U.S. National Institutes of Health
(NIH), which funded at least some of Moderna’s vaccine R&D, is reported to have
media.com/coronavirus/japanese-covid-19-patent-pledge-triples-membership-patent-usersmust-read-fine [https://perma.cc/VJA5-XNAH].
161
Id.
162
Id. (discussing possible interpretations of “sole purpose”).
163
See Zeba Siddiqui, Health Groups Ask India to Rescind Gilead’s Patents for
COVID-19 Drug Remdesivir, REUTERS (May 14, 2020, 3:37 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-health-coronavirus-india-remdesivir/health-groups-ask-india-to-rescind-gileadspatents-for-covid-19-drug-remdesivir-idUSKBN22Q1EJ [https://perma.cc/5DS5-7MXF].
164
Voluntary Licensing Agreements for Remdesivir, GILEAD SCIS.,
https://www.gilead.com/purpose/advancing-global-health/covid-19/voluntary-licensingagreements-for-remdesivir [https://perma.cc/6W5Q-7MRT] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021)
[hereinafter Voluntary Licensing Agreements, GILEAD SCIS.]; Ed Silverman, Gilead Signs
Licenses for Generic Companies to Make and Sell Remdesivir in 127 Countries, STAT (May
12, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2020/05/12/gilead-generics-remdesivircovid19-coronavirus-licenses/ [https://perma.cc/ZE77-4HEH].
165
Voluntary Licensing Agreements, GILEAD SCIS., supra note 164.
166
Press Release, Moderna, Statement by Moderna on Intellectual Property Matters
During the COVID-19 Pandemic (Oct. 8, 2020, 6:39 AM), https://investors.modernatx.com/
news-releases/news-release-details/statement-moderna-intellectual-property-matters-during
-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/A3TW-ZD4K] [hereinafter Moderna Press Release].
167
Id.
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claimed an interest in some of Moderna’s patents.168 Moderna’s pledge could have
helped to persuade NIH to drop its claims to the patents, given their reduced
licensing value. In addition, one watchdog group has alleged that Moderna failed to
make legally required disclosures of federal funding for the inventions underlying
some of its patents, leading to an ongoing investigation by the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA).169 Unlike most of the other pledgors discussed
above, Moderna was the subject of a significant public campaign to make its vaccine
technology more broadly available.170
Table 1, below, summarizes the principal terms of the foregoing pledges made
and royalty-free licenses granted in response to COVID-19 and situates the Open
COVID Pledge chronologically within this group.

168

Adam Houldsworth, Potential Breakthrough Covid Vaccine Faces Even Greater IP
Uncertainties, INTELL. ASSET MGT. (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.iam-media.com/litigation/
potential-breakthrough-covid-vaccine-faces-even-greater-ip-uncertainties [https://perma.cc
/3PQC-MGWQ]; Jorge L. Contreras, Deconstructing Moderna’s COVID-19 Patent Pledge,
BILL OF HEALTH (Oct. 21, 2020), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/10/21/moder
na-covid19-patent-pledge/ [https://perma.cc/6NHE-526S] [hereinafter Contreras, Moderna].
169
Luis Gil Abinader, Moderna Failures to Disclose DARPA Funding in Patented
Inventions (Knowledge Ecology Int’l, Research Note 2020:3, Aug. 27, 2020),
https://www.keionline.org/wp-content/uploads/RN-2020-3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HD9SUPQ6].
170
See Press Release, Univs. Allied for Essential Meds., Moderna Should Free All
COVID-19 IP (Nov. 19, 2020), https://freethevaccine.org/2020/11/19/uaem-press-releasemoderna-should-free-all-covid-19-ip/ [https://perma.cc/SE7V-QXMZ] (discussing civil
society campaigns, including the August 2020 protest at Moderna’s Cambridge, Mass.
headquarters).
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Table 1: Intellectual Property Pledges and Royalty-Free Licenses for COVID-19
Pledge

Date

Form

Duration

IP

Wellcome Trust
Publishers’ Grp

1/31/20

Pledge

Duration of
outbreak

Fortress/
Labrador

3/17/20

Pledge

?

AbbVie

3/19/20

Pledge

?

Smiths

3/21/20

Pledge

?

Publications
relating to
COVID-19
Diagnostic
patents relating
to COVID-19
Kaletra/Aluvia
patents
Ventilator
designs,
software,
patents

UC Berkeley
Innovative
Genomics Inst.

3/23/20

Pledge +
Bilateral
License

Term of
patents

Specified
patents

Medtronic

3/30/20

Public
License

PHEIC* or
12/1/24

Designs,
software,
patents

Open COVID
Pledge

4/7/20
4/7/20

Pandemic**
+ 1 year or
1/1/23
Pandemic**
+ short period

Patents,
copyrights

Harvard-MITStanford
OxfordAstraZeneca

4/8/20

Pledge +
Public
License
Pledge +
Bilateral
Licenses
Pledge +
Bilateral
Licenses

Pandemic**

Unspecified

Open COVID19 Declaration
(Japan)

5/7/20

Pledge

PHEIC*

Patents, utility
models, designs,
copyrights

Gilead Sciences

5/12/20

Licenses

PHEIC* or
approval of
alternate drug

Remdesivir
patents, knowhow

Moderna

10/8/20

Pledge

n/a

mRNA vaccine
patents

Unspecified

* Duration of WHO-declared Public Health Emergency of International Concern
** Duration of WHO-declared COVID-19 pandemic

Restrictions and
limitations
n/a
n/a
n/a
Only offered to
members of UK
Ventilator
Challenge
Consortium
Only covers
technology
invented after
3/13/20
Sharealike for
modifications;
User registration/
identification
Defensive
suspension
Licensed products
must be distributed
at low cost
Licensed products
must be distributed
free of charge, atcost or cost +
limited margin
Applies to
activities whose
“sole purpose” is
addressing
COVID-19.
Add’l restrictions
may be added by
pledgors
Licensed to 5
generic drug
makers for sale in
low-income
countries
n/a
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III. ANATOMY OF THE OPEN COVID PLEDGE
In early 2020, as COVID-19 infections rapidly spread around the world and
stories of patent-related impediments to the supply of critical technologies began to
surface, groups of scientists, engineers, and advocates came together at conferences
and via discussion lists and collaboration platforms to explore ways that they might
help. Would it be possible, some wondered, to create a platform that could enable,
and thereby encourage, a broad range of organizations to commit their IP to the fight
against the pandemic? The legal structures described in Part II—open source code
licensing, Creative Commons licenses and earlier IP pledges—informed the effort
to create a generalized platform for the contribution of intellectual property to this
cause. This Part describes the genesis and evolution of this effort and details some
of the considerations that went into the design and drafting of the Open COVID
Pledge.
A. The Role of a New COVID-19 Pledge Community
As discussed in Part I, there are several ways in which access to critical
technologies may be facilitated in times of crisis. These include governmental
measures, such as compulsory licensing, as well as voluntary pools coordinated by
non-profit or intergovernmental bodies. The sudden onset and evident seriousness
of COVID-19 led to rapid interventions by a handful of governments,171 but these
initial actions did not precipitate a broader cascade of governmental relaxation of IP
rights. Especially in the U.S., strong internal opposition to the weakening of IP rights
made such interventions unlikely.172 Moreover, formal patent pools, while
potentially valuable, require significant time, funding, administrative support, and
political willpower to develop.173
In contrast, voluntary pledges that a number of IP holders, such as Medtronic,
Smiths Group, and AbbVie, made early in the pandemic achieved expanded access
to key technologies quickly and with a minimum of administrative overhead. But as
valuable as these unilateral actions were, they represented one-off interventions
designed with a particular company’s rights, goals, and markets in mind.
The founders of the Open COVID Pledge believed that a more generalized
platform for IP contributions could facilitate pledges by organizations that did not
wish to re-invent the wheel (with the concomitant expenditures of managerial and
legal resources), or that wished to participate in a collective activity with broad171

See discussion supra Section I.B.1.
See id. Notwithstanding this longstanding attitude, in May 2021, to the surprise of
many, the U.S. Trade Representative expressed public support for the waiver of trade
penalties against countries authorizing broader access to COVID-19 technologies. See Press
Release, Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Statement from Ambassador Katherine Tai on the Covid-19
Trips Waiver (May 5, 2021), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2021/may/statement-ambassador-katherine-tai-covid-19-trips-waiver [https://perm
a.cc/XNP3-NRS5].
173
See discussion supra Section I.B.3.
172
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based industry support. Such a platform could also offer an avenue for meaningful
contributions by holders of IP in industries that were not directly targeted by
organized pooling efforts (i.e., while vaccines and therapeutics have received
significant attention in international pooling proposals, medical equipment, and
software applications have not).
Such a legal framework, once available, could also be utilized by governments
that wished to encourage (or require) parties receiving research grants and
procurement funding to make the resulting IP broadly available.174 In a similar vein,
a common legal framework for pledging IP could be used by international pooling
efforts such as the WHO’s COVID Technology Access Pool (C-TAP) as a
lightweight alternative to a formal IP pool structure.175
For all of these reasons, the need presented itself for an independent,
lightweight framework to enable IP sharing by a broad range of entities in the fight
against COVID-19.
B. Organization—The Open COVID Steering Committee176
The Open COVID Pledge arose from discussion threads among researchers at
the Innovative Genomics Institute at University of California Berkeley, the
Department of Genetics at Stanford University, and the Engineering Department at
the University of Cambridge. As these discussions moved toward potential legal
interventions, legal academics and practitioners familiar with IP sharing structures
were invited to join.
By mid-March 2020, at least three sets of written proposals for a common IP
sharing platform had been circulated by different groups. Shortly thereafter, a selfdesignated core of volunteers coalesced to reconcile the different approaches. This
small group referred to itself as the Open COVID Coalition and, later, as the OCP
Steering Committee,177 and included four academic scientists and engineers, a
practicing engineer, two legal academics, and two practicing attorneys, with
individuals based at various organizations in the western U.S. and the UK.178

174
See Jorge L. Contreras, Expanding Access to Patents for COVID-19, in ASSESSING
LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, 158, 160 (Scott Burris, Sarah de Guia, Lance Gable,
Donna E. Levin, Wendy E. Parmet & Nicolas P. Terry eds., 2020),
https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/covid-legal-responses.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XK9K-DAEJ] [hereinafter Contreras, Expanding Access]; Tietze et al.,
supra note 8, at 13–14.
175
See C-TAP Concept Paper, supra note 98, at 5 (integrating the OCP into WHO’s CTAP program).
176
The material in this Part is based on the author’s personal recollections, notes, and
email archives.
177
See supra note 33.
178
Later, a marketing specialist was added. Additional assistance was provided by a
number of student volunteers at Stanford University, Cornell University, and elsewhere.
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Most of these individuals had prior professional or personal connections with
at least some other members of the group,179 thereby leveraging personal networks
to facilitate both formation and collaboration. Importantly, each individual brought
different but overlapping expertise to the group in complementary areas including
biological science, product engineering, software development, technology
dissemination, patent analysis, and intellectual property licensing.
By mid-March, travel restrictions were in place across much of the world, so
frequent meetings were held during late March and early April via Zoom, and
document drafting and review progressed rapidly through email, Google Docs, and
the Slack collaboration platform.
C. Design Requirements
The goal of the Steering Committee was to create a legal framework for the
rapid and broad commitment of IP rights to facilitate the discovery, development,
manufacture, and supply of critical technologies and equipment in the worldwide
response to COVID-19. Such a framework would need to accommodate the
requirements of both IP holders and IP users across multiple jurisdictions.
As such, a number of fundamental design requirements were recognized early
during the drafting process of what would come to be known as the Open COVID
Pledge.
The fundamental design requirements for the OCP were:
1. Legal Enforceability—any commitment made by IP holders had to be
legally enforceable. Mere aspirational statements and expressions of intent were not
sufficient. The commitment of IP to the COVID-19 response via this mechanism
was intended to be binding and, if need be, enforceable through the legal system.
What’s more, given the number of lawsuits brought by PAEs, even in the COVID19 area,180 the pledge needed to bind not only the pledgor, but any subsequent holder
of the pledged IP.
2. Broad Use of Pledged IP—the commitments made through the OCP should
ensure the broadest possible use of the committed IP. This principle was recognized
as important to ensure that the likely global demand for medical products and
compounds would be addressed as expeditiously as possible. It was recognized that
179

The author, for example, had prior connections with four other Steering Committee
members.
180
As noted in Introduction, both Labrador Diagnostics and Swirlate, which asserted
patents covering COVID-19 applications, are PAEs that acquired their patents from prior
owners (Theranos and Panasonic, respectively). The binding nature of IP pledges on
successive IP holders has been discussed at length in the literature and has been the subject
of several disputes. See generally Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND
Commitments and Other Patent Pledges, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 479 (2015) [hereinafter
Contreras, Market Reliance] (discussing various theories supporting the enforceability of
patent pledges).
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a requirement of broad usage would rule out the granting of exclusive licenses.
However, it was also believed that the typical rationale for exclusive licensing—the
need to give large financial incentives to innovators in order to undertake significant
development risks and costs—might be offset in the context of COVID-19 by
governmental grant and procurement programs that could provide enormous
financial incentives to innovators.181
3. Supplier Acceptance—the legal framework for making commitments should
not be so burdensome or punitive to IP holders that it would dissuade them from
participating. That is, the requirements on IP holders (suppliers) should be as
reasonable as possible, within the constraints established by Requirements 1 and 2.
In this way, the OCP should reflect the design of other open innovation frameworks
“both to keep proprietary technologies safely protected within the boundaries of an
integrated firm and to govern the collaboration and knowledge exchange across
large ecosystems of actors trying to jointly address complex challenges.”182
Legal
Enforceability

Supplier
Acceptance

Broad
Dissemination

Figure 2: Key Design Requirements for the Open COVID Pledge
As illustrated by Figure 2, these three requirements were seen as interacting
with and counterbalancing one another. For example, an overly legalistic structure
(e.g., one requiring signed and notarized contracts for every transaction) could deter
both IP holders and users from participating. Yet an insufficiently binding
arrangement, while perhaps attractive to IP holders, would offer little comfort to
potential IP users. Likewise, structures that would encourage broad dissemination
but were too accommodating to users, such as contribution of IP to the public
domain, might be unattractive to IP holders.183 What was needed was a balance
among these three fundamental requirements.
181

Contreras, Expanding Access, supra note 174.
McGahan et al., supra note 38, at 55.
183
While some scholars have advocated for an increased use of the public domain for
open innovation, see, e.g., Clark D. Asay, A Case for the Public Domain, 74 OHIO ST. L.J.
753 (2013), this approach is often less appealing to IP holders than pledges because it
182
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D. Design Principles
From the three fundamental design requirements for the OCP emerged a set of
design principles that guided the creation of the OCP legal instrument. These design
principles included the following:
1. Simplicity—in order to drive adoption by both IP holders and users, it was
determined that the legal structure for the OCP should be as simple and intuitive as
possible. In this respect, the Creative Commons suite of licenses was viewed as an
exemplar—the top-level CC ‘tags’ are straightforward and elegant in their design
and understandable to non-lawyers around the world, yet each tag is linked to a
comprehensive licensing agreement that contains a range of necessary terms and
conditions.184
2. Uniformity—in order to engender trust and to accelerate adoption, it was
determined that the OCP should offer a uniform set of terms for adoption by IP
holders. Like the Creative Commons licenses and popular OSI-certified OSS
licenses,185 the use of a known set of terms that have been vetted and adopted by
others is likely to achieve rapid uptake by IP holders. Likewise, from the perspective
of users, there is significant benefit in using IP that is licensed under a consistent
and well-understood set of terms, rather than a patchwork of bespoke licenses that
varies from licensor to licensor. Uniform in-license terms enable a user to conduct
its business without concern that certain licenses may not permit the desired activity,
and without detailed monitoring of multiple licensing arrangements.
3. Self-Execution—it was determined that, like Creative Commons and OSS
licenses, as well as many patent pledges, the OCP should be a self-executing and
anonymous license that did not require negotiation or signature by either party.
Interposing administrative steps such as these into the licensing process would, it
was felt, substantially lengthen the time required for each transaction and reduce the
overall uptake of contributed IP. Likewise, the introduction of a negotiated license,
represents an apparent abandonment of potentially valuable assets, it eliminates the holder’s
ability to enforce IP against unauthorized uses (i.e., beyond the scope of the relevant pledge
or license), and it relinquishes a potential weapon that can be used defensively in IP litigation.
For these reasons, even OSS licenses do not constitute a contribution to the public domain.
See supra note 102.
184
See discussion supra Section II.B. By the same token, overly complex and
unfamiliar licensing programs can deter participation. See Jorge L. Contreras, FRAND
Market Failure: IPXI’s Standards-Essential Patent License Exchange, 15 CHI.-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP. 419, 439 (2016). The experience of Creative Commons with open patent
licensing was invaluable to the OCP Steering Committee. See Mariateresa Maggiolino &
Maria Lillà Montagnani, Standardized Terms and Conditions for Open Patenting, 14 MINN.
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 785, 797–98 (2013) (discussing Creative Commons’ prior experiences with
patent licensing).
185
See discussion supra Sections II.A., II.B; Maggiolino & Montagnani, supra note
184, at 792 (discussing the value of standardization in open licenses).
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as well as requirements for tracking and reporting of use, could deter small and
unsophisticated parties from using contributed IP. Thus, unlike the pledge
frameworks proposed by Berkeley IGI and HMS,186 the OCP would not require any
form of written or electronic acknowledgement by users. Rather, the OCP would
make IP available to anyone who wished to use it with no strings attached.
4. Limited Scope—from the standpoint of attracting IP holders, it was
important to limit the scope of the Pledge to the COVID-19 pandemic and no more.
As noted above, potential therapies, medical equipment, and response systems that
could be used in connection with COVID-19 might have existing and new uses
beyond the pandemic. Yet asking IP holders to relinquish the commercial potential
of all potential applications of their technology was viewed as excessive. Thus, the
scope of the OCP was limited to the COVID-19 pandemic and related activities. In
this sense, the OCP resembled the pledge made by pharmaceutical manufacturer
AbbVie, which pledged not to assert patents covering its drug Kaletra, but only to
the extent that the drug was used as a therapy for COVID-19 and not as a treatment
for AIDS (the drug’s principal use and source of revenue).187 In a complementary
vein, it is possible that a pledge of rights could popularize a particular technology
developed by the pledgor, leading to potential commercial licensing opportunities
after the end of the pandemic or in fields beyond COVID-19.188
5. No Charge—the crux of the OCP commitment is that it allows the use of
pledged IP without charge. There is little public benefit to facilitating or promoting
paid licenses by IP holders. IP holders who wish to charge for licenses to use their
IP are already in a position to do so, and potential users may approach them to
negotiate a license on commercial terms.189
In some industries, particularly electronics and telecommunications,
participants in technical standards development organizations (SDOs) are required
to commit to license their patents to users of standards on terms that are “fair,
reasonable and nondiscriminatory” or FRAND.190 This type of pledge seeks to
ensure broad adoption of the standardized technology while allowing patent holders
to recoup their investment in technology development. The Steering Committee
186
See discussion supra Sections II.C.3.d, II.C.3.e; Maggiolino & Montagnani, supra
note 184, at 794 (discussing Yahoo Domain Keys as a self-executing, open public patent
license).
187
See Israel Approves Import of Generic, PHARM. TECH. , supra note 152.
188
This “loss leader” strategy has been used to explain other IP pledges as well. See
Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 119, at 573 (describing “inducement” type pledges in
which “the pledgor calculates that it is likely to derive greater benefit from the behavior that
it seeks to induce in others than from using its patents to exclude others from the market”);
see also discussion supra Section II.C.1.
189
For this reason, we saw little value in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s
vaunted “Patents 4 Partnerships IP Marketplace Platform.” See supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
190
Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 119, at 575–76.
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rejected this approach, however, as the meaning of FRAND, even in industries
where it has been used for decades, is hotly contested and has led to significant
litigation around the world.191
In order to achieve the broadest possible dissemination and use of pledged IP,
the Steering Committee determined that licenses must be free of charge, even if the
inability to charge deters some IP holders from participating.192 Moreover, the
absence of usage charges substantially contributes to the simplicity, uniformity, and
self-executability of the Pledge, as it does with Creative Commons and open-source
software licenses.
DESIGN REQUIREMENTS

DESIGN PRINCIPLES
Simplicity

Legal Enforceability
Uniformity

Broad Dissemination

Self-Execution

Limited Scope
Supplier
Acceptance
No Charge

Figure 3: Mapping of OCP Design Requirements to Design Principles
E. Legal Structure
The legal structure for the Open COVID Pledge is driven by the fundamental
Design Requirements and Principles described in Sections III.C and III.D, above.
The requirement for legal enforceability, including the need to ensure that
subsequent holders of IP are bound by the pledgor’s commitments, suggested that
the OCP be supported by a legally binding license agreement.193 Yet the design
191

See generally Jorge L. Contreras, Global Rate Setting: A Solution for StandardsEssential Patents?, 94 WASH. L. REV. 701, 713–22 (2019) (describing international debates
and litigation over FRAND royalty determinations).
192
See discussion infra Section IV.B.2.a (identifying potential financial motivation as
a reason for lack of participation).
193
While numerous legal arguments have been advanced regarding the enforceability
of IP pledges standing alone, see Contreras, Market Reliance, supra note 180, at 500–41
(discussing pledge enforcement theories based on contract, antitrust, estoppel, and property
law), a more conservative approach utilizes a written licensing agreement, as licenses are
typically interpreted as running with the licensed IP, notwithstanding a change of underlying
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principle of simplicity dictated that the OCP be presented in a short and nontechnical format, easily understandable to researchers and other non-lawyers. In this
respect, the Creative Commons licenses offered an attractive model. As discussed in
Section II.B, the different CC licensing modes are described with intuitive labels
and graphical icons that are unobtrusively linked to more comprehensive legal
licensing agreements in a two-tier structure. Though the formal CC licensing
agreements are legal documents requiring a degree of legal sophistication to
understand, most users rely primarily on the simple descriptors of licensing terms
when deciding how to license their works.
This being said, the license agreements utilized by CC are, like OSS licenses,
“public” licenses that bind all persons and entities electing to download or use the
licensed content, rather than bilateral, signed licensing agreements. While the
Berkeley IGI, HMS, and Oxford pledges require users to execute individual license
agreements, the design principle of self-execution suggested that the OCP use the
simpler approach of CC and OSS, with public licenses that do not require individual
signature and delivery.
Accordingly, a one-sentence “pledge” statement was developed, stating, at a
high level, that the IP holder pledged certain IP to the fight against COVID-19. This
pledge sentence was preceded by two introductory sentences describing the urgent
need for such a pledge. After the pledge, a sentence referencing the more formal
licensing agreement was added. The final text of the OCP, as released, read as
follows:
Immediate action is required to halt the COVID-19 Pandemic and treat
those it has affected. It is a practical and moral imperative that every tool
we have at our disposal be applied to develop and deploy technologies on
a massive scale without impediment.
We therefore pledge to make our intellectual property available free
of charge for use in ending the COVID-19 pandemic and minimizing
the impact of the disease.
We will implement this pledge through a license that details the terms and
conditions under which our intellectual property is made available.
To implement a self-executing system for the OCP, a clickable “Make the
Pledge” button was inserted below the text of the pledge. When the button is clicked,
the user is taken to a set of instructions for formalizing the relevant licensing terms.
Three steps are required in order for an IP holder to make the pledge:
1.
2.

It must issue a public statement that it is making the Open COVID Pledge
(i.e., by posting on a website, issuing a press release, etc.);
It must adopt a licensing agreement (see below) detailing the terms and
conditions under which its intellectual property is made available; and

ownership. See CONTRERAS, LICENSING, supra note 105, at 56–57; Maggiolino &
Montagnani, supra note 184, at 789–90.
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It must email the Pledge organizers a link to the public statement and
license, as well as a point of contact and a copy of the organization’s logo.

The above approach ensures that the IP holder informs the public that it has
pledged certain IP under the terms of the OCP, and enables the Steering Committee
to announce this fact as well. In practice, the Steering Committee has posted the
logos of pledgors on its own website shortly after they have made the pledge, both
as recognition of their commitment and also to inform the user community that IP
held by these entities is available under the terms of the Pledge.
F. Key License Terms
Armed with a set of design principles and an overarching legal structure, the
Steering Committee, with input from the legal departments of a handful of early
potential pledgors, next developed a set of formal licensing terms to effectuate the
Pledge. These terms were incorporated into a set of “template” license forms
(referred to as Open COVID Licenses) that could easily be designated and adopted
by pledgors.194 Below are some of the considerations that informed the development
of the Open COVID Licenses, as well as a number of concessions and trade-offs that
were dictated by the design principles described above. For reference, the full text
of an Open COVID License is included in Appendix A.
1. Licensed Rights
The Open COVID Licenses cover two forms of intellectual property: patents
and copyrights. As described above, concerns regarding patents motivated the
project from the beginning. Nevertheless, the Steering Committee debated whether
to require pledgors to license their entire worldwide portfolio of patents, or to allow
pledgors to select certain patents for licensing. From an administrative standpoint, a
blanket portfolio license would be easier to execute, whereas a license of specified
patents could become complex with detailed descriptions of particular patent
families and jurisdictions. Because simplicity was an overriding concern of the
Steering Committee, it was decided that the Open COVID Licenses would be drafted
as worldwide portfolio licenses, but pledgors would be permitted to adopt
customized licenses covering only selected patents.195
The decision was made to include copyrights within the scope of the OCP given
their importance to software and digital design files, both of which are integral to
equipment and systems used in response to the pandemic. The pledge of copyrighted
scientific articles by the Wellcome Trust group196 also weighed in favor of including
194
It was anticipated from the beginning that some pledgors would insist on drafting
their own licensing agreements. To accommodate this approach, a set of compatibility
criteria were developed. See discussion infra Section III.G.
195
See id; Maggiolino & Montagnani, supra note 184, at 807 (discussing single patent
versus portfolio licenses in the context of DPL and MDPL).
196
See discussion supra Section II.C.3.a.
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copyrights in the Open COVID Licenses. However, given sensitivities of some
potential pledgors in the software industry,197 the OCP allows pledgors to choose a
form of license that covers both patents and copyrights, only patents or only
copyrights.
Other forms of intellectual property are not covered by the OCP. Trademarks
are specifically excluded, as a licensee that manufactures a patented or copyrighted
product under an OCL should not be permitted to label it with the licensor’s brand
or logo absent a commercial relationship between the two.198 Such relationships
typically require strict quality control procedures, which often involve the licensor’s
careful selection of potential licensees and monitoring of the licensee’s product
quality.199 Because such activity could impose substantial costs on the pledgor, and
could not practically be effected through a lightweight public license, no trademark
or related rights are granted.
Similarly, the OCP does not cover trade secret, know-how or similar rights, nor
does it require that the pledgor provide licensees with training, technical assistance,
knowledge transfer or materials. The Steering Committee was aware that, for certain
products such as vaccines, patent licenses alone may be insufficient to enable a
secondary supplier to manufacture the product.200 As the author has previously
observed, “complex technologies often cannot be understood and implemented,
especially by non-experts working in the developing world, merely through patent
disclosures.”201
For this reason, initiatives such as the Medicines Patent Pool and the proposed
WHO COVID-19 pool aspire to include a broad range of enabling rights, materials,
and knowledge beyond patent rights.202 Nevertheless, the overriding design
principles of simplicity and pledgor acceptability ruled out any requirement that
pledgors take affirmative steps to train or enable licensees to make use of licensed
rights. As with trademark quality control, it was felt that imposing costly and
197

For example, a software vendor might be willing to allow others to develop and
distribute their own software that is covered by the pledgor’s patents, but not to copy and
distribute the pledgor’s software without payment.
198
See Theodore C. Max & Lindsay van Keulen, 3M Takes Action to Protect Its Brand
from Price Gouging and Trademark Infringement, NAT’L L. REV. (May 5, 2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/3m-takes-action-to-protect-its-brand-price-gougingand-trademark-infringement [https://perma.cc/52HU-HXWB]; Michael R. Justus,
Unmasking the Takeaways from 3M’s Lanham Act Litigation Against N95 Mask Price
Gouging, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/unmaskingtakeaways-3m-s-lanham-act-litigation-against-n95-mask-price-gouging
[https://perma.cc/M7FH-WEQ6].
199
See CONTRERAS, LICENSING, supra note 105, at 420–428.
200
W. Nicholson Price II, Arti K. Rai & Timo Minssen, Knowledge Transfer for LargeScale Vaccine Manufacturing, 369 SCIENCE 912, 912–13 (2020).
201
Contreras et al., Pledging Patents for the Public Good, supra note 57, at 82–83
(identifying lack of technology transfer as a significant shortcoming of the EcoPatent
Commons); see also Reynolds et al., supra note 57, at 41–43 (discussing need for technology
transfer in order to create effective “research commons” for solar climate engineering).
202
See discussion supra Sections I.C.2, I.C.3.
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potentially unbounded obligations on pledgors would make the OCP unattractive to
many pledgors. Instead, the approach of the OCP is to make available legal rights
only, without affirmative service or technology delivery obligations.203 While this
could make the OCP less useful in the context of know-how-heavy products such as
vaccines,204 this compromise was felt to be necessary to secure a broad range of
patent and copyright licenses that could be profitably utilized without the provision
of additional services or materials.
2. License Scope
The scope of the Open COVID Licenses encompasses “diagnosing, preventing,
containing, and treating COVID-19,” including all research relating to COVID19.205 While this field of use is broad, it is also constrained. As noted above, many
technologies used in the response to COVID-19, whether diagnostics, therapeutics,
protective gear, medical devices or hospital equipment, have applications and uses
beyond COVID-19. A hospital ventilator, for example, can be used to treat a range
of indications causing respiratory stress, and many therapeutics being tested for use
against COVID-19 were originally developed and approved in connection with a
range of other autoimmune disorders and infectious diseases.206 For example,
AbbVie’s Kaletra drug, primarily used to treat AIDS, was considered as a potential
COVID-19 therapy, and AbbVie’s unilateral pledge relating to Kaletra was limited
to use in treating COVID-19.207
The OCP is designed specifically to address the COVID-19 pandemic, not to
open patents across the board for medical usage. Thus, if a particular patented
product is useful against both COVID-19 and another disease indication, only the
use against COVID-19 is licensed under an Open COVID License; the patent holder
may continue to charge for other uses.
Of course, this type of “single indication” license is vulnerable to abuse,
especially as licensees are not required to report on their usage to pledgors. A
licensee could conceivably sell products purportedly for COVID-19 use, with the
understanding that they can (or will) be used otherwise. The Steering Committee felt
that the risk of such abuse was not worth imposing more stringent reporting
203
See Frequently Asked Questions, OPEN COVID PLEDGE, https://opencovidpledge.
org/faqs/ [https://perma.cc/M65U-LMJ7] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021) [hereinafter OCP FAQ]
(“The Open COVID License is simply a grant of legal rights. It does not require any
cooperation, training, technical assistance or consultation by the pledgor, nor does it require
reporting or consultation by the licensee, though we encourage those taking advantage of the
pledge to share how they are using the pledge if appropriate, in order to encourage others to
join in. If a cooperative arrangement would benefit both parties, we encourage them to
negotiate one separately, with compensation if desired.”).
204
See discussion infra Section IV.B.2.
205
OCP FAQ, supra note 203 (explaining that all forms of research are covered by the
Pledge).
206
See Liu et al., supra note 5, at 324.
207
See Mancini & Kuchler, supra note 153.
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requirements on licensees (i.e., the priority was to achieve the goal of broad
adoption). If a licensee engaged in the large-scale sale of licensed products into nonCOVID markets, it is likely that the pledgor would eventually discover this abuse;
the pledgor could pursue an action for infringement.208 But at the margin, the
Steering Committee determined that the risk of undetected unlicensed uses did not
outweigh the need for a lightweight licensing framework without onerous reporting
and monitoring provisions.209
3. Waiver of Regulatory Exclusivities
In the U.S., manufacturers of FDA-approved drugs receive a period of
regulatory market exclusivity under the Hatch-Waxman Act210 that is independent
of the patent protection that they may also enjoy. Exclusivity periods range from six
months (for the first generic version of a drug that is approved) to three years (for a
new use of a previously approved drug) to five years (for a new drug compound) to
seven years (for a new “orphan” drug).211 These periods may run concurrently with
patent protection. But because they arise independently of patent rights, the grant of
a patent license does not necessarily authorize the licensee to manufacture or sell the
relevant product if the patent holder also enjoys market exclusivity under HatchWaxman. As a result, the Open COVID Licenses require the pledgor to waive the
enforcement of any regulatory exclusivities associated with products covered by the
licensed IP rights.212

208

See CONTRERAS, LICENSING, supra note 105, at 54–55 (exceeding the scope of an
IP license results in an unlicensed and infringing use).
209
Even in high-value commercial licensing arrangements it is difficult to prevent the
sale of all licensed products for unauthorized or off-label uses. See id.
210
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360cc).
211
See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.108, 316.31, 316.34 (2020); 21 U.S.C. §§ 355a, 355f,
355(j)(5)(B)(iv); Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat.
1040 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(v)). For a summary, see also Frequently Asked
Questions on Patents and Exclusivity, FDA (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/devel
opment-approval-process-drugs/frequently-asked-questions-patents-and-exclusivity#howlo
ngexclusivity [https://perma.cc/L9MK-WGJ7].
212
See Open COVID Pledge, Open COVID License—Patent Copyright version 1.1,
para. 3 (Apr. 17, 2020), https://opencovidpledge.org/v1-1-ocl-pc/ [https://perma.cc/QM352Q7K] (“REGULATORY EXCLUSIVITY - The Pledgor will not assert any regulatory
exclusivity against any entity or individual for use of the Licensed IP in accordance with the
license granted in Section 1, and we will not seek injunctive or regulatory relief to prevent
any entity or individual from doing so.”) [hereinafter Open COVID License].
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4. Term and Post-Termination Commitments
The term of the Open COVID Licenses is defined as follows:
This license is effective as of December 1, 2019 and lasts until one year
after the World Health Organization declares the COVID-19 Pandemic to
have ended, but in any event not beyond January 1, 2023, unless otherwise
extended by the Pledgor.213
The effective date for all licenses is December 1, 2019, to coincide roughly with
the emergence of COVID-19 in Wuhan. This early date ensures that any potentially
infringing activity undertaken by a licensee will be licensed retroactively once the
license is granted and avoids the anomalous situation in which a licensee is
authorized to operate under the licensed IP going forward, but remains liable for past
infringing activity. This uniform start date for all licenses also avoids the confusing
situation in which the holders of patents covering different aspects of a single
product have committed to grant Open COVID Licenses on different dates. The
manufacturer of such a product need not worry about liability for parts of its product
at different times—so long as a patent holder has made the Open COVID Pledge, its
patents should not be enforced against any product created or sold in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic.
The license extends until the end of the WHO-declared COVID-19 pandemic
plus one year. At the end of the license term, the licenses granted will be terminated
and of no further force or effect. Thus, if a user wishes to continue to use the licensed
IP after this date, or wishes to use the licensed IP for applications other than COVID19, it must negotiate an extension or a new license with the IP holder.
The one-year “tail” period following the end of the pandemic is intended to
permit licensees to wind down their licensed activity. This approach recognizes that
COVID-19 infections may still be prevalent in some parts of the world after COVID19 ceases to qualify as a global pandemic. The one-year wind-down period is also
intended to give licensees a reasonable period to negotiate commercial licenses with
pledgors for post-pandemic usage.
The “outside date” of January 1, 2023, is intended to address the situation in
which the WHO does not act expeditiously to lift its pandemic declaration. Such an
outside date is not required, and the OCL permits pledgors to offer licenses that have
no outside date, or which do not expire at all (i.e., allowing licenses to run for the
full duration of the licensed IP rights).

213

Id. at para. 2. Other open patenting frameworks have taken different approaches to
license duration. See Jason Schultz & Jennifer M. Urban, Protecting Open Innovation: The
Defensive Patent License as a New Approach to Patent Threats, Transaction Costs, And
Tactical Disarmament, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 57 (2012) (describing the Defensive Patent
License (DPL), which offers a perpetual and irrevocable license, and the Modified DPL,
which allows a licensor to terminate licenses after a 6-month notice period); Maggiolino &
Montagnani, supra note 184, at 805 (comparing DPL and MDPL).
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There is no obligation on the part of pledgors to grant post-termination licenses,
or to price post-termination licenses at fair or reasonable rates. Some have suggested
that this lack of post-termination commitment by pledgors could result in “hold-up,”
a situation in which users make substantial investments to manufacture and deploy
licensed technology during the term of the license and are thus pressured to pay
elevated rates to continue their use following termination.214 Though the threat of
hold-up is a real one, the Steering Committee deemed it more critical to make the
Pledge as attractive as possible to IP holders by limiting its duration and scope solely
to the COVID-19 pandemic. Unlike hold-up scenarios in other industries, in which
a patent threat may be unknown prior to the investments made by users,215 potential
users of pledged IP know, in advance, when the Open COVID Licenses terminate.
Thus, users should have sufficient information to price their products in a manner
that recoups their investments during the term of the license, without any assurance
of post-license continuation.
5. No Sharealike or Grantbacks
As discussed in Part II, CC “Share-Alike” and OSS “Copyleft” licenses require
that a licensee make its own modifications and improvements to the licensed
technology available to others on the same open terms as the underlying rights were
made available to it.216 This approach was adopted by Medtronic in its COVID-19
ventilator pledge.217 The theory behind such requirements is that the licensee obtains
the licensed rights for free, and should thus contribute its own improvements to the
community on a similar basis (or should at least be prevented from suing others who
wish to use those improvements).218
The Steering Committee debated whether or not to include a Share-Alike
provision in the OCL, but determined, on balance, that such a provision could
dissuade potential users from adopting and using (or at least improving) the licensed
IP.219 Given the primary goal of promoting the broadest possible use of the pledged
214

See generally Norman V. Siebrasse, Holdup, Holdout and Royalty Stacking: A
Review of the Literature, in PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS, supra note 124, at
239.
215
Joseph Farrell, John Hayes, Carl Shapiro & Theresa Sullivan, Standard Setting,
Patents, and Hold-up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 618 (2007).
216
See discussion supra Sections II.A, II.B; Maggiolino & Montagnani, supra note
184, at 799–800 (describing license-back requirements of BiOS project, but also noting with
approval that Creative Commons and GreenExchange do not have license-back
requirements); id. at 802–04 (lack of user commitments under DPL).
217
See Medtronic, Permissive License, supra note 137, at 2 (“If you modify, transform,
improve or build upon the Design Materials or the Software (collectively, “Modifications”),
you must make your Modifications available under a license that includes terms identical to
the terms of this license.”).
218
See CONTRERAS, LICENSING, supra note 105, at 546–47.
219
One indication of this is the reluctance that many commercial enterprises have to
using software that is licensed on a copyleft basis. See id. at 550.
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IP, it was felt that greater dissemination would occur if users were not subject to
such requirements. Thus, licensees are not required to grant any licenses with respect
to their modifications and improvements to the licensed technology. This being said,
pledgors who wish to impose Share-Alike requirements in their license agreements
may do so and have their licenses certified as acceptable “OCL-Alternative”
licenses.220 Moreover, the Steering Committee encourages all IP holders, including
licensees, to make their own pledges under the OCP.221
6. Defensive Suspension
Some fields relevant to COVID-19 are characterized by frequent patent
disputes,222 and the unconditional pledging of an organization’s patents could place
it at a significant disadvantage if it became involved in such a dispute.223 Thus, the
OCL includes a clause that automatically suspends224 a license “if the licensee or
any entity affiliated with the licensee threatens or initiates a suit or legal proceeding
alleging the infringement of any patent or other intellectual property right against
the Pledgor or any entity affiliated with the Pledgor.”225 This “defensive suspension”

220

See discussion infra Section III.G.
See OCP FAQ, supra note 203 (“Is the licensee required to grant any rights back to
the IP holder? No. The license granted under the Open COVID Licenses is a one-way
commitment from the pledgor to licensees. Licensees are not required to grant rights back to
the pledgor. While this imbalance may seem unfair or inequitable in some ways, we believe
that it will result in the greatest adoption of licenses by manufacturers and institutions around
the world. And, of course, we encourage all holders of IP relating to COVID-19 to make the
pledge as to their own IP.”).
222
The field of vaccine development is one such field. See, e.g., Angus Liu, PfizerBioNTech, Regeneron Sued for Patent Infringement with COVID-19 Products, FIERCE
PHARMA (Oct. 6, 2020, 10:55 AM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/pfizer-biontechregeneron-sued-for-infringement-allele-s-patent-their-covid-19-products [https://perma.cc/
U4JA-WGLR]; Mark Terry, Moderna’s Vaccine Technology Continues to Be Tangled in
Patent Challenges, BIOSPACE (July 24, 2020), https://www.biospace.com/article/modernaloses-patent-challenge-with-arbutus-on-vaccine-technology/
[https://perma.cc/HMP7ULAY].
223
For example, a party that has licensed its IP to its competitors cannot thereafter
assert such IP in a counterclaim if a competitor later sues it for infringement.
224
The license is temporarily suspended rather than terminated outright to address the
situation in which one division or subsidiary of a large organization asserts IP against an
OCP pledgor without realizing that another division or subsidiary of the same organization
is making use of a license granted under the OCP. In effect, the suspension may be “cured”
by the withdrawal of the infringement claim. See OCP FAQ, supra note 203 (“If a licensee
threatens or sues the pledgor for infringing any IP relating to COVID-19, then the license
will automatically be suspended until that threat or suit is withdrawn.”).
225
Open COVID License, supra note 212, at para. 4.
221
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clause permits a pledgor to assert its IP “defensively” against a licensee that brings
its own IP infringement against the pledgor.226
One of the reasons that such a clause is necessary is because, as discussed in
Section III.F.5, above, the OCL does not require that a licensee grant the pledgor
any rights to modifications or improvements that the licensee makes to the licensed
technology. Thus, a pledgor could find itself in the unenviable position of granting
a free license to a competitor, the competitor improving the licensed technology and
obtaining IP protection for that improvement, and then suing the original pledgor for
using a similar improvement. The defensive suspension clause, which suspends the
effect of the OCL if the licensee threatens or brings such a suit, allows the pledgor
to assert its IP covering the underlying IP against the licensee. Of course, it is not a
goal of the OCP to enable further IP litigation, but to orient the parties’ rights in such
a manner that they are more likely to negotiate a satisfactory commercial
arrangement covering use of the licensee’s improvements. The defensive suspension
clause achieves this orientation.
7. No Downstream Pricing Controls
Downstream pricing controls are used in licensing agreements to ensure that
the licensee does not charge excessive prices for licensed products. For example, A
grants a license to B, and requires that any products sold by B under authority of the
license be priced at cost, or at reasonable levels.
Controls such as this are particularly salient when the license from A to B is
granted without compensation—if A grants a free license to B, then it is not
unreasonable for A to expect that B will not make excessive profits by selling
licensed products. Such “downstream” pricing controls were utilized by the U.S.
National Institutes of Health during the 1990s in its Cooperative Research and
Development Agreements (CRADAs) with private industry,227 and more recently
have been used in licensing agreements with the Medicines Patent Pool.228 The

226
Such clauses are well-known in the licensing field. See, e.g., CONTRERAS,
LICENSING, supra note 105, at 551 (discussing the “defensive termination” clause in the
Apache OSS license); AM. BAR ASS’N COMM. TECH. STANDARDIZATION, STANDARDS
DEVELOPMENT PATENT POLICY MANUAL 62–67 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2007) (discussing
defensive suspension clauses in standards policies) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS MANUAL].
227
See Jorge L. Contreras, What Ever Happened to NIH’s “Fair Pricing” Clause?,
BILL OF HEALTH (Aug. 4, 2020), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/04/nihfair-pricing-drugs-covid19/ [https://perma.cc/2257-9SLC].
228
See Medicines Patent Pool, Form of Sublicense and Technology Transfer
Agreement for Bristol-Myers Squibb Patents Covering Hepatitis C Virus Therapy, Section
4(c), https://medicinespatentpool.org/licence-post/daclatasvir-dac/ [https://perma.cc/NV94ZYTP] (“In recognition of the humanitarian objectives of this Sublicense Agreement, the
Sublicensee also will use all reasonable efforts to promote the affordable access to the
Licensed Products in the Territory.”).
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COVID-19 licensing frameworks developed by Oxford University and HarvardMIT-Stanford also include pricing limitations for licensed products.229
However, the OCL does not include downstream pricing controls for a number
of reasons. First, implementing and enforcing such controls would require
significant reporting by licensees and monitoring by pledgors. This, in turn, would
require the establishment of confidentiality relationships between pledgors and
licensees, as pricing information is often confidential. All of which substantially
increases the complexity of the relationship. Second, agreements relating to product
pricing, particularly if made among competitors, invariably give rise to antitrust
concerns, as they (or their enforcement) could enable illegal price fixing or
coordination. Finally, even in industries in which “fair and reasonable” pricing has
been mandated for years, it is notoriously difficult to determine what “fair and
reasonable” prices are.230 Imposing a condition that product pricing meet any
subjective standard could be a recipe for litigation. For all of these reasons, the
Steering Committee determined that including pricing controls on downstream
products in the OCL would introduce significant administrative burdens and
disincentives for user adoption, while offering only modest benefits to the public
during the limited duration of the Pledge.
8. No Warranties or Indemnities
The OCL is intended as a broad immunity from suit, rather than a guaranty that
any particular product can be manufactured, sold or marketed.231 Thus, pledgors are
not required to make any representations or warranties to licensees, and all IP is
licensed on an “AS IS” basis. Licensees must assume responsibility for clearing their
products against any applicable IP (including IP that is not licensed under the OCL),
as well as regulatory and other governmental requirements. This approach is similar
to that adopted by most OSS and CC licenses, and even with many royalty-bearing
academic patent licenses.

229

See discussion supra Sections II.C.3.e, II.C.3.f. Universities have long experimented
with pricing controls for products destined for sale in the developing world. See CONTRERAS,
LICENSING, supra note 105, at 396–98 (discussing university humanitarian licensing
initiatives).
230
See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
231
See OCP FAQ, supra note 203 (“Does the pledge guarantee that a licensee will be
able to manufacture or sell any particular product? No. Some products may be covered by IP
that is held by multiple parties. In order to manufacture or sell such products, the
manufacturer must ensure that it has obtained rights from all holders of IP. We recognize
that it may be difficult to determine who owns all of these rights. But that is a problem that
exceeds the scope of what the Open COVID License can accomplish except through
identification of some pledgors and, if provided, the IP rights made subject to the pledge.
Our hope, of course, is that all major holders of COVID-related IP will adopt the pledge,
making the production of these technologies free from IP risk. However, this cannot be
guaranteed.”).
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G. Compatibility Assessment
The principle of uniformity requires that the terms on which pledged IP are
licensed to users are as uniform as possible across IP holders. In order to encourage
uniformity, the Steering Committee developed a set of “template” licensing
agreements for the licensing of patents and/or copyrights. These “Open COVID
Licenses” (OCL) are posted on the OCP website and may be adopted by any
pledgors.
However, the Steering Committee quickly realized that many IP holders,
particularly large organizations, have individual sensitivities and concerns that make
them unwilling to use a standardized licensing agreement. In order to increase the
attractiveness of the OCP to potential pledgors, the Steering Committee
implemented a process whereby potential pledgors may submit proposed licensing
agreements to the Committee for review, much as the creators of new OSS licenses
may submit them to OSI.232 If, after review, the Committee determined that the terms
of the proposed license were consistent with those of the OCP template agreements,
the proposed license was deemed “OCL-Compatible.” If the terms of the proposed
license were mostly consistent with the terms of the Open COVID Licenses, but
deviated in one or more ways deemed nevertheless to preserve the intent of the OCP,
the proposed license was deemed to be an acceptable “OCL-Alternative” license. If,
however, the proposed license deviated in some material way with the Open COVID
Licenses, it was deemed “incompatible” and an IP holder adopting it would not be
considered to have made the Pledge.
A list of compatibility criteria was developed to guide the review process.233
For example, certain CC and OSS licenses are automatically deemed to be OCLcompatible. In order to be deemed OCL-Compatible, customized licenses must
contain certain minimum terms, such as a scope and duration at least as broad as the
Open COVID Licenses, and may not bear royalties or other charges. OCLAlternative licenses may include one or more specified terms that, on their face, are
inconsistent with the OCL Licenses, but which, overall, preserve the intent of the
OCP. Terms that are permitted in OCL-Alternative but not in OCL-Compatible
licenses include Share-Alike, copyleft, and grant back clauses, which require the
licensee to make modifications and derivatives of licensed IP available on similarly
open terms. The OCL-Alternative license may also limit licensees to particular
countries, or exclude particular countries, but only when required by applicable legal
regulations, limit the field to medical and research use only (e.g., excluding home
entertainment applications, even when related to COVID-19), or require the licensee
to register as a user.

232
The License Review Process, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, https://opensource.org/app
roval [https://perma.cc/V497-3N8L] (last visited Feb. 24, 2021).
233
About the Licenses, OPEN COVID PLEDGE (July 29, 2020), https://opencovidpledge.
org/licenses/ [https://perma.cc/87FA-ZFSX] (presenting an overview of OCL Compatible
Licenses (OCL-Compatible)).
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However, some restrictions and limitations are deemed to be so inconsistent
with the spirit of the OCP and its fundamental design principles that licenses
containing them will not be certified as either OCL-Compliant or OCL-Alternative.
For example, restrictions on commercial use could severely limit the use of pledged
rights, and will thus make a proposed license non-compliant. Likewise,
“downstream” pricing requirements (e.g., requiring that the licensee make licensed
products available at no charge, at cost, or at “fair and reasonable” prices) could
reduce users’ willingness to employ the licensed rights and thus limit their
usefulness in combatting the pandemic. Prohibiting the licensee from making
derivatives or modifications of the licensed IP, or requiring the licensee to assign to
the licensor rights in derivatives or modifications of the licensed IP, would also be
significant disincentives for users to use and improve the licensed IP. Of course, the
licensor’s charging fees of any kind, including reimbursement of expenses,
disqualifies licenses from the OCP, as does requiring the licensee to report sales or
other utilization to the licensor. Finally, a duration that is shorter than the OCL term
(the earlier of the end of the COVID-19 pandemic plus one year, or January 1, 2023)
is disqualifying, both because of its significant potential to reduce uniformity among
licenses, and because it limits the usefulness of pledged IP to address the pandemic.
H. Notice of Pledged IP
In order for an IP pledge to achieve the pledgor’s goals, potential users must be
made aware of the pledge as well as the IP that is available for use—the so-called
“notice function” of IP pledges.234 Conversely, one of the greatest barriers to the
broad use of pledged IP is a lack of widely disseminated information about the IP
that is available for use.235

234

See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 119, at 596 (“In order for a pledge to
achieve the pledgor’s desired effect . . . broad public dissemination or ‘notice’ of the pledge
is desirable. Likewise, in order to extend the benefit of the pledge to the entire intended
category of beneficiaries . . . broad public notice is also desirable.”); see also Clark D. Asay,
The Informational Effects of Patent Pledges, in PATENT PLEDGES: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES
ON PATENT LAW’S PRIVATE ORDERING FRONTIER 227, 227 (Jorge L. Contreras & Meredith
Jacob eds., 2017) (“[P]atent pledgers use patents to efficiently and credibly convey
information to the relevant public about their innovation preferences and activities.
Transmission of this information may then facilitate a variety of economic objectives,
depending on the nature of the pledge.”).
235
See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 119, at 596 (“[D]espite [the] pressures
toward broad dissemination and notice of pledges, many patent pledges falter as to the notice
function.”); Contreras et al., Pledging Patents for the Public Good, supra note 57, at 82
(notification of pledged IP “was not particularly intuitive or informative,” contributing to
lack of use); Nicole Shanahan, Overcoming Information Asymmetry in Patent Pledge
Records, in PATENT PLEDGES, supra note 234, at 301, 301 (“The way patent pledges are
publicized and made available today is not effective in reaching an optimal level of
distribution of the underlying open access contained in these pledges.”); Colleen V. Chien &
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In the case of the OCP, the dissemination of information relating to pledged IP
presents several challenges. First, the large number of patents pledged (see Section
IV.A, below) makes any attempt to list individual patents infeasible.236 Several early
pledgors held tens of thousands of patents each and, as any patent practitioner
knows, the “docket” information for such portfolios is voluminous, complex, and
constantly changing. Listing individual patents would impose an insurmountable
burden on the pledgors’ in-house legal departments, and would have been
impossible for any outsider to compile accurately. What’s more, a listing of tens or
hundreds of thousands of patents, whether organized by assignee, issuance date or
patent number, would be of little use to potential users.237 Finally, copyrights, which
lack even the registration information of patents, are notoriously difficult to catalog
with any degree of specificity.
Though a comprehensive listing of pledged IP was neither feasible nor
particularly useful for the OCP, the Committee sought ways to disseminate
information regarding pledged IP to potential users and to make this information
easily accessible. It undertook two approaches in this regard, and has developed
plans for a third.
1. Featured IP
One of the methods adopted by the OCP to highlight pledged IP was to develop
a number of vignettes describing pledged IP and how it was being, or could be, used
in the response to COVID-19. Each of these vignettes identifies the relevant pledgor
and includes a short textual description, some keywords (tags), an illustrative image,
and a list of relevant patent numbers or other technical details (if the viewer clicks
the “Learn More” button). Below are four examples of featured IP on the OCP
website:238

Evan Hastings, Spurring and Clearing the Path for Open COVID Innovation Through
Contextual Patent Disclosure, PATENTLY-O (May 20, 2020), https://patentlyo.com/patent/20
20/05/innovation-contextual-disclosure.html [https://perma.cc/NMD9-LNAE] (“Innovators
can use traditional search tools, but without context, in particular reliable assignee or product
information, may be hard-pressed to find relevant technology.”).
236
There was some disagreement within the Steering Committee regarding this
conclusion. This article reflects the views of the author. But see Meredith Jacob, Best
Practices for Making Patent Pledges, in PATENT PLEDGES, supra note 234, at 317, 318
(recommending enumeration of each patent pledged).
237
Even the EcoPatent Commons, which included only 225 patents, was viewed as
difficult for potential users to understand. See Contreras et al., Pledging Patents for the
Public Good, supra note 57, at 82.
238
Featured IP, OPEN COVID PLEDGE, https://opencovidpledge.org/partner-ip/
[https://perma.cc/8WQW-2N49] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
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Figure 4: Featured IP on the Open COVID Pledge Website
It was hoped that these use cases would inspire potential users to explore the
pledged IP and use it in creative ways. As of this writing, approximately thirty
“Featured IP” vignettes are posted on the OCP website.
2. Patent Searching
The second prong of OCP’s IP dissemination effort involves a natural language
processing (NLP) search engine that enables users to search patents pledged under
the OCP. Given the large number of pledged patents (more than an estimated
500,000), and the many subject areas covered by these patents, it is not sufficient to
display a list of pledged patents and expect users to find what might be useful to
them. Accordingly, functionality is required to make the body of pledged patents
searchable by potential users that have particular needs and requirements. While
several pledgors have committed their entire portfolios under the OCP, others have
pledged specific patent portfolios or individual patents. Thus, even ordinary patent
search engines such as Google Patents and the USPTO’s website search feature do
not enable easy searching of the set of pledged patents. Accordingly, the OCP has
collaborated with Swedish analytics firm IPScreener, that has generated a database
index consisting solely of pledged patents and has adapted its existing NLP to target
these patents.239 This search functionality is designed to enable potential users to
identify pledged patents relevant to particular areas in which they may wish to
operate.

239

Search Open COVID Pledged IP, OPEN COVID PLEDGE, https://opencovidpledge.
org/ip/ [https://perma.cc/8K22-ZTGH] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
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3. Topical Index
Another goal of the OCP is to create a comprehensive “index” of COVIDrelated topics covered by pledged IP (including both patents and copyrights), with
links to the relevant IP. Thus, relevant IP would be indexed and collected under topic
headings such as ventilators, respirators, contact tracing apps, diagnostic kits,
disinfecting solutions, vaccines, therapeutics, and the like. The beginnings of this
system already exist in the keyword tags identified in the Featured IP vignettes. It is
anticipated that, once completed, such a resource will be useful in informing
potential users of the types of technology projects that can be undertaken using IP
pledged under the OCP.
I. The OCP Environment
Though issues relating to website hosting and design may seem mundane, these
and other aspects of the “environment” surrounding the Pledge played an important
role in its planning and launch. Initially, the OCP was hosted on an independent
website controlled by a Steering Committee member. In August 2020, the site was
transferred to Creative Commons, which assumed the responsibility for
“stewardship” of the project.240 Then in [April 2021], the OCP website was
transferred to the Program for Information Justice and Intellectual Property (PIJIP)
at American University Washington College of Law, which currently hosts and
stewards the project.241
The OCP website includes a number of relatively standard features such as a
“frequently asked questions” (FAQ) page, news releases, blog posts,242 information
about the organizers, and a list of online resources. Prior to launch, the OCP also
contracted for the design of a logo that could be used to generate brand recognition,
identity, and loyalty.

240

Eric Steuer, Creative Commons to Steward the Open COVID Pledge, OPEN COVID
PLEDGE (Aug. 27, 2020), https://opencovidpledge.org/2020/08/27/creative-commons-tosteward-the-open-covid-pledge/ [https://perma.cc/L94G-XLFH].
241
Patent Pledges: Open COVID Pledge, AM. U. WASH. COLL. L. PROGRAM INFO.
JUST. & INTELL. PROP., https://www.wcl.american.edu/impact/initiatives-programs/pijip/im
pact/patent/ [https://perma.cc/3UQZ-QKX5] (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
242
Much of the public outreach for the OCP, including press releases and news
announcements, was handled by Creative Commons, first on a volunteer basis, and then as
the steward of the OCP from September 2020 to April 2021.
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Figure 5: The OCP Logo
The institutional steward of the OCP maintains a Twitter account for the OCP
(@OpenCovidPledge), which it uses, in addition to blog posts on the website, to
disseminate news regarding new pledgors, interactions with other groups,
publications by Steering Committee members and other news relevant to the OCP.
In addition to pledgors of IP, the OCP sought to attract endorsements from
organizations that are supportive of the OCP’s mission. While such organizations
did not pledge IP (and often control no relevant IP), the accumulation of a large
number of “Supporters” from around the world both validated the legitimacy of the
OCP program and demonstrated broad support for its goals among well-respected
groups.
As of this writing, there are forty-four OCP Supporters, including academic
centers,243 advocacy groups, foundations, and professional service providers.244
Supporters are featured on the OCP website with links to their own websites.245 A
complete list of OCP Supporters is included in Appendix C.
IV. ADOPTION OF THE OPEN COVID PLEDGE
The Open COVID Pledge was “launched” on April 7, 2020, with Intel as its
first major pledgor.246 Within two weeks, Amazon, Facebook, Hewlett Packard
Enterprise, IBM, Microsoft, and Sandia National Laboratories also joined the OCP
with pledges of tens of thousands of additional patents and other IP.247 In May, the
WHO recognized the OCP in its global Solidarity Call to Action, calling on IP
holders to help end the pandemic by sharing “relevant knowledge, intellectual
property and data to enable widescale and worldwide production, distribution and
use of such technologies and necessary raw materials” through mechanisms
243

Academic centers are policy-focused centers within academic institutions that do
not represent the views of their larger institutions or technology licensing offices.
244
Some professional service firms, such as patent law firm BananaIP based in
Bangalore, India, offered to perform free legal services for clients who participated in the
OCP. Free Patent Filings for Open COVID Pledge Adopters, BANANAIP (Apr. 29, 2020),
https://www.bananaip.com/ip-news-center/free-patent-filings-for-open-covid-pledgeadopters/ [https://perma.cc/PPQ4-447C].
245
Partners, OPEN COVID PLEDGE, https://opencovidpledge.org/partners/ [https://per
ma.cc/5YFW-YPET] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
246
Steuer, Patent Holders, supra note 34.
247
Steuer, Amazon, supra note 35.
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including the OCP.248 By mid-June, 2020, the OCP had attracted more than thirty
pledgors with an estimated 500,000 pledged patents. This Part analyzes the adoption
patterns of the OCP and assesses the value of the OCP in fields in which adoption
has been high and low.
A. Profile of Pledgors and Pledges
1. Overall Statistics
As of February 1, 2021, thirty-two entities had formally made the Open COVID
Pledge (see Appendix B). These included twenty-six corporate entities, four nonprofit entities (universities or research institutes) and two U.S. national laboratories.
Twenty-six pledgors are based in the U.S., four in Europe and two in Japan.

Type of Pledgor (n = 32)
4
2

26

Corp

Natl. Lab

Non-Profit

Figure 6: Types of Entities Making the Open COVID Pledge
With regard to the IP rights pledged, four entities pledged copyrights and
twenty-nine pledged patents (with one entity pledging both patents and copyrights).
Of the patent pledgors, twenty pledged all patents, while nine pledged selected
patents or patent applications only.
2. Timing of Pledges
In terms of timing, the large majority of pledgors committed to the OCP during
the first month after launch, April 2020. A handful of additional pledgors committed
in the following two months, with only one pledgor per month in August through
October, after which no additional pledgors have joined.
248

WHO, Solidarity Call to Action, supra note 27.
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Pledge Adoption by Month (2020)
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Figure 7: Adoption of the Open COVID Pledge, by Month
This trend does not correlate with the steady rise in COVID-19 cases or
fatalities worldwide. Rather, it reflects an initial burst of interest, followed by a
steady decline in new pledge commitments. There are several possible explanations
for this trend.
First, there may be a natural limit to the number of IP holders willing to pledge
their IP for a cause such as the COVID-19 response. However, given that only thirtytwo out of tens of thousands of IP holders made the Pledge, it seems unlikely that
the natural limit of pledgors has been reached.
Second, IP holders may find few benefits to making the Pledge substantially
after the OCP’s launch. Entities that joined early enjoyed the publicity of being
associated with a new endeavor that was attracting attention from the media as well
as international bodies and governments. It is possible that latecomers, not
anticipating any significant attention so long after the launch of the OCP, do not feel
that the benefits of making the Pledge outweigh its potential costs or even the
internal effort required to review it and seek internal management approval.
Third, entities that adopted a “wait and see” approach to the Pledge may have
concluded, following its debut, that the benefits enjoyed by early adopters were not
as significant as originally anticipated, and that negative effects from not joining did
not materialize. As such, for these entities, the cost-benefit balance might continue
to weigh in favor of not making the Pledge.
Fourth, IP holders might foresee negative publicity from making the Pledge
long after OCP’s launch, particularly if the pandemic is close to ending. That is, an
entity might not want to be lampooned as a “Johnny come lately,” making the Pledge
only after it is hardly worth making anymore.
Finally, after a significant initial effort to recruit pledgors and supporters in
anticipation of the OCP’s launch, the Steering Committee itself flagged in its efforts
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to recruit new pledgors. This decline likely resulted from a combination of
competing time demands on Steering Committee members, the lack of a permanent
administrative staff249 and the lack of a coherent recruitment strategy for new
pledgors. In this respect, the recruitment difficulties of the OCP bear similarities to
those of the earlier EcoPC and Defensive Patent License group.250
B. Adoption Trends by Industry Sector
Patterns of adoption began to emerge almost immediately after the launch of
the OCP. Organizations in some industry sectors, such as information technology
(IT), embraced the Pledge in significant numbers, while those in the
biopharmaceutical sector did not. This Section discusses some of the industryspecific factors and considerations that may have driven, or deterred, adoption of the
OCP during its first year of operation.
1. Crisis-Critical Products
Frank Tietze (a Steering Committee member) and co-authors have previously
identified five categories of product innovation that are critical when responding to
a major infectious disease outbreak such as COVID-19 (“crisis-critical products”).251
These categories include:
•
•
•
•
•

Vaccines and treatments
Diagnostic tests
Medical equipment (especially hospital/ICU devices such as ventilators)
Personal protective equipment (PPE)
Digital innovation, including “artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled tracking
apps for cases and spreaders and epidemic modeling to monitor and
understand the spread and development of the virus across populations.”

249
Recruitment of pledgors fell primarily to the personal contacts of key Steering
Committee members, as well as a handful of student volunteers who eventually redirected
their efforts to their studies and other activities.
250
See Contreras et al., Pledging Patents for the Public Good, supra note 57, at 103
(“Most trade associations have dedicated personnel for membership development, and
enrolling members takes significant time and effort. Without these resources, it is not
surprising that the EcoPC was unable to recruit a larger body of members nor that WBCSD
and ELI spent few additional funds for EcoPC recruitment.”); Contreras, Evolving
Landscape, supra note 121, at 10 (“It is possible that the lack of a dedicated membership and
recruitment mechanism as part of the DPL has disadvantaged it as compared to the [License
on Transfer (LOT) network], just as this absence seems to have worked against the success
of the EcoPC.”).
251
Tietze et al., supra note 8, at 3.
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Intellectual property in each of these crisis-critical product categories has been
pledged to the COVID-19 response under the OCP. The following discussion
summarizes and offers examples of pledges in each of these categories.
2. Biopharmaceuticals (Vaccines and Cures)
(a) Private Sector
The biopharmaceutical sector—particularly vaccine development and
manufacture—has been among the most visible in the public debate over patents and
COVID-19. Not surprisingly, given the large amounts at stake, patent assertions and
litigation have affected this sector from an early date.252 As a result, repeated calls
have been made by government officials to open access to vaccine-related patents.253
Yet compared to other market sectors, there has been comparatively little
adoption of the OCP, or any voluntary pledging activity, with respect to IP covering
COVID-19 vaccines or therapeutics (a few exceptions being the unilateral pledges
made by AbbVie254 and Moderna,255 and pledges by a number of Japanese firms in
the biomedical sector256). Firms in the biopharmaceutical sector have likewise
avoided participation in the WHO’s C-TAP pool.257
252

See Bultman, supra note 26 and accompanying text; WHO, Solidarity Call to Action,
supra note 27 and accompanying text; see also Hailey Konnath, Pfizer, Regeneron Hit with
Patent Suits over COVID-19 Tech, LAW360 (Oct. 5, 2020, 8:15 PM EDT),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1316977/pfizer-regeneron-hit-with-patent-suits-overcovid-19-tech [https://perma.cc/DR8H-SMF6] (describing early concerns over patents in the
vaccine industry).
253
See Bill de Blasio, Opinion, Biden’s Covid Order Lets Big Pharma Companies
Waive Vaccine Patents. They Must Do So, NBC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2021, 11:52 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/covid-vaccine-supply-dangerously-low-willbiden-s-executive-order-ncna1256171?_sm_au_=iVVr8v3NjJF7WPZNvMFckK0232C0F
[https://perma.cc/YD2E-HLYD] (calling on vaccine developers to “follow Moderna’s lead
and stand down on its patents” because “[i]n a global pandemic, ‘intellectual property’
should not matter. Human lives should”); David M. Herszenhorn, Charles Michel Says EU
Could Invoke ‘Urgent Measures’ in Response to Vaccine Shortfall, POLITICO (Jan. 28, 2021,
6:56 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/charles-michel-says-eu-could-invoke-urgentmeasures-response-coronavirus-vaccine-shortfall/#
[https://perma.cc/KRC7-44AD]
(reporting that the President of the European Council suggested that the European Union
could “force vaccine-makers to share their patents, or other licenses, and take other steps to
ramp up production of the desperately sought-after vaccines”).
254
See supra Section II.C.3.g.
255
See supra Section II.C.3.j.
256
See supra Section II.C.3.h.
257
Adam Houldsworth, WHO Covid-19 IP Pool Launches This Week Without Strong
Pharma Support, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (May 26, 2020), https://www.iam-media.com/coro
navirus/who-covid-19-ip-pool-launches-week-without-strong-pharma-support [https://perm
a.cc/L8RL-G7JX] (quoting Thomas Cueni, Director-General of the International Federation
of Pharmaceutical Companies and Associations (IFPMA)).

2021]

THE OPEN COVID PLEDGE

899

Simple economic forces may be at work here, as firms that anticipate a direct
and significant windfall from the sale of COVID-19 products to governments and
health plans may be less inclined to commit their IP to a public cause or to make it
available to their competitors. This economic logic underlies the vaccine industry;
as Professor Ana Santos Rutschman describes it, “patents have permeated the ethos
of vaccine R&D.”258 And, more generally, scholars have long observed the high
value placed on patents and exclusivity within the biopharma sector.259 These
longstanding attitudes pose a substantial barrier to participation in arrangements that
tend to limit the enforceability of IP rights—more so than in industries, such as
information technology, in which patents have traditionally played a smaller role in
innovation and product development.260
In addition, biopharmaceutical firms point to legitimate concerns about the
quality and safety of products that may be manufactured under open licensing
regimes.261 For all of these reasons, it is not surprising that companies in the
biopharmaceutical sector have had limited participation in the OCP and other
pledging and pooling initiatives.262
However, not all vaccine-related initiatives are profit-seeking. The Rapid
Deployment Vaccine Collaborative (RaDVaC), which was formed by researchers
affiliated with Harvard Medical School, seeks the “rapid development, testing, and
free and open-source sharing of vaccine designs and essential protocols.”263
RaDVaC freely shares all information on its vaccine designs, production, selfadministration, and testing on its website under the OCP.264
In addition, a number of large firms that are not directly engaged in the
biopharmaceutical industry have contributed potentially valuable IP to the
development of vaccines and therapies targeted at COVID-19. For example, a
pledged IBM patent covers the use of cationic polyamines for the treatment of

258

Ana Santos Rutschman, The Vaccine Race in the 21st Century, 61 ARIZ. L. REV.
729, 746 (2019).
259
See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS
CAN SOLVE IT 65 (2009) (patents are most valuable in the pharmaceutical industry (citing
James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical Research on
Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 5 (2005))).
260
See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 259 (patents contribute little to firm value in
electronics industry).
261
Houldsworth, supra note 257 (quoting Corey Salsberg, head of IP affairs for
Novartis).
262
This being said, a number of vaccine manufacturers have made other public
commitments relating to product access and pricing during the COVID-19 pandemic. See
Adam Houldsworth, Your Guide to Covid-19 Vaccine Stakeholders’ IP Strategies, INTELL.
ASSET MGMT. (Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.iam-media.com/coronavirus/your-guide-covid19-vaccine-stakeholders-ip-strategies [https://perma.cc/MAS7-FLVW].
263
RADVAC, https://radvac.org [https://perma.cc/MPY7-HWU4] (last visited Feb. 17,
2021).
264
Id.
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viruses.265 Moreover, as described in Section IV.B.6.a, below, numerous firms have
pledged IP covering artificial intelligence and computational methods for enhancing
drug discovery, design, testing, manufacture, and administration.
(b) Universities
A large amount of biomedical innovation in the U.S. and elsewhere originates
in academic research institutions, much of which is funded by governments and
charitable foundations. Yet no major research institution has yet participated in the
OCP with respect to biopharmaceutical inventions. The lack of broader OCP
adoption by research universities has been disappointing, given that universities
generally have broad public charters that would seem to support the advancement of
public health.266
Twenty-four academic research institutions have committed to use the HarvardMIT-Stanford COVID-19 Technology Access Framework described in Section
II.C.3.e, above.267 This Framework, announced on the same day as the Open COVID
Pledge, shares many of the OCP’s fundamental design features including royaltyfree licensing of IP related to the COVID-19 response. While the HMS Framework
is more administratively burdensome than the OCP, in that it appears to require
bilateral, signed licensing agreements between participating universities and
licensees, and also imposes downstream pricing constraints on licensees, such
arrangements have yielded beneficial results, for example, in the Medicines Patent
Pool. It is not known how many, if any, licenses have been executed under the HMS
Framework.
But even with these programs, the vast majority of academic research
institutions worldwide268 have declined to make any pledge whatsoever with respect
to their intellectual property. There are several possible explanations for this lack of
interest. First, some universities may genuinely believe that the granting of exclusive
licenses to patents covering fundamental discoveries is most likely to result in the
commercialization of products based on those discoveries. This may explain Oxford
University’s reportedly exclusive license of vaccine technology to AstraZeneca,269

265

Cationic Polyamines for Treatment of Viruses, U.S. Patent No. 9,682,100 (filed Jan.
26, 2015) (issued June 20, 2017) (assigned to IBM).
266
See NAT’L. RSCH. COUNCIL, MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 2 (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2010) (“The first
goal of university technology transfer involving [intellectual property] is the expeditious and
wide dissemination of university-generated technology for the public good.”).
267
In addition, Oxford University announced a licensing framework similar to that of
HMS. See discussion supra Section II.C.3.f.
268
See QS World University Rankings, QS TOP UNIVS., https://www.topuniversities.
com/university-rankings/world-university-rankings/2021 [https://perma.cc/S29C-BC6W]
(last visited Feb. 17, 2021) (ranking over 1,000 research universities in 2021).
269
See discussion supra Section II.C.3.f.
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and was cited by a representative of at least one major U.S. research university with
whom the author spoke in connection with the OCP.270
Alternatively, like private firms, universities may wish to maximize revenue
generation from their intellectual property portfolios. While such a profitmaximizing motivation may seem incongruous with the public missions of many
universities, it has been well-documented over the past several decades.271
(c) UAEM and Free the Vaccine
One of the most heartening, and unexpected, developments arising from the
release of the OCP was its adoption in June 2020 by the student activist group
Universities Allied for Essential Medicines (UAEM). UAEM got its start more than
twenty years ago during the controversy over Yale University’s exclusive license of
the AIDS treatment stavudine to Bristol-Myers-Squibb (BMS). Student protests
helped to persuade the university administration to require BMS to distribute the
drug, for which Yale earned approximately $40 million per year, at substantially
reduced prices in Africa.272
During the summer of 2020, UAEM turned its attention to the COVID-19 crisis
and the anticipated cost of the vaccines under development. It created a campaign
known as “Free the Vaccine for COVID-19” which advocates the creation of a free
“People’s Vaccine” based on publicly funded research.273 In its calls to action, Free
the Vaccine promoted the Open COVID Pledge as the preferred mechanism for
securing public rights to develop and manufacture such vaccines:
We call for universities, organizations, and companies receiving public
funds for COVID research to sign the Open COVID Pledge, a legal

270

Telephone interview by Jorge L. Contreras with a representative of a U.S. university
(June 30, 2020) (on file with author).
271
See, e.g., DANIEL S. GREENBERG, SCIENCE FOR SALE: THE PERILS, REWARDS, AND
DELUSIONS OF CAMPUS CAPITALISM (2007); JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC.: THE
CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION (2005); Rebecca S. Eisenberg
& Robert Cook-Deegan, Universities: The Fallen Angels of Bayh-Dole?, 147 DAEDALUS 76,
86 (2018); Jorge L. Contreras, Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics: A
Critical Reassessment, 27 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 1, 45 (2020).
272
See Julian Borger & Sarah Boseley, Campus Revolt Challenges Yale over $40m Aids
Drug, GUARDIAN (Mar. 13, 2001, 12:59 PM EST), https://www.theguardian.com/world/20
01/mar/13/education.highereducation [https://perma.cc/3G8Z-PMLG]; After an Uproar,
Price of AIDS Drug Falls in Africa, 35 YALE MED. 1, 4 (Spring 2001),
https://medicine.yale.edu/news/yale-medicine-magazine/ym_sp01_348411_43933_v1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MP7U-6P6X].
273
Press Release, Univs. Allied for Essential Meds., UAEM Activists Launch Free the
Vaccine Campaign to Ensure Access and Affordability of Vaccines for COVID-19 (Apr. 11,
2020), https://www.uaem.org/free_vaccine_camp [https://perma.cc/JEV4-AFMC].
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commitment to open licensing the intellectual property needed for the
cure.274
The principal focus of UAEM’s and Free the Vaccine’s advocacy was the
university community, where most of its members were students.275 They organized
specific initiatives to encourage universities including Vanderbilt, Arizona State,
University of California Los Angeles, and Georgetown276 to adopt the OCP and
contribute their patented technologies to the creation of a public vaccine. Members
of the Steering Committee participated in meetings with UAEM and university
representatives to discuss the legal specifics of the OCP.
To date, these efforts have not resulted in further pledges by universities.
However, unlike medical equipment, vaccine manufacture and distribution is still in
a relatively early phase, and additional pressure to make vaccines more widely
available at lower prices will likely continue, particularly with respect to the
developing world. The same can be said for therapeutics targeting COVID-19,
another area in which grassroots activism can potentially help to broaden access and
lower prices. In both of these areas, it is possible that continued pressure from groups
such as UAEM will persuade more research universities to commit their IP to the
COVID-19 response.

274

Support a People’s Vaccine, FREE THE VACCINE FOR COVID-19,
https://freethevaccine.org/why-sign-on/ [https://perma.cc/YB8N-6FSY] (last visited Feb.
17, 2021).
275
See OPEN COVID PLEDGE, UNIVS. ALLIED FOR ESSENTIAL MEDS.,
https://www.uaem.org/opencovid_pledge [https://perma.cc/JEQ3-TYAP] (last visited Feb.
17, 2021).
276
List of Institutions, UNIVS. ALLIED FOR ESSENTIAL MEDS., https://www.uaem.org/
list_of_institutions [https://perma.cc/NH73-WV57] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
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Figure 8: A UAEM Promotion Featuring the Open COVID Pledge
3. Diagnostics
Early efforts to develop diagnostic tests for the SARS-CoV-2 virus were led by
research groups at University of California Berkeley and the Broad Institute, which,
Walter Isaacson reports, avoided seeking patent protection on these
developments.277 Patents covering COVID-19 diagnostic tests gained prominence
early in March 2020, when Labrador Diagnostics asserted patents, which its parent
Fortress Investments acquired from defunct blood testing firm Theranos against
diagnostic test makers.278 As discussed above,279 Fortress and Labrador eventually
bowed to public pressure and withdrew those suits, instead pledging not to assert
their patents against COVID-19 diagnostics.
Numerous other pledges relating to diagnostic equipment, testing and methods
have been made through the OCP. Intel, for example, holds a patent covering
methods for detecting target bioanalytes using ferromagnetic microdisks.280 IBM
277

ISAACSON, supra note 142, at 430.
Labrador Diagnostics LLC v. BioFire Diagnostics, LLC, & bioMérieux S.A., No.
1:20-cv-00348, at *6–61 (D. Del. filed Mar. 9, 2020).
279
See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
280
Resonant Magnetic Disks for Bioanalyte Detection, U.S. Pat. No. 7,943,398 (filed
June 29, 2007) (issued May 17, 2011). For a discussion of the potential of magnetic
278
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holds and has pledged several relevant patents, including one claiming a method for
detecting a nucleic acid (e.g., DNA or RNA) sequence using a cellular phone,281 and
a pending patent application claiming a microfluidic device with programmable
verification features282—a technology similar to that allegedly developed by
Theranos. Sandia National Laboratory, which holds a number of patents covering
the detection of proteins and other organic molecules,283 has also pledged IP relating
to the design of a “low-cost, easy-to-use outdoor shelter for healthcare workers to
conduct safer COVID-19 drive-up or walk-up testing.”284 Together, these pledges
represent a meaningful body of technology that can be useful in the development of
new diagnostic tests for COVID-19, the improvement of existing diagnostic tests,
and the efficient manufacture and supply of diagnostic test kits, all with reduced
concerns of patent infringement.
4. Medical Equipment
As noted in the Introduction, the lack of hospital ventilators and ventilator
replacement parts during the early weeks of the pandemic was one of the
precipitating factors that led to calls for greater access to proprietary IP. The
unilateral Medtronic and Smiths Group pledges with respect to ventilator equipment
were significant steps toward opening these markets to broader participation. The
Open Ventilator System Initiative (OVSI), an OCP participant, is a UK-based
project that has designed a portable and affordable ventilator device for deployment
in low- and middle-income countries.285 With these pledges, significant access has
been granted in the area of hospital ventilator equipment, and numerous open-source
ventilator projects have emerged around the world.286
IP covering a number of other medical products and devices relevant to
COVID-19 has also been pledged. These products include simple yet innovative
nanoparticles in diagnosing COVID-19, see Wudan Yan & David Schneider, The Race for:
A Here-and-Now COVID-19 Test, 57 IEEE SPECTRUM 60, 64 (Oct. 2020).
281
Cellular Phone Based Optical Detection of Specific Nucleic Acid Sequences, U.S.
Pat. No. 9,719,935 (filed May 29, 2015) (issued Aug. 1, 2017).
282
Microfluidic Device with Programmable Verification Features, U.S. Pat. No.
10,697,986 (filed June 23, 2017) (issued June 30, 2020).
283
See, e.g., Multiaxis Sensing Using Metal Organic Frameworks, U.S. Pat. No.
9,546,887 (filed Dec. 17, 2014) (issued Jan. 17, 2017); Method for Voltage-Gated Protein
Fractionation, U.S. Pat. No. 8,163,154 (filed July 18, 2007) (issued Apr. 24, 2012); Protein
Detection Sys., U.S. Pat. No. 7,527,977 (filed Mar. 22, 2005) (issued May 5, 2009).
284
Drive-Up Shelter for Safer COVID-19 Testing, SANDIA NAT’L LAB’Y (June 15,
2020), https://ip.sandia.gov/technology.do/techID=259 [https://perma.cc/PFQ8-B2D4].
285
See OSVI Makes the Open COVID Pledge, OSVI (Apr. 23, 2020),
https://ovsi.org/ovsi-makes-the-open-covid-pledge [https://perma.cc/2LB2-CK9A]; see also
Open Ventilator System Initiative, OSVI, https://ovsi.org [https://perma.cc/VHQ6-K4F4]
(last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
286
See Joanna Goodrich, Iranian Engineers Invent Resilient Open-Source Ventilator,
IEEE SPECTRUM TI-6, TI-6 (Sept. 2020); Ravinder Dahiya & Andrew Hart, Why DIY
Ventilators Are Still a Vital Stopgap, IEEE SPECTRUM TI-8, TI-10 (Sept. 2020).
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devices such as a nasal forcep swab for sample collection287 and a plastic device for
spiking IV bags.288 These devices, produced by smaller entities, may be protected
by a single patent application. Yet by joining the OCP alongside some of the largest
corporations in the world, these entities highlight their products in a favorable light.
5. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
Personal protective equipment (PPE) such as masks and face shields are
essential to preventing the spread of airborne infectious agents, both in public places
and healthcare facilities, but also at vaccine and drug manufacturing facilities where
contagious agents may be concentrated.289 Shortages of PPE became acute during
the early months of the pandemic and have continued to plague hospitals, clinics and
testing sites. Both Sandia National Laboratory and the NASA Jet Propulsion
Laboratory (JPL) were early contributors of PPE intellectual property to the fight
against COVID-19. Sandia analyzed 200,000 designs for face coverings and 900
designs for face shields made using commonly available materials and made its
findings publicly available.290 JPL published the digital design files for four different
3D-printed respirators.291 One small business, ProBuccal, pledged its intellectual
property in an oral bioaerosol shield for dental applications.292 And Leonardo, and
Italian industrial conglomerate, pledged a patent for monitoring PPE usage in the
workplace.293
Though not as highly publicized as PPE, other technologies have become
important for preventing and containing the spread of infection. The use of
ultraviolet radiation as a powerful disinfecting agent has attracted significant

287

NJIT-Forcep Swab for Covid-19 Testing, OPEN COVID PLEDGE (May 20, 2020),
https://opencovidpledge.org/2020/05/20/njit-forcep-swab-for-covid-19-testing/ [https://per
ma.cc/N76U-QMGX].
288
HMJ Medical–Spike Assist, OPEN COVID PLEDGE (May 19, 2020),
https://opencovidpledge.org/2020/05/19/hmj-medical-spike-assist/ [https://perma.cc/Y748YLPD].
289
See Jack Maxwell, Manufacturing Safe Vaccines, ASTM INT’L STANDARDIZATION
NEWS (Jan./Feb. 2021), https://sn.astm.org/?q=features/manufacturing-safe-vaccinesjf21.html [https://perma.cc/9VW5-NKE3].
290
Observations for Face Covering and Face Shield Designs Using Commonly
Available Materials, SANDIA NAT’L LAB’Y (June 15, 2020), https://ip.sandia.gov/technology
.do/techID=258 [https://perma.cc/9HKP-S5JL].
291
NASA-JPL-3D Printed Respirators, OPEN COVID PLEDGE (May 20, 2020),
https://opencovidpledge.org/2020/05/20/nasa-jet-propulsion-laboratory/ [https://perma.cc/
VK6V-CAFB].
292
ProBuccal-Covinhood™ Oral Bioaerosol Shield for Dental Applications, OPEN
COVID PLEDGE (Aug. 11, 2020), https://opencovidpledge.org/2020/08/11/probuccalcovinhood-oral-bioaerosol-shield-for-dental-applications/ [https://perma.cc/DZ6B-F8MU].
293
Sys. for Monitoring the Utilization of Pers. Protective Equip. by Workers in the
Workplace, U.S. Pat. No. 8,842,019 (filed May 20, 2011) (issued Sept. 23, 2014).
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attention during the COVID-19 pandemic.294 A pledged IBM technology sanitizes
touchscreen devices using ultraviolet light after use.295 In a slightly different vein,
recent patents and patent applications held by Microsoft296 and Intel,297 respectively,
cover the authentication of a user’s identity using contactless gestures in threedimensional space (i.e., avoiding the need for direct contact between an individual
and a device). Technologies such as these are being utilized with increasing
frequency as concern over contamination and the spread of contagion through
human touch remains high.
6. Digital Innovation
Both in terms of number of pledgors and number of patents, the greatest uptake
of the OCP has been in the information technology (IT) sector. Large multinational
firms such as Intel, IBM, Microsoft, Facebook, Fujitsu, Uber, Mitsubishi Electric,
Amazon and SAP have each made thousands or tens of thousands of patents
available through the OCP. Any accurate inventory of the close to a half million
patents pledged in this area is impossible. However, some of the industry sub-sectors
into which such patents fall are summarized below.
(a) Biopharmaceutical Research Tools
Over the past decade, drug discovery and development have become
increasingly dependent on computational methods and machine learning.298 A
number of patents covering artificial intelligence systems and algorithms for
computational drug discovery and design (including vaccine design) have been

294

See Mark Anderson, The Ultra-Violet Offense, 57 IEEE SPECTRUM 50, 51–52 (Oct.

2020).

295

Touch Input Device with Pathogen Transmission Mitigation, U.S. Pat. No.
9,772,714 (filed June 30, 2016) (issued Sept. 26, 2017).
296
Shape Trace Gesturing, U.S. Pat. No. 8,845,431 (filed May 31, 2011) (issued Sept.
30, 2014).
297
Gesture-Based Signature Authentication, U.S. Pat. No. 10,681,042 (filed Mar. 6,
2019) (issued June 9, 2020).
298
See Emily Waltz, AI Takes Its Best Shot, 57 IEEE SPECTRUM 24, 25–26 (Oct. 2020)
(noting that machine learning systems and computational analysis assist researchers in
understanding virus structure, immune response, choosing vaccine elements, tracking virus
mutations and understanding experimental data); Megan Scudellari, Can AI and Automation
Deliver a COVID-19 Antiviral While It Still Matters?, IEEE SPECTRUM (Sept. 23, 2020, 9:00
PM
GMT),
https://spectrum.ieee.org/artificial-intelligence/medical-ai/can-ai-andautomation-deliver-a-covid19-antiviral-while-it-still-matters
[https://perma.cc/AFQ5BYGL] (predicting that AI and automation will reduce drug discovery cycles from five years
to six months).
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pledged under the OCP by firms including Microsoft299 and Fujitsu.300 One
particularly relevant Microsoft patent covers the use of machine learning algorithms
to facilitate the assembly of vaccine cocktails for pathogens, such as HIV, that
evolve quickly under immune pressure of the host.301 And a recent IBM patent
claims methods for identifying clinical trial site locations based on epidemiological
and demographic factors.302
In addition, Hewlett-Packard Enterprise has pledged its substantial portfolio of
IP relating to data handling and exchange in cryo-electron microscopy systems,
important research tools for drug discovery and development.303 With respect to the
administration of therapeutics, IBM has pledged IP covering a computerized
decision support tool for optimizing long-term drug therapy.304 The fact that these
advanced digital innovations have been pledged may enable firms in the
biopharmaceutical sector to research and develop COVID-19 vaccines and
therapeutics more effectively and rapidly, without exposure to patent infringement.
(b) Contact Tracing and Epidemiology
The rapid spread of COVID-19, its long latency period, and the uncertainty
surrounding its precise vectors of transmission has led to a need for reliable and
pervasive methods of modeling, predicting, and tracing the spread of contagion.305
So-called “contact tracing” applications, which allow users to track the individuals

299

See, e.g., Vaccine Design Methodology, U.S. Pat. No. 8,452,541 (filed June 18,
2007) (issued May 28, 2013); Ass’n-Based Epitome Design U.S. Pat. App. No. 11/324,467
(filed Dec. 30, 2005); see also Tom Lawry, Artificial Intelligence in Health: The Future Is
Not What It Used to Be, 17 SCI. TECH. L. 4, 4 (2020) (describing a range of Microsoft AI
applications used to fight COVID-19); Jennifer Yokoyama, Microsoft Commits Patents to
Help Fight COVID-19, MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES (Apr. 20, 2020), https://blogs.microsoft.
com/on-the-issues/2020/04/20/open-covid-19-pledge-patents/
[https://perma.cc/KT5JZUKJ].
300
See, e.g., Method & Device for Searching Binding Site of Target Molecule, U.S.
Pat. App. No. 16/178,126 (filed Nov. 1, 2018) (assigned to Fujitsu); see also Fujitsu, Fujitsu
Open COVID Pledge of Non-Assertion (May 12, 2020), https://pr.fujitsu.com/jp/news/2020
/05/12b.pdf [https://perma.cc/CB8T-TMJE].
301
Sys. & Methods That Utilize Mach. Learning Algorithms to Facilitate Assembly of
AIDS Vaccine Cocktails, U.S. Pat. No. 8,478,535 (filed Dec. 30, 2005) (issued July 2, 2013).
302
Med. Clinical Trial Site Identification, U.S. Pat. No. 10,515,099 (filed Apr. 7, 2015)
(issued Dec. 24, 2019).
303
Brett Alten, HPE Opens Its Patents to Fight COVID-19, HEWLETT PACKARD
ENTER. (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.hpe.com/us/en/newsroom/blog-post/2020/04/hpeopens-its-patents-to-fight-covid-19.html [https://perma.cc/DJ35-2FYT].
304
Decision Support for Effective Long-Term Drug Therapy, U.S. Pat. App. No.
15/822,454 (filed Nov. 27, 2017).
305
See Matthew Hutson, The Mess Behind the Models, 57 IEEE SPECTRUM 30, 31 (Oct.
2020) (discussing shortcomings in current disease and epidemic modeling algorithms).
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with whom they have had contact, have helped epidemiologists to understand the
nature of the disease and its spread.306
Numerous patents claiming contact tracing methods and technologies, as well
as epidemiological modeling techniques, have been issued. One such contract
tracing patent held by Utah-based Blyncsy, Inc.307 was the subject of a successful
public call for prior art by Unified Patents, a participant in the OCP.308 Unified
alleged that Blyncsy was asserting this patent against firms developing and
deploying contact tracing technology for COVID-19.
Notwithstanding such assertions, a significant number of patents, patent
applications and other IP relating to contract tracing and epidemiological modeling
have been pledged under the OCP by firms including apheris AI,309 IBM,310

306

Jeremy Hsu, The Dilemma of Contract-Tracing Apps, 57 IEEE SPECTRUM 56, 56
(Oct. 2020).
307
Tracking Proximity Relationships & Uses Thereof, U.S. Pat. No. 10,198,779 (filed
June 2, 2017) (issued Feb. 5, 2019).
308
See $2,000 for Blyncsy Prior Art, UNIFIED PATENTS (Oct. 21, 2020),
https://www.unifiedpatents.com/insights/2020/2000-blyncsy
[https://perma.cc/N6TSD864]. Unified Patents is a member-supported organization that, among other things, seeks
to invalidate patents that have been asserted by PAEs through inter partes review (IPR)
proceedings at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). See FAQ, UNIFIED PATENTS,
https://www.unifiedpatents.com/faq [https://perma.cc/LMG9-EGS5] (last visited Feb. 27,
2021). As part of this effort, Unified conducts competitions with cash prizes for those
identifying prior art that can be used to invalidate such patents. See Patroll—Contests,
UNIFIED PATENTS, https://patroll.unifiedpatents.com/contests [https://perma.cc/MR6BMXDB] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
309
See Apheris’s Use Cases, APHERIS AI, https://www.apheris.com/usecases
[https://perma.cc/E5Q8-H6TV] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021) (describing “Covid-19 Privacypreserving frameworks for contact tracing applications”).
310
See, e.g., Sys., Method, & Serv. for Inducing a Pattern of Commc’n Among Various
Parties, U.S. Pat. No. 7,426,557 (filed May 14, 2004) (issued Sept. 16, 2008); Head Mounted
Video & Touch Detection for Healthcare Facility Hygiene, U.S. Pat. No. 9,659,367 (filed
Apr. 4, 2014) (issued May 23, 2017); Tracking Pathogen Exposure, U.S. Pat. App. No.
15/238,099 (filed Aug. 16, 2016); Biometric Disease Growth Prediction, U.S. Pat. App. No.
15/372,815 (filed Dec. 8, 2016).
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Mitsubishi Electric,311 and Microsoft.312 These contributions, together with the prior
art identified by Unified Patents, are likely to provide significantly enhanced
freedom to operate in the area of contract tracing technology.
(c) Infrastructure and Logistics
Though seldom making headlines, the COVID-19 pandemic has placed
unexpected strains on global physical and network infrastructures, supply chains,
and transportation systems. As governments and institutions struggle to cope with
aging systems, new technologies are being deployed to ensure the rapid, safe, and
efficient allocation of resources across physical spaces. In many cases, these
technologies are covered by IP that has been pledged through the OCP.
For example, IBM, which has pledged all of its patents under the OCP, has
developed significant technology to secure the medical product supply chain,
particularly for compounds (such as vaccines) requiring refrigeration.313 HewlettPackard Enterprise, which has also pledged its patents under the OCP, has deployed
wireless technology and location-based services to enable pop-up clinics and

311

See, e.g., Device Localization Using RSS Based Path Loss Exponent Estimation,
U.S. Pat. No. 10,514,437 (filed Sept. 22, 2015) (issued Dec. 24, 2019); Localization Using
Millimeter Wave Commc’n Signals, U.S. Pat. No. 10,425,910 (filed Mar. 19, 2018) (issued
Sept. 24, 2019); Method & Sys. for Localization of a Device in an Enclosed Env’t Based on
Received Signal Strength Levels, U.S. Pat. No. 9,282,531 (filed Mar. 2, 2015) (issued Mar.
8, 2016); Method for Estimating Location of Nodes in Wireless Networks, U.S. Pat. No.
8,054,226 (filed July 14, 2009) (issued Nov. 8, 2011); Method for Signaling Quality of Range
Estimates in UWB Devices, U.S. Patent No. 7,729,659 (filed June 16, 2006) (issued June 1,
2010); see also Mitsubishi Electric—Wireless Localization for Contact Tracing, OPEN
COVID PLEDGE (Aug. 7, 2020), https://opencovidpledge.org/2020/08/07/mitsubishielectric-wireless-localization-for-contact-tracing/[https://perma.cc/5JTM-PQEJ] (describing
Mitsubishi Electric’s applicable patents on wireless localization which have been pledged to
the OCP).
312
See Microsoft—Covid-19 Search Data, OPEN COVID PLEDGE (May 19, 2020),
https://opencovidpledge.org/2020/05/19/microsoft-bing/
[https://perma.cc/S53R-A2PC]
(describing “[a] dataset of anonymized Bing queries relating to the COVID pandemic, useful
for research on the spread and containment of the pandemic . . . .”).
313
See, e.g., IBM Raises Alert for COVID-19 Cold Chain Security, IBM NEWS ROOM
(Dec. 3, 2020), https://newsroom.ibm.com/IBM-Raises-Alert-for-COVID-19-Cold-ChainSecurity [https://perma.cc/K74E-NGR8] (reporting that IBM has discovered a “precision
phishing campaign” targeting the “cold [supply] chain” which ensures Covid-19 vaccines
are maintained at temperature); Jason Kelley, A Groundbreaking Vaccine Will Need a
Groundbreaking Supply Chain, IBM NEWS ROOM (Nov. 12, 2020), https://newsroom.ibm.
com/A-Groundbreaking-Vaccine-Will-Need-a-Groundbreaking-Supply-Chain [https://per
ma.cc/HG97-8AP6] (noting that IBM has recently demonstrated the value of IBM
blockchain networks in supply chain management, speeding product recalls from “three days
to just a few seconds,” and has helped develop “a vendor-neutral blockchain platform” for
pharmaceutical supply chains).
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hospitals, including at least one shipboard “floating” hospital in Italy.314 And another
pledgor, Mitsubishi Electric, has contributed IP relating to the efficient allocation of
personnel to service machines across multiple locations, such as hospitals.315
Efficiently routing emergency vehicles through traffic is particularly important
during spikes in demand. One pledged AT&T patent application covers methods for
optimally routing ambulances and other emergency vehicles to hospitals.316 A patent
pledged by Uber allows drivers to select routes based on safety conditions, which
can be particularly relevant for families with children or drivers wishing to avoid
congested or crowded areas during pandemic conditions.317
(d) Information Reliability
One highly publicized development that has emerged from the COVID-19
pandemic is the spread of misinformation about the disease and its prevention and
treatment. Much of this misinformation is spread via social media, and numerous
firms operating in the IT space have developed methods for assessing the reliability
and accuracy of information posted to social media accounts. For example,
Facebook has developed methods for automatically generating and collecting
contextual information about posts, including credibility indicators, additional
content and statistical information, and for displaying this information for users.318
Microsoft, another pledgor, has also developed methods for using credibility-related
data in conjunction with servicing web requests such as search queries.319 And IBM
holds patents covering methods for aggregating data from multiple sources to
validate incidents reported via social media,320 and also for measuring a recipient’s
perceived degree of trust in an online message.321 The patents and patent applications
underlying these and many other technologies for increasing the accuracy and
reliability of public information have been pledged under the OCP.
314

Press Release, Hewlett Packard Enter., HPE Aruba Supplies Network Infrastructure
to Floating Hospital to Aid COVID-19 Patients in Italy (Apr. 2, 2020),
https://www.hpe.com/us/en/newsroom/press-release/2020/04/hpe-aruba-supplies-networkinfrastructure-to-floating-hospital-to-aid-covid-19-patients-in-italy.html [https://perma.cc/
6DYU-NMRR].
315
Sys. & Methods for Res. Allocation for Mgmt. Sys., U.S. Pat. No. 10,362,139 (filed
Oct. 6, 2016) (issued July 23, 2019).
316
Sys. & Method for Optimally Routing Ambulances & Other Vehicles In-Route to
Hosps. U.S. Pat. App. No. 15/852,592 (filed Dec. 22, 2017).
317
Safe Routing for Navigation Sys., U.S. Pat. No. 10,563,994 (filed Feb. 11, 2019)
(issued Feb. 18, 2020).
318
Contextual Info. for Determining Credibility of Social-Networking Posts, U.S. Pat.
App. No. 15/824,669 (filed Nov. 28, 2017).
319
Credibility Info. in Returned Web Results, U.S. Pat. App. No. 13/110,117 (filed
May 18, 2011).
320
Sys. & Method for Incident Validation & Ranking Using Hum. & Non-Hum. Data
Sources, U.S. Pat. App. No. 15/859,488 (filed Dec. 30, 2017).
321
Action Based Tr. Modeling, U.S. Pat. No. 10,051,069 (filed Nov. 26, 2014) (Aug.
14, 2018).
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C. Motivations for Pledging
As discussed above, previous work has explored the motivations that drive
private firms to relinquish potentially valuable IP rights through pledges and other
public mechanisms.322 The OCP has not undertaken a systematic investigation of the
rationales that led pledgors to participate. However, a number of pledgors have
volunteered information about their motivations in public statements and writings.
For example, at an October 2020 conference, a representative of Sandia
National Laboratory explained the lab’s decision to pledge more than 1,000 patents
in terms of its public mission as a taxpayer-funded facility.323 Making these patents
available on a royalty-free basis, he observed, would enable firms using the
technology to avoid sizeable payments and lengthy negotiations, thereby helping
firms during a time of economic crisis. A Microsoft representative at the same
conference explained that by pledging its patents, her company was responding to
significant “fear, uncertainty and doubt around IP rights” that emerged at the outset
of the COVID-19 pandemic.324
Under the taxonomy that I have previously developed, these motivations would
be characterized as philanthropic or mission-based.325 Of course, such assessments
of institutional motivations are limited to statements voluntarily made by the subject
institutions, and the degree to which such statements reflect true institutional
motivations is inherently uncertain. Moreover, different decision makers within an
institution may have different goals, further complicating the identification of
particular institutional motivations for corporate actions. Finally, different
institutions are differently situated, and it would not be surprising to find that similar
actions, such as pledging IP, may be motivated by very different factors across
organizations.
Thus, in the case of pledging IP, organizations that characterize their actions in
altruistic terms may have additional, commercially-driven motivations that also
drive their behavior. For example, it has been proposed that Moderna and AbbVie
pledged patents relevant to the COVID-19 response in order to forestall potential
government action—compulsory licensing in the case of AbbVie’s drug Kaletra326
and ownership disputes in the case of Moderna’s mRNA vaccine technology.327

322

See supra notes 121–123, 188 and accompanying text.
Ryan B. Kennedy, Sandia Nat’l Lab’y, Comments at Creative Commons Global
Summit (Oct. 20, 2020), https://ccglobalsummit2020virtual.sched.com/event/efA5/anintroduction-to-the-open-covid-pledge [https://perma.cc/AFZ2-ZVHK].
324
Isabella Fu, Microsoft Corp., Comments at Creative Commons Global Summit (Oct.
20, 2020), https://ccglobalsummit2020virtual.sched.com/event/efA5/an-introduction-to-theopen-covid-pledge [https://perma.cc/AFZ2-ZVHK].
325
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
326
See Silverman, supra note 153 (quoting Professor Brook Baker as viewing AbbVie’s
Kaletra pledge to be a reaction to potential compulsory licensing of the drug).
327
See Contreras, Moderna, supra note 168 (discussing possible motivations for
Moderna’s patent pledge including avoidance of patent disputes with NIH and DARPA).
323
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Nevertheless, such extrinsic factors have not surfaced in connection with the
pledges made under the OCP, and in most cases it is not clear what commercial gains
could be obtained by organizations making such pledges. Accordingly, there is
plausible evidence that altruism and mission-oriented goals did, in fact, motivate
many of these pledges.
D. Creating an Open Innovation Landscape
As discussed in Section III.A, above, patent pledging efforts will seldom, if
ever, result in the complete elimination of IP risks for technology developers or
users. Even when efforts are closely coordinated by all principal developers of a
particular technology, there remains a risk that “outsiders” will emerge to assert
patents reading on a particular technology. Nevertheless, the clearance of even some
level of IP risk can encourage users to enter new markets that they otherwise might
not have entered. This possibility is enhanced if prominent IP holders have made
their IP broadly available to users in connection with a common cause such as
pandemic response.
Table 2, below, offers an (admittedly subjective and non-quantitative)
assessment of the adoption of the OCP by providers of the five crisis-critical product
categories discussed in Section IV.B, based on a three-tier assessment (low,
medium, high) of the quantity of IP pledged in each category. In addition, Table 2
includes an assessment by category of the IP pledges made in such category when
combining the OCP with the other unilateral and collective pledges described in
Section II.C.
Table 2: Pledges of Crisis-Critical Product IP
Product category
Pledged through OCP
Biopharma
Diagnostics
Medical equipment
Personal protective
equipment (PPE)
Digital innovation

Low
Low
Low-Medium
Medium

Pledged through all
Pledges
Low-Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium

High

High

As shown in Table 2, there is wide variation in pledging activity among product
categories. The lowest degree of activity has occurred with respect to
biopharmaceutical products such as vaccines and treatments, most likely due to the
substantial economic factors discussed in Section IV.B.2. Vaccine-related pledges
such as those by Moderna and RaDVaC could facilitate the development and
production of vaccines by alternate sources, though the majority of technologies in
this space remain fully protected by proprietary rights.
At the other end of the spectrum, a significant amount of IP has been pledged
in the areas of PPE and digital innovation. With respect to PPE, pledged IP appears
sufficient to enable the manufacture of respirators and other forms of equipment
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without significant risk of infringement—an achievement that has an immediate
potential benefit to society.
Likewise, numerous categories of digital innovation appear to be substantially
“opened” to innovation and product development through pledging mechanisms.
This effect is particularly striking in areas such as contact tracing, in which pledges
by leading multinational firms signal an openness to market entry that should be
attractive to innovators in this area. Moreover, even if innovators are unaware of
specific pledged IP, or even the existence of such pledges, the resulting lack of IP
enforcement in these market segments should, itself, encourage further development
and innovation that might otherwise be chilled in an atmosphere of active IP
enforcement.328
The broad nature of most OCP pledges, and the public licensing structure of
the OCP, further contribute to the open innovation landscape. That is, within fields
in which OCP (and related) pledge coverage is high, potential users of pledged IP
need not identify specific patents or copyrights that they wish to use, as required by
the various university COVID-19 frameworks described in Section II.C.3. Such an
identification exercise is both time consuming and technically difficult, and requires
an investigation of each pledgor’s IP portfolio with a degree of expertise that may
be unavailable to many potential users. The OCP’s public license structure also
eliminates the need to identify individual IP licensors and negotiate licenses with
each of them, another time consuming and potentially daunting exercise for a small
entity not inured to the legal culture of the U.S.
Thus, while quantitative measurement of the precise impact of IP pledges on
markets is difficult, particularly given the large number of patents pledged under the
OCP and similar programs,329 there is cause to be optimistic that such pledges may
be having an effect, direct or indirect, on the willingness of innovators to invest in
the development of products that can contribute to the containment of the COVID19 pandemic. This “opening” of fields to innovation and new market entry is among
the principal benefits of the OCP.
V. SUSTAINABILITY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Pledges made under the OCP are irrevocable and will survive notwithstanding
the fate of the OCP organization itself. Nevertheless, as shown by the experience of
the EcoPC, it is desirable for such pledge communities to continue to recruit new
pledgors and to promote and disseminate information about IP that is available for
use. The long-term success of the OCP thus depends, in part, on its continued
operation and the OCP framework’s application to other contexts. This Part briefly
explores the prospects for the OCP’s continued operation as well as potential future
directions.

328

See Chien & Hastings, supra note 235 (referring to OCP as “a useful non-assertion
covenant that helps to clear the path for innovation”).
329
See discussion infra Section V.E.
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A. Stewardship and Financial Security
One of the principal failings of the EcoPC was its lack of a committed
organizational steward. While the project received significant support and attention
from its corporate sponsors prior to and immediately after its launch, its ongoing
operations were subsequently delegated to two non-profit organizations that did not
commit substantial personnel or financial resources to its upkeep or expansion.330
As a result, no new members were recruited, and no new patents were pledged,
during the last five years of its existence.331 The host organizations were not to blame
for allowing the project to languish, as their administration of the EcoPC came with
no financial assistance from its corporate members.332 Thus, their activity was
limited primarily to hosting and maintenance of the EcoPC website, but little was
done to expand membership or disseminate information about patents that were
made available under the pledge.
With this experience in mind, the OCP Steering Committee carefully
considered the ongoing stewardship of the OCP from its inception. As noted in
Section III.I, responsibility for hosting the OCP website was transferred from an
individual Steering Committee member to Creative Commons in August 2020, and
then to the PIJIP program at American University in April 2021. Each of these
transitions was intended to entrust the ongoing stewardship of the project to an entity
with goals and a mission aligned with those of the OCP.
Nevertheless, as the example of the EcoPC demonstrates, providing more than
a minimal level of services is difficult without a reliable source of funding. While
the OCP made efforts at fundraising during the summer and fall of 2020, these
efforts, undertaken during the height of the pandemic, did not yield meaningful
financial contributions. Nevertheless, it is hoped that additional attempts to raise
funds for the ongoing maintenance and expansion of the project will come to fruition
in the future.
B. Community
One of the original goals of the OCP was to create a community of users making
beneficial use of pledged IP. Such communities can be valuable channels for
information dissemination. They can both “spread the word” about potential uses of
the IP, and give users an opportunity to share know-how and experiences concerning
practical aspects of that use. It is hoped that Creative Commons, which has
established online communities and chapters around the world, may facilitate the
formation of these user communities.

330
See Contreras et al., Pledging Patents for the Public Good, supra note 57, at 102–
03. For a discussion of the institutional structures of other pledge communities, see
Maggiolino & Montagnani, supra note 184, at 810–11.
331
Contreras et al., Pledging Patents for the Public Good, supra note 57, at 74–76.
332
Id. at 78.
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C. Internationalization
In October 2020, Creative Commons led an effort to translate the OCP into the
six official languages of the United Nations: Arabic, Chinese, English, French,
Russian, and Spanish.333 These translations, which are available on the OCP
website,334 are intended to make the Pledge accessible and understandable to
individuals around the world for whom English is not a native language. Future
activities could include translating the OCP into additional languages, as well as
translating the Open COVID Licenses into languages beyond English.

Figure 9: Arabic and (Simplified) Chinese Translations of the Open COVID Pledge
D. Integration with Complementary Efforts
The OCP is only one of several coordinated efforts around the world that is
intended to facilitate the pledging and contribution of IP to the COVID-19 response.
Both the Japanese Open COVID Declaration and the WHO’s COVID Technology
Access Pool (C-TAP) have also achieved some success in meeting these goals. It is
thus important that such efforts expand their coordination and cooperation,
particularly in the area of enhancing public information about IP that has been made
available for use. To this end, the OCP and Japanese Declaration currently crossreference one another on their respective websites, and, as noted in Section I.C.3
above, the WHO has expressly designated the OCP as an operational part of the CTAP program.

333
Diane Peters, Internationalizing the Open COVID Pledge: Translations and
Outreach, CREATIVE COMMONS (Oct. 14, 2020), https://creativecommons.org/2020/10/14/
internationalizing-the-open-covid-pledge-translations-and-outreach/ [https://perma.cc/P96T
-9FUT].
334
The Pledge, OPEN COVID PLEDGE, https://opencovidpledge.org/the-pledge/
[https://perma.cc/45CL-WVMU] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
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E. Measuring Impact
Assessing the success of any initiative depends in large part on the ability to
measure its effects on its target markets. One of the principal shortcomings of the
EcoPC was its failure to track or report on the use of pledged IP.335 This failure made
the case for further contributions weak, and eventually contributed to the
discontinuation of the project.336 Accordingly, the OCP has, from the outset,
recognized the need to understand and communicate how pledged IP is used.
Unfortunately, the task of measuring the use of IP when users are not required
to enter into bilateral licensing agreements, register with IP holders or even identify
themselves publicly, is difficult.337 In addition, unlike the EcoPC, which had just
over 240 pledged patents, the OCP has close to 500,000, most of which are not
directly relevant to the purpose of the pledge. These difficulties are compounded by
the fact that counterfactuals are lacking—while the OCP seeks to create an open
innovation landscape around COVID-19, it is not possible to know how much
innovation or development would have occurred without the pledges that have been
made. For all of these reasons, quantitative tracking of use of pledged patents has
proven challenging.
This being said, it may be possible, over time, to assess user take-up of pledged
IP through a variety of mechanisms, including analyzing forward citations of
COVID-19 related pledged patents in subsequent patent filings338 (once sufficient
time has elapsed for patent applications submitted during the pandemic to be
published), case studies of particular product categories (e.g., contact tracing),
comparisons to markets in which pledges have not been made, and interviews with
likely users of pledged technology.
F. Extensibility of the OCP Beyond COVID-19
While the OCP was developed as a direct response to the COVID-19 pandemic,
the IP pledging framework that it establishes is not unique to COVID-19. Rather,
the OCP provides a lightweight, legally enforceable mechanism for the coordinated
pledging of intellectual property rights within a defined scope and for a limited
period. As such, the OCP may be a useful model for the response to future public
health emergencies in which intellectual property rights may constrain research,
development, or the supply of crisis-critical products.
Such an IP-sharing framework may not, however, be suitable for addressing all
public health crises. For example, there are many devastating health conditions, such
335

See Contreras et al., Pledging Patents for the Public Good, supra note 57, at 81–82.
Id.
337
Understanding how particular patents cover particular products is challenging and
complex, even when the patents and products are known. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note
259, at 2 (noting “significant uncertainty about the scope of patent claims and whether a
particular defendant is infringing”).
338
See Contreras et al., Pledging Patents for the Public Good, supra note 57, at 70
(describing methodology).
336
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as cancer and heart disease, with far higher mortality rates than COVID-19. Yet
broad IP-sharing mechanisms may not be well-suited to addressing conditions such
as these. One of the defining characteristics of COVID-19 and other disease
outbreaks is the strain that they unexpectedly place on existing resources,
infrastructure, manufacturing capacity and supply. IP-sharing can help to alleviate
bottlenecks in the supply chain by authorizing additional producers to enter the
market and to meet sudden spikes in demand for critical products. Thus, while there
are innumerable societal challenges associated with chronic health conditions—cost,
reimbursement, unequal access, and the like—broad IP sharing mechanisms that are
effective to increase the supply of critical products may not be the ideal solutions for
these public health issues.
Another looming health crisis is posed by climate change. Limited IP pledging
efforts, including the EcoPC,339 have been undertaken in this area for some time, yet
none has made available significant amounts of IP. Climate change poses many
daunting challenges—technological, social, and political—and it is not clear
whether IP is currently blocking or promoting progress toward their solution.340
Moreover, it is not clear that a generalized pledging framework would achieve
meaningful gains when issues are tied to local conditions (sea rise, drought, storms),
require substantial services, know-how, and technical expertise to address, and do
not lend themselves to commoditized solutions that are usable by large segments of
the affected populations.341 Thus, the adaptation of IP pledging frameworks to such
future challenges will require careful consideration of the specific design
requirements and principles suggested by those challenges. For example, Reynolds
et al. have proposed a research commons for solar climate engineering, combining
a commitment to data sharing with an IP pledge that could be subject to royalties.342
Thus, even if the OCP is not adaptable wholesale to future crises, it is hoped that its
design and features may help to inform future efforts to coordinate the public IP
response to national and international public health emergencies.

339

See generally id. (elaborating on the EcoPC). One promising new initiative known
as the Low Carbon Patent Pledge has been led by three OCP pledgors—Hewlett-Packard
Enterprise, Facebook, and Microsoft. See LOW-CARBON PATENT PLEDGE,
www.lowcarbonpatentpledge.org [https://perma.cc/4DRL-5ZEF] (last visited July 20,
2021).
340
See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Government Choices in Innovation Funding (with Reference
to Climate Change), 62 EMORY L.J. 1087, 1089 (2013) (noting that analyses of public
financing in innovation generally support the public domain nature of the subsequent
inventions, but that they also recognize that “intellectual property rights sometimes have
superior features”); Joy Y. Xiang, Addressing Climate Change: Domestic Innovation,
International Aid and Collaboration, 5 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 196, 199–201
(2015) (proposing a collaborative approach to create conditions for “sustainable international
transfer[s] of clean technologies”).
341
See Reynolds et al., supra note 57, at 54–56 (discussing importance of trade secrets
in climate-related innovation).
342
Id. at 101–06.
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CONCLUSION
The Open COVID Pledge was conceived as a legal framework to facilitate the
voluntary contribution of intellectual property rights to the COVID-19 response. It
was modeled on successful public licensing structures previously developed by the
open-source software community, Creative Commons, and other pledge
communities, and sought to extend the gains made by a number of unilateral pledges
made early during the COVID-19 pandemic. In this respect, the OCP sought to offer
a lightweight alternative to direct governmental intervention through compulsory
licensing and to administratively complex patent pools.
The public response to the launch of the OCP was both heartening and
instructive. A large number of patents—approaching 500,000—were pledged under
the OCP within a short period of time. However, the willingness of IP holders to
make pledges varied considerably by market segment. At one end of the spectrum,
few pledges were made with respect to biopharmaceutical products such as vaccines
and treatments, most likely due to the substantial economic windfalls that await the
successful producers of those products. In this area, more direct governmental
intervention may be required to encourage IP holders to make their IP more broadly
available to expand access to lifesaving vaccines and therapies.
At the other end of the spectrum, however, a significant amount of IP has been
pledged in the areas of PPE and digital innovation, and to a lesser degree in the areas
of diagnostics and medical devices. Pledges that have been made to date through the
OCP and other mechanisms have already enabled the development and manufacture
of hospital ventilators and replacement parts, respirators, and a variety of other
medical tools and devices. In addition, very large quantities of IP covering digital
innovation have been pledged for public use, including biopharmaceutical discovery
tools, contact tracing methodologies, disease modeling algorithms, emergency
response systems, supply chain enhancements, and social media mechanisms for
ensuring the accuracy of information disseminated to the public. The participation
of multiple leading multinationals in this effort signals an openness to market entry
that should be attractive to innovators in a broad range of technology markets.
Moreover, even if innovators are unaware of specific pledged IP, or even the
existence of such pledges, the resulting lack of IP enforcement in these market
segments should, itself, encourage further development and innovation that might
otherwise be chilled in an atmosphere of active IP enforcement.
Thus, while precisely measuring the impact of IP pledges on markets is
difficult, particularly given the large pledges made under the OCP and similar
programs, there is cause to be optimistic that such pledges may be having an effect
on the willingness of innovators to invest in the development and supply of products
that will contribute to the containment and eventual eradication of the COVID-19
pandemic. This “opening” of fields to innovation and new market entry is among
the principal benefits of the OCP.
Regrettably, however, COVID-19 is not likely to be the last public health
emergency to afflict the world. Future pandemics, as well as global climate change
and its associated health impacts, will create an even greater demand for access to
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innovative, lifesaving technologies. It is hoped that the OCP, which was carefully
designed to balance the competing interests of broad user adoption with
acceptability to IP holders in a lightweight and legally enforceable manner, may be
a useful model for future IP sharing endeavors.
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APPENDIX A—OPEN COVID LICENSE
Open COVID License—Patent and Copyright (OCL-PC) 1.1
Having made the Open COVID Pledge, we (the “Pledgor”), in order to speed the
development and dissemination of the technologies needed to end the COVID-19
Pandemic and mitigate the effects of the disease, grant the license described below. Our
intent in doing so is to advance the shared cause of ending the COVID-19 Pandemic,
and we do so without any expectation of consideration or compensation, and with
knowledge of the rights we are licensing.
1. GRANT AND SCOPE
The Pledgor grants to every person and entity that wishes to accept it, a nonexclusive, royalty-free, worldwide, fully paid-up license (without the right to sublicense)
under Pledgor’s patents and copyrights that we have the right to license (the “Licensed
IP”) to make, have made, use, sell, and import any patented invention, and reproduce,
adapt, translate, distribute, perform, display, modify, create derivative works of and
otherwise exploit any copyrights, solely for the purpose of diagnosing, preventing,
containing, and treating COVID-19.
2. TIME LIMITATION
This license is effective as of December 1, 2019 and lasts until one year after the
World Health Organization declares the COVID-19 Pandemic to have ended, but in any
event not beyond January 1, 2023, unless otherwise extended by the Pledgor.
3. REGULATORY EXCLUSIVITY
The Pledgor will not assert any regulatory exclusivity against any entity or
individual for use of the Licensed IP in accordance with the license granted in Section
1, and we will not seek injunctive or regulatory relief to prevent any entity or individual
from doing so.
4. DEFENSIVE SUSPENSION
The license and non-assertion covenant granted above shall automatically be
suspended, and the Pledgor shall be free to assert the Licensed IP against the licensee, if
the licensee or any entity affiliated with the licensee threatens or initiates a suit or legal
proceeding alleging the infringement of any patent or other intellectual property right
against the Pledgor or any entity affiliated with the Pledgor.
5. NO WARRANTY
The license granted herein is “AS IS” without any warranties, express or implied.
All copyright and related rights in the Open COVID License are waived via CC0.
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APPENDIX B—OCP PLEDGORS
PLEDGORS, DATE AND LICENSE TYPE
Pledgor

License

Agnisys

OCL-P
v1.1
Custom

Allen Institute
for AI
Amazon
apheris AI GmBH
AT&T
Bow Market
Fabricatorz
Foundation
Facebook
Fujitsu Limited

Date

Rights Licensed

9-May-20

All patents

25-Jun-20

Select patents

20-Apr-20

All patents

8-Apr-20

Select patents

30-Apr-20

All patents

22-Apr-20

All patents

7-Apr-20

All patents

20-Apr-20

All patents

12-May-20

All patents

20-Apr-20

All patents

8-Apr-20

All patents

20-Apr-20

All patents

7-Apr-20

All patents

22-Oct-20

Select patents

16-Jun-20

Select patents

1-Apr-20

Select copyrights

20-Apr-20

Select patents

OCL-P
v1.1
OCL-P
v1.1

License
Category
OCL
Standard
OCL
Compatible
OCL
Standard
OCL
Compatible
OCL
Standard
OCL
Standard
OCL
Standard
OCL
Standard
OCL
Compatible
OCL
Standard
OCL
Standard
OCL
Compatible
OCL
Compatible
OCL
Standard
OCL
Compatible
OCL
Alternative
OCL
Compatible
OCL
Standard
OCL
Standard

20-Apr-20

All patents

28-May-20

All patents

OCL-P
v1.1
Apache
2.0

OCL
Standard
OCL
Compatible

19 June
2020
6-May-20

All patents

OC-P
v1.1
Apache
2.0
OCL-P
v1.1
OCL-PC
v1.0
OCL-PC
v1.1
OCL-P
v1.1
Custom

Hewlett Packard
Enterprise
HMJ Medical
LLC
IBM (and its
subsidiaries)
Intel Corporation

OCL-P
v1.1
OCL-PC
v1.0
Custom

KINETIC

OCL-P
v1.1
Custom

Leonardo
Company
McKinsey &
Company, Inc.
Meedan
Microsoft
Mitsubishi
Electric Research
Laboratories
Morgan Stanley
NASA-Jet
Propulsion

Custom

Custom
MIT

Select patents

922
Pledgor
Laboratory at
CalTech
New Jersey
Institute of
Technology
OVSI
RADVAC

UTAH LAW REVIEW
License

License
Category

Date

Rights Licensed

Custom

OCL
Compatible

22-Apr-20

Select patents

CERN
OHL (S)
v2.0
OCL-P
v1.1; CC
BY-4.0

OCL
Alternative

23-Apr-20

All patents

OCL
Standard;
OCL
Compatible
OCL
Alternative

21-Aug-20

All patents; All
copyright

20-Apr-20

OCL
Standard
OCL
Standard
OCL
Standard
OCL
Compatible
OCL
Alternative
OCL
Standard
OCL
Standard

6-Jun-20

Select U.S. patents;
available to U.S.
persons only; expires
June 30, 2021
All patents

21-May-20

All patents

30-Apr-20

Select patents

9-Apr-20

24-Apr-20

No patents, copyright
license only
No patents, copyright
license only
All patents

31-Mar-20

All patents

Sandia National
Laboratories

Custom

SAP

OCL-P
v1.1
OCL-P
v1.1
OCL-PC
v1.0
CC BY
4.0
CC BYSA 4.0
OCL-P
v1.1
OCL-PC
v1.0

Seagate
Technology plc
SiFive
Skopos Labs
Tom Bihn, Inc.
Uber
Unified Patents,
LLC

[NO. 4

1-Sep-20
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APPENDIX C—OCP SUPPORTERS
OCP SUPPORTERS
Creative Commons
Universities Allied for Essential Medicines
Mozilla
University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law, Center for Law and
Biomedical Sciences
Sage Bionetworks
Laboratorio de Ideas sobre Propiedad Intelectual
Stanford University Center for Compassion and Altruism Research and
Education
NEURO—Montreal Neurological Institute—Hospital
American University Washington College of Law Program on Information
Justice and Intellectual Property
The Center for Artistic Activism
CLAIMS Intellectual Property Lawyers
ENGINE - The Voice of Startups in Government
Open Knowledge Foundation
Greek Free Open-Source Society
University of Houston Law Center –Health Law & Policy Institute
National Information Standards Organization
MITO Technology
COMMUNIA - The European Thematic Network on the Digital Public Domain
Distributed Design Platform, Co-funded by the Creative Europe Programme of
the European Union
Global Alliance for Genomics & Health (GA4GH)
Open-Source Hardware Association (OSHWA)
Rightcare Alliance
Sagacious Global IP Research and Consulting Firm
Guardian Project
Northeastern Law Center for Law, Innovation and Creativity
Niskanen Center
OS/2 World
GEMSEKI
Prepr
BananaIP Counsels
Intellectual Property Institute (IPI)
LeapIP
International Generic and Biosimilar Medicines Association
Engineering World Health
Clairvolex
Young Moon
University of Ottawa Centre for Health Law, Policy and Ethics

924

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

Eifl Knowledge Without Boundaries
Legal Advantage LLC Intellectual Property & Legal Support
Centro Internacional en Docencia e Investigación Educativa (CIDIE)
Commonwealth Peoples Association of Uganda
Cognition IP
Knowledge Futures Group

